

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST Wednesday, May 11, 1960 D 13

# U. S. Has Two Secretaries of State

By Drew Pearson

The dispatch of the American "observation" plane over the heart of the Soviet Union shortly before the summit conference highlights a situation which has plagued U. S. foreign policy ever since the war.

It is the fact that we have two Secretaries of State.

One is the official Secretary of State, Christian Herter. The other is Allen Dulles, head of the Central Intelligence Agency. In many cases, Secretary of State Herter has little idea what the super-secret arm of the U. S. Government, Central Intelligence, is doing. More than once Central Intelligence has severely disrupted U. S. foreign relations.

Last week, State Department and Pentagon officials were telling the truth—as far as they knew it—when they put out that phony alibi about pilot Powers having oxygen trouble over Lake Van. This is what they were told by the CIA, and they seemed so convinced the story was true that a good many newsmen, including this writer, believed them.

This was how the United States, on the verge of one of the most important international conferences in recent

years, got caught, first spying, and then lying.

No country could have been put in a more humiliating position. And no country could have had its bargaining power at the Paris talks more neatly pulled out from under it.

Note — All Premier Khrushchev has to do, to make his propaganda sockeroo devastatingly complete, is to take pilot Francis Powers to Paris and personally hand him back to President Eisenhower with the gesture: "We don't want him. We won't punish him because he was merely carrying out capitalistic orders. You can have him. But don't let him come our way again."

And since Khrushchev is one of the most skilled propaganda artists in five continents, he may well do this.

## Man to Outer Space

What Central Intelligence was up to was to spy on what secret stunt the Russians were going to pull just before the summit conference. It will be recalled that Russian scientists hit the moon just before Khrushchev came to the United States, and it has long been rumored that they would launch a man into space just before the summit.

The chief Russian missile center is northeast of the Caspian directly on the course taken by pilot Powers on his ill-timed flight. His telescopic cameras were supposed to pick up any sign of Soviet

scientific activity which might surprise the world just before the summit.

In Washington, Central Intelligence is known as the hush-hush agency. It is also sacrosanct. Congress does not investigate it. Congress does not even try to get a breakdown on the use of its funds. Congressional appropriations committees are eagle-eyed with every penny spent for propaganda by the U. S. Information Agency, and Rep. John Rooney of Brooklyn has even cut back that agency because it hasn't employed certain Voice of America personnel from Brooklyn.

Not so with Central Intelligence. It can afford to pay pilot Powers \$2500 a month and not be answerable to Congress. It can also afford to invest in the two gold wrist-watches, seven ladies' rings, 500 rubles plus the gold French francs, which gave Khrushchev the opportunity of getting off that wisecrack about being wrapped in cellophane in the "cultured American way."

"Why," asked Khrushchev, "was all this necessary in the upper layers of the atmosphere? Maybe he was to have flown on to Mars (with those seven ladies' rings) to lead astray Martian ladies."

## Backstage With CIA

No CIA personnel can ever admit they work for the CIA. Even in Washington they are

anonymous . . . For some time Air Force planes used to make reconnaissance flights over Russia. But since the flight of military personnel over another country could be an act of war, this job was transferred to the CIA. When a plane flies over 50,000 feet, it's hard to spot. Powers' plane was flying at 65,000. But specially built cameras can take excellent photographs at this altitude. Experts who know how to read them can tell exactly what is going on 65,000 feet below . . . Modern spying long ago abandoned Mata Hari techniques. It now consists of long-range lenses, electronic listening devices, plus the poison needle—if you're caught. Powers had the needle but did not use it . . . Soviet planes have never been caught over the continental United States, but vapor trails have been picked up over Alaska, Iran and Canada. One reason Soviet planes don't try to spy on the United States is because every one of our bases is known, while very accurate aerial maps can be purchased from the U. S. Government. All the Soviet Embassy has to do is go down and buy them.

Copyright 1960, Bell Syndicate Inc.

TAB

WOL (WASHINGTON)  
MBS Radio Network:

9 May 1960

"SPY PLANE INCIDENT BURNING FURIOUSLY HERE"

Fulton Lewis Jr., at 7:00 P.M. over WOL (Washington) and the NBS Radio Network:

LEWIS: "The controversy over the shot-down reconnaissance plane, and the pilot and material evidence which the Russians captured, burned here furiously here tonight, with Congress up in arms generally, and charges from all sides that Mr. Allen Dulles' CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY is guilty of one of the stupidest blunders in contemporary world politics. Mr. Dulles, together with Secretary of State Herter appeared before a special closed session of the Republican and Democratic leaders of the House and Senate at the Capitol this afternoon, and gave as much of a fill-in as possible, but admitted that there are many things they do not know, notably how the plane was downed--whether it came down in a crash landing or whether it actually was shot out of the skies at 72 thousand feet, which the Russians claim. They doubt it. There are so many built-in anachronisms to that challenge, that challenge that latter claim, as to make it totally unrealistic, and there are so many practical explanations which are plausible in the light of all the known facts that perhaps we might speculate a little along those lines, but we'll get around to that later if we have time.

"After the Congressional briefing was over, Secretary Herter took the bull by the horns and voluntarily admitted that the United States has conducted extensive aerial surveillance over and around Russia for years past, and intends to do so in the future. He said that under the National Security Act of 1947, President Eisenhower has issued directives calling for the gathering of intelligence information on possible surprise attacks by every means possible. Secretary Herter said the specific flights have not been subject to personal orders from the White House, or from Washington for that matter, but of necessity had to be ordered by authorities on the scene at the time, because the effectiveness of those flights depends on weather and photographic conditions. Thus the decision on this occasion was made by CIA authorities on the scene in Pakistan.

"Other light operations have been conducted out of northern Turkey, but this one seems to have been based from Pakistan. Mr. Herter told reporters that under the President's directives, programs have been developed and put into operations which have included extensive aerial surveillance by unarmed civilian aircraft normally around the edges of the enemy territory, but on occasions in the form of deep penetrations as was true in this case. Mr. Herter said the world has lived in a state of apprehension with respect to Soviet intentions. The Soviet leaders have almost complete access to the open societies of the free world, and supplement this with vast espionage networks. However they keep their own society tightly closed, and rigorously controlled. With the development of modern weapons carrying tremendously destructive nuclear warheads, the threat of surprise attack and aggression presents a constant danger.

"This menace is enhanced by the threats of mass destruction frequently voiced by the Soviet leadership. He then recalled that Russia rejected President Eisenhower's so-called open skies proposal of 1955, and later rejected his proposals for exchanging of ground observers, abolition of travel restrictions, and controlled disarmament. 'I will say frankly,' the Secretary said, 'that it

is unacceptable that the Soviet political system should be given an opportunity to make secret preparations to face the free world with a choice of abject surrender or nuclear destruction.' On the score of whether or not the espionage operation should have been conducted, Mr. Dulles and Secretary Herter seemed to have almost unanimous backing of the Congress and the general latitude is that if they had not been conducting these operations, they have been grossly derelict in their duty. So there is no basic criticism of the principle of these attempted flights, of attempting these flights, to get as much information as possible, and indeed there is considerable evidence to the effect that the U-2 plane with extremely high altitude possibilities and great speed, has been developed especially with this view in mind. It was the timing which aroused the criticism--a selection of a date this close to the summit Paris conference, and the fact that the pilot let all of the material evidence fall into the hands of the Russians intact.

"As one Senator put it, he violated the 11th commandment, thou shalt not get caught. One possible explanation of this flight is the fact that it was made on May Day, the traditional day of great celebration on the part of the Russians, and the CIA authorities in command in Pakistan may have figured that that on that occasion of all others, the Russians would have their guard down, as to Japanese chose Pearl Harbor in the early Sunday hours to strike us. Reconstructing the plausible possibilities, it may well be that the Russian intelligence agents may have tipped them off that this flight was coming. They may have infiltrated the non-American personnel at the base of operations because some of the Pakistanis must have been in on the secret of these various missions, since they were taking off from their territory. That gets us back once again to the question of what happened, and Mr. Dulles and Mr. Herter told the members of Congress today that they are not even sure that the plane was shot down at all. It may have crash landed.

"Experienced government aircraft men have been brought in on this particular angle, and viewing the pile of rubbish and pieces of fuselage and wing which are contained in the picture which the Russians have released. They are unanimous in the opinion that this plane could not have possibly been shot out of the skies by a missile at 72 thousand feet, as the Russians claim, because it would have been scattered over hundreds of square miles of area. The fact that this much of it was together in one place indicates, they say, that it either was shot down at very low range, or that it crashed after the pilot bailed out and came down by parachute. That leaves the question why didn't the pilot use his demolition equipment which would have destroyed the cameras, the evidence, the plane, and everything else that might be of value to the Russians, and to this there is no answer. Perhaps he became flustered and forgot to trigger the blast--the demolition blast--only he can give the answer to that one, and he is in the hands of the Russky's.

"Reviewing all of the evidence at hand, and considering all the possibilities, remembering the fact that he radioed his home base, that he was having trouble with his oxygen supply, he may have been forced down from the high altitude because of that oxygen shortage and finally when he was down in low altitude range, able to breathe, he found himself in the range of the Russian ground crew, who may in fact have winged his plane, in which event he bailed out and parachuted to safety. Because the plane was reasonably intact the Russians were able to pick up the camera and the film and the rest of the evidence. If the Russians



did have that intelligence information from the home base, they would have had full book on him and he may have figured that there was no use holding out any further, he might as well admit his identity..There has been some speculation that the pilot may have been a double agent, that is to say he may have been in the service of the Russians at the same time he was pretending to operate for us, but that is pretty much brushed aside because of his past record, as was reported today as being very excellent. I'll have more news for you now, in just half a minute.

\* \* \* \* \*

"British reaction to all this centers around the idea that the great crime is that it may create such an atmosphere at the summit conference that all chance of accomplishing any tangible understandings will be out of the window. That is typically British in this whole summit picture, and thoroughly naive so far as the rest of the Big Four are concerned, because they and we have long since written off any realistic expectations that the summit is going to accomplish anything anyway. The essential consideration here is not that we have lost any opportunity for any accomplishment, because there never was any such opportunity, but that we have placed in Khrushchev's hand on the eve of the big sounding board opportunity for him a powerful big propaganda weapon that makes us look ridiculous, and ridiculous we do look. If our speculation about what may have happened is correct, and the plane was shot down at low altitude after been forced down from above by the oxygen shortage, Khrushchev can still say truthfully that his missile did shoot the plane down and to the world it sounds as if he has a missile that can be effective at 72 thousand feet--a powerful propaganda implement.

"For your information no knowledgeable person here believes that. They are convinced that this plane could not have been shot down at high altitude, and they point out that the pilot even if he had been able to eject himself at such altitude, could not have survived. It just doesn't add up in terms of practical reality. Politically this is going to be a severe blow to Mr. Allen Dulles, whose CIA has never been in very good standing with the Congress anyway--he had a bad time before the special briefing group this afternoon, and so muttered to Secretary Herter as he was leaving. Reporters heard him say, 'That was a tough one.'

One result of the incident almost certainly will be the setting up of some special committee of some sort to oversee the activities and operations of the CIA from here on, and to make a basic surveillance of its system of operation. That probably is where the difficulty lies, and it can be analyzed by comparison with the methods used by the CIA and those used by the FBI. In the latter case, the system is one of careful brick-by-brick ground work, and in the case of the CIA, the system is based on cocktail party gossip and social informers, and TV-type foreign intrigue. The trouble is it works two ways, you are never sure of what you are getting in the first place, and you are never sure of how much you are giving. And because the system has fallen down for still another time, Mr. Allen Dulles' job may well be in serious jeopardy. A lot of people in a lot of high places have had the hatchet out for him for a long time anyway.

"

"The Un-American Activities Committee gets credit for an assist in this ball game by way of bringing home the fact that espionage is not the private sport of the United States alone. They took the occasion to release heretofore secret testimony from Frantisek Tisler, former Military and Air Attache at the communist Czechoslovakian Embassy here, who defected last summer and spilled to the FBI how he used his office staff at the Embassy to operate a clandestine anti-American intelligence ring. He says he used funds of the Czech government to help an American communist of Czech origin who was on trial in Cleveland Ohio for violation of the Smith Act. I'll have more news for you now in just one minute."

# Spy-Plane: Doubt Rocket Claim

CAPITAL REPORT: FULTON LEWIS JR.

WASHINGTON, May 13. — Informed sources view with great skepticism the Soviet claims that a "remarkable new rocket" was used to down the American U-2 intelligence plane shot down over Russian territory.

There are, in the words of Congressman Craig Hosmer, "holes" and contradictions in the Russian story, as released by the official news agency, Tass. They include the following Red claims:

1.—The Soviet rocket was fired "on the direct orders" of Premier Nikita Khrushchev. American experts doubt that Khrushchev ever gave the word to Marshal Andrei Grechko, reportedly the head of the Soviet rocket forces, to shoot down the plane. Red pilots have downed other American planes, without warning.

2.—The Red rocket hit the U. S. plane on "the first shot," with the American pilot then parachuting to earth. Any plane, hit by a ground-to-air missile, would be immediately destroyed and would be no hope for the pilot.

3.—The Soviets retrieved pictures of missile sites and other installations taken by the American pilot. The American plane, supposedly destroyed by a Soviet rocket, would not drift to earth with those secrets; an American pilot, bailing out over enemy territory, would carry them.

Note: The only Soviet ground-to-air missile

known to intelligence sources is the T-6, a primitive weapon, based on the Russian U. S. model.

AMERICAN anti-aircraft weapons date back to 1954 when the Nike Ajax became operational. Considerably more than 100 Nike sites circle ninety major cities and defense sites today, and the missile's effectiveness has been proved time and again.

Another key surface-to-air missile is the Hawk, used in conjunction with the Nike. This missile is designed for low-flying supersonic aircraft.

Advanced Nike systems include the Nike-Hercules, heavier and superior to its predecessor in range and destructive power. The Hercules can reach 100,000 feet, times the speed of sound, and has a ceiling of 80,000 feet.

Under development, the Nike-X is the world's first anti-aircraft missile with a nuclear warhead, like the one being tested in New Mexico. Other Nike missiles are Army

as the Bomarc, and the Nike-Zeug, the first Air Defense Missile. The Nike-Zeug was developed two years ago. Other Nike missiles are the Tartar and the Terrier. The Terrier is a surface-to-air missile, fired from ships. With a ceiling of 75,000 feet and a range of 70 miles it is equal to any aircraft in the world.

TAB

P

WTOP (Washington) and  
the CBS Radio Network

MAY 8, 1960

GOVERNMENT REAPS CONSEQUENCES OF SPY CASE

Howard K. Smith at 12:15 P.M. over WTOP (Washington) and  
the CBS Radio Network:

BLAIR CLARK (substituting for Howard K. Smith): "The first rule of espionage is not to get caught. Having sensationally broken that rule in the case of pilot Powers and the photo reconnaissance of the Soviet Union, the United States government has begun to reap the consequences. They are all, without exception, bad. Let us leave to the moralist the question whether it is right for us to engage in spying. Let us accept the premise of yesterday's somewhat shame-faced admission by the State Department that Khrushchev was right when he told the Supreme Soviet that he had knocked an American spy out of the Russian air space. That premise is that the Russians are constantly spying on us. The conclusion from it is that it is all right for us to spy on them .

"This State Department statement laboriously worked out in consultation with the White House during more than ten hours yesterday is a remarkable document. It shows the strain of compromise--the compromise that seems to have been negotiated between those government bureaus that wanted to go on denying everything, and those that thought that under the circumstances with what Khrushchev obviously had on us in the way of evidence, we simply had to admit at least part of the truth. What is remarkable about the statement is the combination of the admission and the justification for it. We are saying, in effect, that we probably did fly an intelligence mission over the Soviet Union. There is a curious phrase that insofar as the authorities are concerned the flight Khrushchev bleakly accuses us of was not authorized--what authority? But we go on to justify our probably action by saying that everyone does the same sort of thing, especially the Russians.

"The State Department's labored explanation edns up with an attempt to link this flight--which probably happened--to the President's open skies proposal at the summit conference of 1955, the proposal which even then the Russians promptly dismissed as spying. This is not one of the most lucid and convincing documents to emerge from our State Department. Its obscurities and tortured reasoning arise from the fact that we are in an extremely embarrassing position before the world. The Communists notoriously do not suffer from this kind of embarrassment, when they are caught spying, as we have several times caught them since 1945. This is part of the anti-imperialist game for them, and all in a day's work.

"But for us it's a different story. Democracies have nasty scruples about the cloak and the dagger during a period we call peacetime. We are apt to parade our scruples before the world with a great show of virtuousness. This is going to be a little more difficult from now on.

"There are many mysteries about this whole affair. One, is why we seemed at first to claim that pilot Powers had reported oxygen trouble on an innocent weather mission, and then perhaps blacked out and been unable to turn back from the Soviet border. Perhaps the explanation of that is that we did not then know how much the wily Mr. Khrushchev knew about the whole business. In other words, we thought we could get away with it. Another mystery is, for what agency of our government was pilot Powers making his probably mission? Khrushchev told the Supreme Soviet yesterday that Powers

told his captors that he was working for our CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. So far we have only the Premier's word to go on, but it seems probably that he is right. The CIA has lately taken to dropping the cloak and the dagger for the lecture platform, from Director Allen Dulles on down through the thick ranks of our intelligence operatives.

"And yesterday the CIA's inspector general, Mr. Lyman Kirkpatrick, told a news conference in California that the United States intelligence network inside the Soviet Union was far more effective than the Russians believed it to be. Kirkpatrick added, as if he were a sales manager discussing a weakness in his selling organization, that our intelligence sources in Russia are still not as effective as we would like them to be. Truly extraordinary frankness from one of our leading intelligence bureaucrats. Perhaps the solution would be for Mr. Kirkpatrick to go over to Russia, and hold an inspection of his operatives, lined up in Red Square.

"One remarkable and revealing picture of this American intelligence fiasco is the great good nature with which Khrushchev and his colleagues are taking it. They're smacking their lips over it. They can hardly restrain their laughter. Khrushchev was just bubbling over with humor and jokes as he held up photographs of Russian cities he said that had been taken from the downed American plane. He gaged that the gold wrist watches and bracelets that pilot Powers held with him might be to help him with the ladies of the planet Mars, where he might have been heading. The serious side of this of course, is that it pulls into question our good faith about the summit, and worried diplomats in capitals friendly to us are already pointing this out.

"One shudders to think of Mr. Khrushchev's first jocose remarks to President Eisenhower when he meets him in Paris at the summit, supposedly a week from tomorrow. The reason the Russians are so obviously pleased with the incident is that it gives them at the very best propaganda advantage over us. We are convicted of spying on the Russians just a few days before we sit down with them at the summit to try again to work out an accommodation with them on some of the issues that separate East and West. Even before this fantastic incident of the American reconnaissance plane, the prospects for the summit meeting were far from brilliant. At least they did not shine, if you define the success of the summit as the removal of obstacles to international understanding.

"On the Russian side, there was stubbornly repeated intransigence on all the issues that could possibly be negotiated. But the Soviet preparations for the summit included much repetition of the hope that the West be persuaded to accept the sweet reasonableness of the communist position. So they were going to Paris with the loudly declared aim of finding an accommodation with the West.

"On our side, there were no such spoken hopes. In fact as the date approached, the chorus of pessimism grew louder in the Western camp. The President himself was openly skeptical of any positive results from the meeting. He was going, he made clear, because there was no valid excuse for not going, and because the world seemed to expect it of him. He set a limit to his participation of about six days, after which Vice President Nixon would sit in for him while he went home to tend to Congress. This six-day limit was promptly knocked on the head from two quarters, by Khrushchev and by his crude joke that sending Mr. Nixon to the summit would be like sending a goat to guard the cabbages, and by some tactless Democratic Congressmen who pointed out that this was not Constitutionally speaking, a very good excuse for the President, and he promised anyway not to behave in such a way as to require the interruption of fruitful negotiations by the President.

"Secretary of State Herter was not much more sanguine about the summit than the President, though his tone was slightly more muted. And at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's spring meeting in Turkey last week, the communique writers coined the extraordinary and hardly optimistic saying, 'They talk like peace is indivisible,' in other words, as the communique explained, the communists get away with easing up their pressure in one part of the world, while they step up their pressure and their propaganda somewhere else."

TAB



WTOP (Washington) and  
CBS Network

9 May 1960

Background to the News at 7:00 P.M. over WTOP (Washington) and the CBS Network:

BLAIR CLARK: "A major part of the Communist myth about non-Communist societies is the notion of ruling circles. By this phrase the Communists mean that democracy is just a sham, that the people really have nothing to say about it, and that sinister forces like Wall Street and the military really control our policy. In the light of the present fiasco of intelligence, which is what the American reconnaissance plane shot down over Russia is -- we might as well admit that this Communist myth about ruling circles has been powerfully reinforced, despite Mr. Herter's statement today that the President was generally aware of it. Khrushchev, we may be sure, was having just the first of many goads (?) at this refurbished propaganda scene when in his first speech on this to the Supreme Soviet last week he blamed the bloodthirsty American generals for the incident and made the fantastic comparison with Franco and his dissident Spanish generals about to take over the Spanish republic by force in 1936.

"A number of morally fascinating things have already been said about this affair by some of our leaders. There's an important group that thinks we should not have admitted, that we should have gone on lying about it. As Senator Styles Bridges put it, it was unfortunate that we acknowledged responsibility for the plane. Well, we tried lying, or let's call it equivocation-- it's more polite -- but unfortunately Khrushchev had the goods on us and after the National Space Agency's interesting speculation at first that the pilot of a weather reconnaissance plane had blacked out from oxygen shortage and just drifted over the Soviet borders, Khrushchev pulled up short on the line he had been playing us on, and revealed to the world that he had us thoroughly hooked.

"Khrushchev has said, and our government has not denied, that the fateful flight of pilot Powers was made for the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, that vast hush-hush intelligence arm of our government, whose annual budget has been estimated by Senator Mansfield as perhaps as much as a billion dollars a year.

"No one knows, or at least no one says much about the CIA, despite the best efforts of some important congressmen to find out. The CIA operates in a rather slush vacuum of its own creation. That may indeed be necessary for an agency whose mission is intelligence. But its special staff is exempt from all the usual controls and checks of our governmental system, which has worried Senator Mansfield and other congressmen.

"In Congress, the CIA has been accused of doing its job badly, of failing to know about Russian missile advances, about the coming Hungarian revolt in 1956, about the hostile reception awaiting Mr. Nixon in South America, and so on. The point is, no one knows how the CIA is doing its job, not even the most responsible congressional committees.

"In 1956 a major effort was made to place the CIA under the eye of a joint congressional watchdog committee, like the one that watches over the Atomic Energy Commission. The administration (opposed this?) and it was defeated. Today Senator Mansfield renewed his plea for some congressional check on the CIA, and this time the chances of success are much greater.

"And President Eisenhower, who, Khrushchev politely insists, must have been ignorant of these reconnaissance missions, will certainly more than make it quite clear that he is in control of the U.S. ruling circles."

NEW YORK

MAY 1957

**On the Line:**

# Blunder Hurts U.S. Prestige

By **BOB CONSIDINE**

CHARLESTON, W. Va.: It's hard to concentrate on the mud-slinging Kennedy-Humphrey primary fight here when there's another contest at hand involving our nation's stature in the eyes of the world. The latter shrinks the former to peanut scale.

X-number of West Virginians, many of them out of work and hopeful that some good may come of all the attention that has been beckoned to the State's plight, will cast their ballots today for a host of local office-seekers coveting jobs ranging from dog-catcher on down to governor. In the course of what is for some of them a much more important adventure in suffrage than one involving national office, they will state—almost as an afterthought—what they think of two dunder-bosses named Kennedy and Humphrey.

This afterthought means more to Kennedy than Humphrey. Kennedy has repeatedly stated that what happens here will make or break his pitch for the Presidential nomination, if not for the Presidency itself. If the nomination is achieved, Humphrey takes a brighter view. If he loses here he'll push on to the national primary, like Tommy Reed in his fruitless American invasion.

But all of a sudden, it hardly matters which of these two liberal Democrats wins or loses. It reminds me of a World Series we had in Milwaukee in 1957 and all of us were gabbing about and the papers were full of how the Braves were going to fare against the Yankees when without warning the sound of bat hitting ball was interrupted by the chilling note of "Bleep . . . Bleep . . . Bleep"—from space. The Russians had gotten there first; they had whipped us.

"I honestly don't see why Sputnik is very important," an earnest baseball writer said to me. I've often wondered how he felt since then. He has the com-

**CONSIDINE**

fort of knowing that some of our top people in Washington, including the late John Foster Dulles, experienced the same idiotic indifference. It must be frigid comfort.

Now, when here in West Virginia nothing else mattered except the primary and election, we have the case of the spying U-2. Great nations have been spying on one another since the birth of confederations of people.

The tragedy of the discovery and shooting down of the high-flying jet piloted by Francis Powers, basically, is the shocking stupidity of that branch of government which ordered such a voyage. The Summit and the Presidential trip to Russia, Japan and Korea are coming up. However, somebody took a chance on losing up the whole deal as well as smearing egg on our "face" by sending a plane across the heartland of the USSR to get what must have been just one more infra-red shot of that land.

It was shot down but also, shot down with the U-2 was our reputation for fair play, integrity, rise-above-the-sneaky-prying-scum appellation through the world, even in the Communist countries. That's infinitely more important.

Somebody, or some agency, has fouled the great chance the President of the United States had of leading the Western Powers to a durable peace at the Summit. The Western Powers had never been more united since World War II. Now Britain and France wonder aloud how we could have goofed at a moment when for the first time we could present a real solid front against Khrushchev.

Somebody pulled the rug from under Ike just as he was about to embark on his last meeting with the leader of the opposition, and, in June, his valedictory, not only to the peoples of the Soviet Union but to the peoples of the world.

In a quarter of a century of reporting, this is the first time I've ever felt my country really blew one.

(Hearst Headline Service)

WRC (Washington)  
NBC Network:

8 May 1960

COMMENTARY BY CONSIDINE

Bob Considine at 6:15 P.M. over WRC (Washington) and the NBC Network:

"I wonder if there's ever been a time in our history when we looked worse in the eyes of the world than we do today? On the eve of a summit meeting to which millions of human beings were looking with high hopes and with Western solidarity stronger than at any time since World War II, we send a plane over the Soviet Union to spy on its military and its atomic installations. And they shoot it down, as they should have.

"One short month before President Eisenhower is scheduled to fly to the Soviet Union, and show countless millions and millions of Russians his friendly face and open-handed manner, we pull the rug from under him with a crude and clumsy bit of espionage. Our State Department puts out a shamelessly false announcement at first, suggesting that the pilot of the spy plane was on a scientific flight of some sort, had trouble with his oxygen, probably lost consciousness, and may have accidentally strayed over the Soviet border.

"Absolute bunk, that statement, and we've since shamefacedly admitted it. It was put out, I believe, on the assumption that the pilot of the spying craft, Francis Powers, either went down with his plane or committed suicide to avoid capture. Then Khrushchev announced that the plane was shot down not near the frontier but deep in the heartland of the USSR, near (Smerdlov?) actually, which was closed city until a year ago, and near where Vice President Nixon last summer was shown a huge atomic power plant in the construction stage and a number of heavy industrial complexes.

"The pilot Powers was talking obviously. Khrushchev selected propaganda nuggets from those admissions of this pilot. His salary, \$2500 a month. His instructions, to take infra-red pictures from his U-2 jet as it shistled high over the countryside en route to an American base in Norway, and other details. In all probability, Powers told him a lot more and Khrushchev will reveal those admissions when they are best calculated further to hurt us in the eyes of the world.

"In a stricken and almost humiliating statement, the State Department said yes, the plane was engaged in spying, and that this sort of thing has been going on for four years, as if that condoned this particular flight that goofed.

"There was some odd language in the State Department announcement. One sentence read, it appears that in endeavoring to obtain information now concealed behind the Iron Curtain, a flight over Soviet Territory was probably undertaken by an unarmed civilian U-2 plane, unquote. Probably was taken? In one and the same statement, we say the plane was ours, that it was on a spying mission and then as an afterthought, we say 'probably.' For some reason yet to be explained, the announcement also said that the flight was not authorized by Washington authorities. Well, who did authorize it? The people have a right to know. If Washington authorities didn't give Powers the go-ahead sign, who else could have given him that signal?

"Khrushchev says it was Allen Dulles' CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, and one must presume that he obtained that information from the pilot himself. Isn't Dulles a Washington authority? Are we going to have to eat crow on that statement too?

"As long as we're coming clean before the world and confirming the serious charges made by Khrushchev, I think we should have added something like this: quote, 'All right, chums, you caught us cheating on that one, but the only reason we do anything like that is because we can't join us in any pact which permits

MAY 9, 1960

WTOP-TV (Washington)  
and CBS-TV Network

ESPIONAGE IS UNIVERSAL

Douglas Edwards, at 6:45 P.M. over WTOP-TV (Washington) and CBS-TV  
Networks

DOUGLAS EDWARDS WAS SEEN ON THE TELEVISION SCREEN, IN A STUDIO SETTING.

EDWARDS: "From CBS News, Washington correspondent Howard K. Smith now, a look at the possible consequences and duration of the spy case:"

MR. SMITH WAS SEEN ON THE TV SCREEN, AS HE HAVE HIS REPORT.

SMITH: "After a weekend of aimless commotion, a soberer view of the spy in the sky incident appears to be spreading here, helped on by Secretary of State Herter's statement of today. It is that the whole affair may turn out to be a mere two-weeks wonder, a fascinating spy drama, but one of little lasting political consequence. The basic fact is that it is common knowledge that espionage is going on everywhere, carried on by all nations.

"If Mr. Khrushchev would like to bring this up at the summit conference, our dossier of his country's actions is likely to prove much thicker and darker than any he has of ours. In view of this, most of the criticism directed at the United States in the past two days for this affair may prove to lack durable substance. Allied diplomats complaining to the State Department about the action remind one a little of teenagers who feel obliged to feign surprise at father's explanation of the real role of the stork in human life. And politicians here who say it was all right to do it, except that the timing just before the summit conference was bad, are neglecting history. It was while the Japanese were in conference with us, that they mounted a sneak attack that sank most of the U.S. Pacific fleet.

"Not that America expects Russia to do that now, but the prudent nation tries to keep tab on a suspect adversary all the time, conference or not. Far from angering Khrushchev, photographs of the Soviet leader recently suggest he has not been so delighted since he visited the Garst farm in Iowa last fall. And far from weakening the President's hand at the summit meeting, the incident may strengthen his argument for diminishing the need for espionage.

"Meanwhile the assessment of the incident is being quoted with increasing approval here, as that of Senator Lyndon Johnson, who said 'We do not know just how far Premier Khrushchev intends to push his saber-rattling, but we do know how far the American people intend to go to preserve their freedoms, and that is right to the limit.' Now back to Douglas Edwards in New York."

TAB

impartial inspection of the war-making capabilities of the two great powers. You've got your communist operatives and spies in every free country in the world. We've caught a number of them in the United States redhanded. Put two of them to death actually, the Rosenbergs. We're giving you a little taste of your own medicine, unquote.

"But we did not say that. Maybe it didn't occur to the so-called Washington authorities, just as it didn't occur to them to tell the President of the United States that such a flight was being planned.

"The image of America that the world knew, honest and aboveboard, and aloof of the cloak and dagger propensities of the dictator states, has been rudely jarred by this case. The President goes on the air later this week to explain and I hope he can. Our reputation as the best-informed people on earth about what our government is up to is up for reappraisal. The summit meeting will surely be held on schedule. The President just cannot afford to back out at this time, as Senator Goldwater has suggested.

"For all his apparent apoplexy over this case--he's secretly pleased of course--Khrushchev wants that summit meeting more than ever. He will carry into it the ammunition of still undisclosed revelations made by the pilot of the Spy plane, and drop those hot potatoes in Ike's lap whenever he see fit. The President of the United States must now do his summit bargaining from a defensive position, not from a posture of righteous strength. Mr. Eisenhower has cast a shadow of doubt on whether he'll now undertake his mission to Moscow next month. It was to have been the crowning achievement in his highly effective person-to-person style of diplomacy, the last great peace campaign. It was to have included an appearance on Soviet television and radio, and I dare say he has already done some work on the message he wanted to leave with the Soviet Union's 210 million people. It's a damn shame."

**DORIS FLEESON**

## **Scapegoat Politics in Espionage**

### **U. S. Conduct of Various Aspects Of Spy Plane Boner Is Criticized**

They closed the door and hung a blanket over it so that the waiting reporters could not hear the Congressional critics battling with Secretary of State Herter and Allen Dulles, head of the Central Intelligence Agency. But everybody knew that the real culprit, the President of the United States, under whose leadership this country has been shown to lie, was not there.

One central question exists in this somber capital as this new American tragedy unfolds. Is there a moral necessity to close ranks behind the President in a matter of this kind? Can truth or a lie be bi-partisan.

Washington is not shocked by espionage; its sense of outrage over the United States-Soviet spy plane incident is directed at its timing and self-evident mismanagement. Its humiliation arises from the manner in which the story developed, with presidential ignorance inflated to a pious virtue and fairy tales about bad weather and oxygen trouble fed to the public.

The crashing climax came

with the decision made by Secretary Herter to tell the truth, not because it is the truth, but because we were caught redhanded. Already the administration is rationalizing about that, too.

Official spokesmen impart the word that it is worth all it costs morally because otherwise resulting tensions might wreck the summit conference. Also, they say, it will help the President beat the drums at the summit meeting about the evils of secrecy which forces the free world to spy on others.

That this country should seriously be contemplating moral lectures at Paris next week is perhaps not more incredible than the events of the past week but it strikes some kind of new high—or low.

But there is something even less attractive stirring in the chill breeze whose source seems to be the Pentagon. It is the suggestion that the fault lies with the pilot of the downed plane, Francis G. Powers, because he did not commit suicide when

caught. It is pointed out that Soviet Premier Khrushchev's description of Powers' kit included mention of a hypodermic needle.

It is possible that Powers' orders told him to do exactly that; if so, it is not admitted here. It is a harsh verdict that for want of a needle in one young man's hand, the country's moral position has been lost. If it is believed by the country's leaders to be true, it is not too much to ask that they not use it slyly as self-serving propaganda but proclaim it as truth.

Scapegoat politics on the domestic scene is not new. The attempt to practice it on the international scale in such a manner is fortunately more rare and the American people need to join with their politicians in asking whether the leader of the free world can build a foreign policy on it which will insure survival.

The recent past has offered little encouragement to those who raise such hard and fundamental questions about what goes on here. Yet the American people may be ahead of their elected spokesmen—they often are.

**DORIS FLEESON**

## Burned Fingers for U. S. Officials

### List of Public Servants Harmed By Spy Case Gets Longer

Senate Democratic Leader Johnson, Senate Republican Leader Dirksen and Vice President Nixon have now publicly agreed to quell the possibly dangerous heresy that politicians are liable for the consequences of their own acts. Having sufficiently admired each other for their self-abnegation, they shook hands and wound up the proceedings with plaudits for J. Edgar Hoover.

In spite of this demonstration of the club spirit in the Senate, the unfolding of the Soviet spy plane story continues to show an impressive list of American public servants who have been harmed in the exercise of their important duties.

With rare asperity, the press is asking President Eisenhower to clear up the question of where responsibility lies for authorizing the Powers flight deep into Soviet territory with a reconnaissance plane. Little attempt is being made to minimize the national humiliation over the way the story is developing.

Even if they were successful at home, the Eisenhower explanations are not being well received abroad as the

fateful summit meeting approaches. The Soviet Union is using its advantage skillfully and seems to be getting results.

Upon the Secretary of State, Mr. Herter, devolves the unhappy duty of answering the allied ambassadors who are knocking at his door. So much of what he must explain is purely defensive, he gets little chance to expand his justified offensive against the Soviet Union on the relatively simple matter of espionage.

Then there is the Secretary's special assistant, Charles (Chip) Bohlen, who will accompany him to the summit next week and thereafter accompany the President to Russia as official interpreter. It fell to him in the first shock of the news to explain it all away at a background briefing of reporters.

As usual it was a polished performance, including some earnest speculation about Mr. Khrushchev's motives. It had only one flaw—the explanations given to Mr. Bohlen to deliver weren't true and had later to be retracted.

Reporters who covered the Khrushchev visit are shud-

dering over what may happen if Mr. Khrushchev decides to turn his mordant humor loose on Mr. Bohlen at critical moments. With very much less ammunition, the Russian spokesman reduced U. N. Ambassador Lodge to the role of straight man during their travels here.

The part assigned to the National Aeronautics and Space Agency shouldn't happen to Fala or Checkers. This luckless outfit was singled out by White House Press Secretary Hagerty to give the original explanation of the incident.

Acting in good faith on what information it was able to get, NASA said the plane was one of its U-2s which was missing after taking off on a weather reconnaissance. This is the report which Mr. Herter later repudiated. Now NASA is wondering how, after apparently having been tagged as doing some spying on the side, it can do its job of persuading all nations to join in peaceful space projects.

Pilot Powers' employer, the Central Intelligence Agency, is a little luckier. It is being allowed to explain behind a blanket curtain the enthralling narratives for which Mr. Khrushchev is enjoying such a large public



TAB



# Sky Blunder

MAX LERNER

Jerusalem.

Just as the American plane over Russia plummeted from the skies under Russian rocket fire, so with it American prestige plummeted and reached a new low. Who can doubt that Khrushchev, ever a wily and rough infighter, has won a substantial propaganda and psychological advantage the world over as the summit nears? None except the naive were surprised at this new kind of sky espionage which is inherent in the missile age.

What is surprising is the magnitude of the blunder in risking such flights weeks before the summit opens. If this was an Air Force decision it was curiously obtuse as well as irresponsible.

Khrushchev squeezed additional propaganda value out of suggesting that such a Pentagon power of decision can endanger peace. After the first fumbling and faking statements, the candor of the State Dept. admission took courage and wisdom.

It is good to say honestly that the massive Russian missile buildup carries the threat of surprise attack and that it will remain until an open sky or other inspection plan can be devised for this high altitude by both sides.

\* \* \*

Khrushchev has seized his advantage with his usual cynical skill. It is not yet clear how he will play it. He has two ways open. If he no longer wants a summit agreement he may use this opportunity of putting the burden of blame for the breakdown upon America.

In that case President Eisenhower's dimly veiled threat of canceling his Russian visit ("If I go to Russia") will become a reality and the world will witness the onset of an unrelieved nuclear weapons race with only one sequel.

If Khrushchev still does not want a summit agreement, then by putting America on the defensive he may hope to extort some concessions from the West.

But Khrushchev must know, despite his belligerent Bakst statement about Berlin, that there will have to be concessions on both sides. He has a "Russia First" group to beckon with inside his country. He must also reckon with the Chinese champions of revolution unlimited who attacked him in their Lenin anniversary manifesto and taunt him for softness toward the West.

His series of outbursts against America may thus be calculated to offset these Chinese needlings and make a Paris agreement, if it comes, more palatable to the Communist world.

\* \* \*

These are all conjectures and it is part of Khrushchev's plan to become the center of conjectures and place himself in the big spotlight on the world stage.

By catching the Pentagon with its moral defenses down he is in a position to boast arrogantly of round-the-clock Russian rocket power to destroy America's allies while also pretending to be a prince of peace.

There are many unwary people, especially among the panicky self-pitying anti-nuclear British "marchers," who will fail to see the contradiction in this double Khrushchev role as destroyer and preserver of world peace.

There is another advantage Khrushchev will reap—that of again straining the Western alliance. One can imagine Macmillan's despair at this sky blunder of the Americans which makes his cherished summit strategy more difficult. One can also imagine de Gaulle's contemptuous scorn of a leadership which cannot take a decision and hold to it.

\* \* \*

Yet, having said this in criticism of the American sky blunder, I must add that Khrushchev may again prove to have overreached himself. The trouble with clever people is that while they crow with delight over the discomfiture of their victims they often become themselves the victims of their own cleverness.

Khrushchev may hope to get a partial disarmament agreement without adequate inspection safeguards. Yet his chances are dim. All his vaunted rocketry will not protect Russia from destruction in a war which will probably destroy both sides.

This has been the logic of his whole elaborate campaign for a series of summits. His plans for the lifting of Russian living standards are based on that campaign.

His hope for a place in history is based on it. Dare he now scrap it out of anger against an encroaching plane or out of some tactical propaganda advantage?

\* \* \*

There remains the question posed by the conduct of the flier himself. If it is true that he could have chosen to destroy the plane and its equipment, the question arises why he did not. One must suspend judgment until all the facts are in.

Meanwhile, we may ask how complete the commitment is of some of these young Americans who fly such dangerous missions and what chance the free world has in the long struggle for peace ahead unless its young people devote as deep a belief as deep as the Russians.

TAB

# In The Nation

## The Enigmas in the Pilot Powers Case

By **ARTHUR KROCK**

WASHINGTON, May 7—Until and unless the pilot of the United States U-2 plane can give specific and credible answers to certain fundamental questions which were raised by his spying mission over Soviet Russia, and it débâcles, a final over-all judgment will not be reached by fair and sensible people, including critics at home and abroad who merit the description. There are too many unsolved mysteries remaining in the case to justify more than these corollary conclusions:

1. Whichever Government agency was responsible for the timing of this espionage activity, just before the summit conference, it should be exposed and punished. It either implies incompetence and/or irresponsibility in the use of discretionary authority. The agency has been given by the President. Or it implies an assumption of authority that merits severe punishment. For such an assumption not only would violate the laws and the Constitution. It also would in effect lodge the decision of peace or war in subordinate Government hands.

2. The United States, which in this instance was represented to the world by the Department of State, compounded the error of the timing of the U-2's flight by a combination of mistakes on which questions of its competence are fairly founded. These mistakes were: (a) to be trapped by Premier Khrushchev into making a false statement of the U-2 mission on the amateur conclusion that his first account was complete because he didn't say it wasn't; and (b) to dilute its belated and enforced admission of espionage with this sentence:

It has been established that, in so far as the authorities are concerned, there was no authorization for any such flight as described by Mr. Khrushchev.

The words "as described by Mr. Khrushchev" interposed a quibble into a text designed to demonstrate that the United States was making a clean breast of an espionage activity which had been detected by the Soviet Union. It was a quibble because it diverted the reader from the admission that the Premier's principal accusation was true by setting up and knocking down his headline propaganda that the U-2's

purpose was "aggressive provocation aimed at wrecking the summit conference." And this was absurd and untrue on its face.

4. The final corollary conclusions sufficiently supported by this record are that coordination of policy and act has not yet been attained by the National Security Council and the Operations Coordinating Board, even in connection with procedures

### Unsolved Mysteries

These are sound foundations for the criticism of the Administration by the people, and it is proper also for the Democrats to urge the transfer of Executive power to that party in 1960. But before an over-all judgment of the U-2 incident can intelligently be made, the following enigmas must be solved to which Premier Khrushchev has made no substantial contributions:

1. Did Pilot Powers descend to a level within the target range of the Russians as previously pretty well established? If so, was oxygen failure responsible? Or have the Russians acquired a higher altitude in their anti-aircraft gunnery?

2. Why didn't the pilot use his ejector seat to descend, in which case the plane's mechanism for self-destruction would have operated? How could the Russians have pictures of almost unwrecked sections of the plane, lying close together, unless the pilot before parachuting rode it down to an altitude which makes this photography even faintly conceivable? And, if he did that, was survival his only inducement?

3. Was the territory of Pakistan used for take-off without authorization, and the territory of Norway similarly marked for landing? If so, what was the United States source of this order, as well as of the mission and its timing?

Maybe there never will be satisfactory answers to these questions, or at least none available to this generation.

## In The Nation

### Has Mr. K. Heard of an Old English Proverb?

By ARTHUR KROCK

WASHINGTON, May 12—The deluge of "threats" and Pecksniffian pieties which Premier Khrushchev has been emitting ever since he caught the United States air-spying over Soviet territory is beginning to encourage the hope that once more the Kremlin can be relied on to lose a propaganda battle it has won. There is no English language proverb about shrimps that whistle. But Shakespeare coined the one about the engineer being hoist on his own petard. Mr. K. is now asking for this involuntary and aggravating experience.

Not that the Soviet Russian people will realize, when he hourly lift his hands in horror over spying as an American national policy, that he is the most pious of hypocrites. Not that they or the people of the Communist satellite states will realize that he is condemning in other nations a form of "cold war" activity which the Kremlin has practiced with unmatched ruthlessness. But among the hundreds of millions outside the Communist world hegemony who are the objectives of Kremlin propaganda a great many and all their leaders are fully aware of these things. Hence Premier Khrushchev, who entered this game with the better opening hand, may be overplaying it in a way that will show after the draw.

His off-the-cuff remarks about how could he ask the Russian people to welcome the visit of "a man like that," the President of the United States, who proclaims he regularly dispatches spies among them, already look cheap in parallel with the comment of General Eisenhower. Today the President told some members of Congress that, so far as he is concerned, the Premier's original invitation to Russia still stands; that it will be all right with him if Mr. Khrushchev wants to withdraw it; but that the Premier will have to tell him this face to face in Paris. Thus the President ignored a hint rudely relayed to him through reporters from a Moscow news conference.

The Americans are not the only people who demand that their representatives be treated with civility and respect by the representatives of other nations. National self-right-

eousness has been projected ad nauseam for years by their spokesmen in foreign policy, and its recent exposure as a pretense by false Government statements of the spy episode greatly disturbed them. But Premier Khrushchev has adopted the surest method of reunifying this people by taking the exact posture of the Pharisees who, "like unto whitened sepulchres, which indeed appear beautiful outward, \* \* \* are within full of dead men's bones. \* \* \*

#### Into the Same Trap

The record in which the Soviet rulers previously have snatched propaganda defeat from the jaws of propaganda victory also has entries like that just supplied in Switzerland. This is being caught spying during a full flood of verbose attacks on spying as a provocation of war by others that Russia would never, never think of committing.

The Administration, which in foreign affairs is the full symbol of the American Government, was on the defensive before the world and its own electors when Premier Khrushchev backed into the same trap. We have been air-spying over Russia for years, as essential to the primary objective of preventing a surprise attack by the Soviets on the United States, and at last we got caught. Then on high executive authority, on the amateurish assumption that Khrushchev had revealed all he knew of the episode, the honorable public servants who compose the National Aeronautics and Space Administration were misled into making a false explanation, and the Department of State deliberately issued another. Whereupon the triumphant Premier revealed details he had withheld that demonstrated the falsity of both statements.

The situation included incidental demonstration to the American people that espionage flights have become so much a matter of routine that Washington intelligence authorities permit them to continue without regard to their potential impact on such contrary policy gestures as the oncoming summit conference. And it was compounded for our allies by the State Department's retraction and "confession."

The set-up was perfect for the Soviet Premier. The one thing needed to damage it was for Mr. K. to pose his—of all governments!—as the symbol of self-righteousness that was the root cause of the embarrassment of the United States; and to embellish this caricature with figures of himself as international virtue and of the President as international sin.

# In The Nation

## The Democrats' Message to Eisenhower

By ARTHUR KROCK

WASHINGTON, May 18 — The Democratic leadership policy toward the international crisis produced by Premier Khrushchev's sabotage of the summit conference is implicit in the telegram sent to President Eisenhower yesterday by four principal party spokesmen, and in a speech made to the Senate today by Majority Leader Johnson.

This policy is to keep the nation united in the aftermath of the U-2 espionage episode, including the collapse of the summit conference, and to make certain the Soviet Premier realizes he cannot look to a Democratic Administration for concessions on matters of principle he could not force upon the current Republican Administration. The policy, furthermore, is to make sure Mr. Khrushchev fully understands that he cannot count on the Democratic leadership in Congress to make a partisan political issue of the astonishing series of recent Government stumblings in an operation area full of the explosives which could set off a nuclear war.

To understand the purposes of the telegram sent to President Eisenhower and signed by Speaker Rayburn, Senators Johnson and Fulbright, and Adlai E. Stevenson it is necessary first to know that it was sent yesterday before the summit conference had collapsed, not today after this had happened. The message was written and dispatched on information that there was to be another attempt to convoke the meeting with Mr. Khrushchev as a participant.

Noting that the Soviet Premier had mentioned "six or eight months" as a waiting period before a summit conference he would find any reason for attending, which, of course, meant after President Eisenhower's successor had been chosen, Senator Johnson drew two conclusions: one, that the Soviet Premier thought he could do more profitable business for his side with the Democrats in power; and, two, that it was in the paramount interest of the United States to inform him that assumption was unfounded.

In consultation with the other signers it was agreed that the President was the proper channel of views "to be conveyed" to the Premier (by any means the President might choose); also that this procedure furnished direct assurance to the President from responsible opposition leaders of their full support of him as the representative of the American Government and people. For a time today it was not made clear that the message was sent yesterday in the belief the summit conference might still convene. But when the timing became known, an impression died away that the Democratic leaders were suggesting the impossible, knowing it was, as a pretty hollow campaign gesture.

The same leadership attitude was inherent in a statement by Johnson to the Senate concerning means whereby Congress and the American people could learn the facts behind the U-2 episode. "We shall treat errors," he said, "as mistakes to be corrected, not as a leverage to separate our nation." There will be "a cool and objective assessment of whatever mistakes have been made," but "under conditions and circumstances \* \* \* to contribute to the information of the American people and the strengthening of the country, \* \* \* not as a search for scapegoats."

These words could be taken to forecast a formal Congressional inquiry into the sorry executive U-2 record of quickly exposed denials and amateurish confessions, culminating in impression possibly left by the President's announcement at Paris, in an atmosphere of compulsion created by Premier Khrushchev, that the State Department was bluffing again when it left open the implication that the U-2 overflights would continue.

It appears, however, that the majority leader will not lend his influence to establish this kind of inquiry. Apparently he confidently expects the President to give the full facts in the U-2 record to the key Congressional leaders and as much of these to the public as his estimate of security permits. It remains to be seen whether either account will furnish the answer to these prevalent questions:

Did the U-2 espionage overflights become so much of a "milk route" that nobody in the security complex gave a thought to the special hazard if an expedition were intercepted at the time powers' was? If nobody did, was this the consequence of poor judgment, entrenched bureaucracy or a mechanical lack of the coordination between act and policy that the National Security Council and the "secret subcommittee" of the Operations Coordinating Board were established to provide?

TAB

*Roscoe Drummond Reports*

# President's Summit Ordeal: Insulted, Unable to Retort

PARIS.

At the blood-stained hands of Nikita S. Khrushchev, who loyally helped Stalin murder his way to iron control of the Soviet dictatorship, Dwight D. Eisenhower this week suffered his most undignified, painful, personally humiliating experience as President of the United States.



**Drummond**

Though outwardly tranquil and composed, Mr. Eisenhower was seething within as he sat, helpless to retort in kind lest he make a bad situation worse, while Khrushchev poured moral obliquy and insult upon him because the American U-2 spy plane had traversed Russian territory.

The President knew in general what was coming, but he had no advanced warning of it nor the volume of invective and mock innocence to which he was subjected in a statement which the Soviets were later to read to some 3,000 summit journalists from every country in the world.

Nine times Khrushchev, whose network of spies and subversives have been caught red-handed violating the sovereignty of most free nations, described Mr. Eisenhower and his action in approving the U-2 intelligence mission as "provocative" and four times as "aggressive" or as the act of an "aggressor."

Other adjectives and epithets which he flung at the President were: "ridiculous," "crude," "unprecedented," "deception," "treachery," "disgraceful," "adventurous," and "a guest who would not be welcome" to repay Khrushchev's own visit to the United States.

Unquestionably these were the most lacerating and frustrating moments of a whole lifetime of personally and morally untarnished military and political service. There was little which Mr. Eisenhower could say to shield himself or to deflect the Khrushchev tirade. Mr. Eisenhower had himself given the basis of the argument to the Soviet Premier by candidly stating in advance that the U-2 was on a mission of reconnaissance over Soviet territory and by taking responsibility for it. Within the confines of the case which Khrushchev was making he had international law and all its niceties on his side.

Khrushchev's argument was a total moral condemnation of the United States "for violating Soviet sovereignty by spying" and it rested on total moral hypocrisy, the hypocrisy that Khrushchev and the Soviet Union have never engaged in spying or other intelligence activities.

Some who know of Mr. Eisenhower's low "boiling point," his tendency to occasional quick anger, thought that he would inevitably explode when subjected to such provocation. But the President is equally capable of himself when discharging his gravest responsibilities. Instead of becoming explosive,

Mr. Eisenhower became a veritable iceberg.

Since all the participants at the conference table had been informed that the reconnaissance flights over Russian territory were "suspended" and would not be resumed, it is enraging to speculate as to why Khrushchev decided to heap such torrential abuse upon the President.

There are probably numerous motivations, but there can be no doubt that one of his purposes was to so tarnish and undermine Mr. Eisenhower's moral leadership as a personal symbol of the world's best hope for a better peace that the President would be immobilized for the remainder of his term.

My own impression is that Khrushchev so egregiously overstated his case and so abused the rostrum of the summit conference that he overplayed his hand.

The way the President conducted himself under vicious verbal fire won him the admiration of de Gaulle and Macmillan. The French, German and British press—some of which relish seeing the Americans taken down a peg—were almost unanimously approving.

But even during the worst anxieties of the war, Dwight Eisenhower has never suffered such embarrassing, painful and harassing moments as in Paris this week and, diplomatically, he can emerge from them unscathed. 1960, N.Y. Herald Tribune Inc.



WASHINGTON POST

MAY 13 1960

# The Ordeal . . . . . By Roscoe Drummond

## Eisenhower Humiliated

PARIS—At the blood-stained hands of Nikita S. Khrushchev, who loyally helped Stalin murder his way to iron control of the Soviet dictatorship, Dwight D. Eisenhower this week suffered his most undignified, painful, personally humiliating experience as President of the United States.



Drummond

Though outwardly tranquil and composed, Mr. Eisenhower was seething within as he sat, helpless to retort in kind lest he make a bad situation worse, while Khrushchev puffed moral obloquy and insult upon him because the American U-2 spy plane had traversed Russian territory.

The President knew in general what was coming, but he had no advance warning of the fury of it nor the volume of invective and mock innocence to which he was subjected in a statement which the Soviets were later to read to some 3000 Summit journalists from every country in the world.

Nine times Khrushchev, whose network of spies and subversives have been caught red-handed violating the sovereignty of most free nations, described Mr. Eisenhower and his action in approving the U-2 intelligence mission, as "provocative" and four times as "aggressive" or as the act of an "aggressor."

Other adjectives and epithets which he flung at the President were: "ridiculous," "crude," "unprecedented," "deception," "treachery," "disgraceful," "adventurous,"

and "a guest who would not be welcome" to repay Khrushchev's own visit to the United States.

UNQUESTIONABLY these were the most lacerating and frustrating moments of a whole lifetime of personally and morally untarnished military and political service. There was little which Mr. Eisenhower could say to shield himself or to deflect the Khrushchev attack. Mr. Eisenhower had himself given the basis of the argument to the Soviet Premier by candidly stating in advance that the U-2 was on a mission of reconnaissance over Soviet territory and by taking responsibility for it. Within the confines of the case which Khrushchev was making, he had international law and all its niceties on his side.

Khrushchev's argument was a total moral condemnation of the United States "for violating Soviet sovereignty by spying" and it rested on territory were "suspended and would not be resumed," it is engrossing to speculate as to why Khrushchev detotal moral hypocrisy, the hypocrisy that Khrushchev and the Soviet Union have never engaged in spying or other intelligence activities.

SOME who knew of Mr. Eisenhower's low "boiling point," his tendency to occasional quick anger, thought that he would inevitably explode when subjected to such provocation. But the President is equally capable of exercising stern control over himself when discharging his gravest responsibilities.

Instead of becoming explosive, Mr. Eisenhower became a veritable iceberg.

Since all the participants at the conference table had

been informed that the reconnaissance flights over Russian cided to heap such torrential abuse upon the President.

There are probably numerous motivations, but there can be no doubt that one of his purposes was to so tarnish and undermine Mr. Eisenhower's moral leadership as a personal symbol of the world's hope for a better peace, that the President would be immobilized for the remainder of his term.

My own impression is that Khrushchev so egregiously overstated his case and so abused the rostrum of the Summit Conference that he overplayed his hand.

The way the President conducted himself under vicious, verbal fire won him the admiration of de Gaulle and Macmillan. The French, German and British press—some of which relish seeing the Americans down a peg—were almost unanimously approving.

But even during the worst anxieties of the war, Dwight Eisenhower has never suffered such embarrassing, painful, and harrassing moments as in Paris this weekend, diplomatically and politically. He can hardly emerge from them unscathed.

Copyright 1960, New York  
Herald Tribune Inc.

TAB

# Walter Winchell of New York

## The Spy

The shadowy battlefield of espionage has never known a truce. Relentless, ruthless and constant, this grim struggle will determine, to a large extent, the future of civilization. Every nation engages in espionage—national survival demands such participation. Khrushchev's indignation on the subject is sheer fabricated fury. Actually, Communist Russia, more than any other nation, has been a dominant factor on the spy front. Against espionage forces have been directed primarily against the United States. . . Red Moscow began its undercover war against this nation back in 1923. A Soviet agent named John Pepper (his real name is unknown) arrived here during that year—to function as a liaison between the American Communist Party and Moscow. . . Among the first to learn that the mortality rate among spies is high. Disobedience, failure or straying from the party line is met with swift and brutal punishment.

Pepper was ordered to return to Russia in 1937 and shot.

Moscow has transformed diplomacy into treachery. Every Soviet consulate throughout the world serves as the main spring of a Russian espionage army. The diplomatic spy units are divided into two classes—the economic and political. Each unit has its own code and code clerks, so that their activities are kept secret from one another. The diplomatic-espionage activities are masterminded by the NKVD—the Soviet secret police.

They not only train Soviet diplomats—but also operate as their judge, jury and executioner.

V. M. Zubilin was the Third Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Washington from 1941 to 1944. Several years later a Congressional report described him as U.S. director of the NKVD. The report stated in part: "Zubilin was the head of the administration of the Soviet espionage information service, and as such had complete charge of the espionage agents into and out of the U.S." In 1953, J. Edgar Hoover described Zubilin as "Russia's master spy in North America." Zubilin's activities with Julius and Ethel Rosenberg and Soviet atomic spies.

The atomic revolution has transformed the history of espionage. National survival was based largely on a desperate scientific race. In the area of espionage extended to scholars. . . As indicated in the Canadian-American espionage case several years ago, many were university professors, research scientists and men of philosophy. . . Klaus Fuchs, Alger Hiss and others were known to the Communist conspiracy by the ideological approach. They were convinced they were aiding humanity. Many in the past had been asked to accept payment for espionage activities. . . The evidence of the ideological infamy was far graver than the monetary betrayal.

Communists have long recognized the military implications of atomic research. . . Strategically, they were remarkably effective. Long before the world had heard of the atomic project, Red agents began penetrating organizations composed of scientists and technicians. . . The physicists at Los Alamos were subject to the strictest security measures. Their mail was censored, phones tapped and constantly surrounded by armed guards. They were allowed to leave Los Alamos only in emergencies. And when they left, they were kept under surveillance.

Despite these protective precautions, Red spy Klaus Fuchs infiltrated Los Alamos with almost ridiculous ease.

Reporter W. L. White discovered the efficacy of the Red spy apparatus here. Apparently, the top U.S. military secret was common knowledge among Soviet officials. . . While visiting the USSR in 1944, White's Russian guide bragged: "We have like you call in America, Manhattan project. You know this, yes?"

White responded: "We have lots of war projects in New York. And Manhattan is a part of New York." The Russian guide dropped the subject. One year later—after the Hiroshima blast—W.L. White finally understood the significance of the Russian query.

The most vital task of Communist agents is adding to Moscow's mountainous stockpile of information about potential enemy nations. The information is political, economic, psychological as well as military. Every scrap of information is important—it may provide the missing fragment in a jigsaw. Business reports issued by companies, economic reports issued by the government, the statements of our leaders and editorialists—all are forwarded to Moscow. There they are systematically analyzed by corps of political, economic and military experts—and even psychiatrists.

The nerve center of Communist Intelligence is Moscow's "Institute of International Relations." It functions as a snailshell school for Red diplomats. They are schooled to be propagandists, saboteurs and spies. Their training is prolonged and intensive. They attend the school 6 hours a day for 5 or 6 years. . . Today, Communist agents are pouring money, men, guns and propaganda into one-third of the world supposedly uncommitted in the struggle between East and West. The area extends from the Mediterranean to the South China Sea. The stake: Twenty nations and more than 700 million people.

By far, the mightiest triumph of Red agents was the part they played in the Communist conquest of China. It began in 1920 when Russia planted agents in China. These agents managed to have a Chinese leader appointed director of China's propaganda bureau. That propaganda chief is now Red China's dictator—Mao.

For a long time Allied Intelligence has known of the Russian murder school at Stalingrad. . . Murder, Inc., is a babe in the woods compared with Communism's secret killers. Red Intelligence can put a man on the street armed with perfect counterfeit documents, including money and rubber gloves, with another man's fingerprints on his hands—a silencer pistol for his victim—and a poison ring on his finger—to take his own life before he surrenders his secrets.

General Walter C. Krivitsky was the target of Communist Killers in 1941. He had been chief of Russian Military Intelligence in Western Europe until he broke with the Soviet and escaped to the United States. Krivitsky correctly forecast the Hitler-Stalin alliance. He turned over vital information about Russian espionage to the State Dept and the FBI. His testimony before a Congressional committee—exposing the tactics and objectives of Communism—was a headline event. Shortly before his testimony was made public General Krivitsky was discovered dead in a Washington, D.C. hotel—a bullet in his head.

Police listed his death as "suicide." Nevertheless, the fact remains that Krivitsky had warned the Congressional committee: "If they ever try to prove that I took my own life, don't believe it!"

# Walter Winchell

## of New York

### Methods of a Murderer

President Eisenhower won a great victory at Paris. He won the victory (and it is measured by Khrushchev's rage) because he wouldn't budge... When Khrushchev found that he wasn't going to frighten the President, he called off the whole conference. It would have been too much of a loss of face for him to have received nothing... Ever since the Sputnik went into orbit, Khrushchev has boasted that he would blast us off the map. Just to remind us that he wasn't joking, he shot a 7,500 mile missile into the middle-Pacific.

To find, after all the bluff and bluster, a gentleman unafraid in the President of the United States, and to have provided him with an eminence from which all the world could view his fearlessness was more than Mr. Khrushchev could bear... His bluff was called—and he reneged. It's just that simple... Khrushchev did not dare face the President at Paris because he would have been faced down—and a bully faced down is a bully who has lost face completely... And in the case of Mr. Khrushchev—both of them.

Great criticism has been leveled at the President for the flight of the U-2, the observation plane... Those who most bitterly criticize him, however, did not call for the breaking of diplomatic relations when Mr. Khrushchev's spies (Englishmen Burgess and McLean) were found in charge of the American desk... The hearts bleeding for Mr. Khrushchev today did not miss a beat when the betrayal of our coles was found to be the direct result of Soviet espionage... Nor did the critics of the President blink an eye when the Reds offered these spies asylum... If Mr. Khrushchev regards it as such a high crime—why doesn't he turn Burgess and McLean back to London for trial?

The truth is that for every answer the Kremlin tried on us, President Eisenhower and Allen Dulles had the answer—the only answer the Reds understood... For the threat of Khrushchev, these two great Americans made the only deadly response... From the day that the Sputnik was shot, Khrushchev threatened to bury us with long range missiles... Just so President Eisenhower couldn't possibly misunderstand the threat, Red submarines hung off our Eastern port, missiles plunked into the Pacific and "by accident" a Red "fishing vessel" cut the Atlantic cable.

To clarify Mr. Khrushchev's thinking, American submarines went under the North Pole and around the world... The mass flights of American airmen also wrote out a return message which Khrushchev understands: The price of the murder of New York is the death of Moscow, Leningrad, Kharkov and Vladivostok... In short, to Khrushchev's threat (and it is a very real threat) that he would blow us off the face of the earth unless he gets what he wants, the President had the courage to say: "You are not going to frighten us—and it will cost you your life to take ours."

What did Mr. Khrushchev want at the Summit?... He wanted Berlin... Why does he want Berlin? Because if he could prove to the world that we turned over the 2,500,000 Berliners to the Red slaughter (and slaughter it would be) all Europe would fall... Our alliances would melt and resistance in the Iron Curtain countries would cease—because we would have dishonorably abandoned our friends and allies on a bully's threat.

The President entrusted the defense of this country to another man who doesn't frighten easily—Allen Dulles... Khrushchev had threatened to "bury us" and had repeatedly demonstrated that he has the means to do so... It is Allen Dulles' job to prevent him from doing so if he can—to give us some warning if he does—and to assure Khrushchev that he will be committing suicide the second he attempts to murder this nation.

Allen Dulles' position is this simple: Suppose your neighbor buys a gun and threatens to shoot you and your family. You naturally keep careful watch of him... He discovers that you have a lookout post in your attic and that you are peeking over the fence. Your neighbor then has the consummate gall to protest to the police that you are invading his privacy.

This is exactly the position of our dear neighbor, Comrade Khrushchev... He boasts he will kill (and he has the means), but he wishes to bitterly complain to the U. N. that Allen Dulles tried to find out the caliber and location of the gun designed to kill us... Of course, he knows it is absurd, but he knew he would look more absurd if after all his threats, the President wouldn't budge.

A vocal group of Nervous Nellie Americans are pointing out the consequences of war—as if they could be any worse than the chains of Red slavery... These misled people act as if they had exclusive knowledge of its devastation... But the President knows and hates war—as only one familiar with its horrible face can hate it... A father, he knows the agony of having a son in the battle line... Major John Eisenhower was on the fighting front in Korea... For Allen Dulles, it may be assumed he needs no instructions on the heartaches of a battlefield. His son was badly wounded in Korea.

The sons of both of these men marched up to the line of battle. This should be evidence enough for the faint-hearted Americans (and the hard-hearted Communists) that President Eisenhower and Allen Dulles know full well the price of liberty—and that their own sons stood ready to pay for it with their blood and, in the case of the son of Allen Dulles, did so... There is no doubt that our country is in danger. But in the light of the sacrifice offered by the Eisenhower and Dulles families, the least American cowards can do is shut their mouths and get to the rear. They are in the way of fighting Americans.

Most people missed the strength of the President's reply. It was a reply Khrushchev understood... To Khrushchev's statement that an American plane was over his territory, Mr. Eisenhower's answer was deadly simple. The answer was: "Yes, and we know our targets, too. If you shoot, we won't be shooting blind"... Now Khrushchev wants Allen Dulles punished... Even reprimanding Allen Dulles would throw away the tremendous victory at Paris. He deserves a special medal from Congress, instead.

By the way, the fact is that the U-2 wasn't shot down. Its engine failed... The further fact is that Khrushchev is not going to war... yet... The odds in his favor aren't high enough... And they never will be while the ramparts are watched by two great Americans—Allen Dulles and President Dwight Eisenhower.

Mr. Khrushchev has threatened to exterminate the United States. He has the answer of Mr. Eisenhower and Mr. Dulles in the number of the plane U-2.

WW Narrates "The Untouchables" Tonight at 9:30, Ch. 7

TAB

# Khrushchev's Charges Seen Imperiling Summit

## Washington Feels Tirade Was Consciously Staged Maneuver

By Marguerite Higgins

WASHINGTON, May 5.—Soviet Prime Minister Nikita S. Khrushchev's attack on the United States concerning the plane incident may not—as yet—have jeopardized the May 16 summit meeting, but it won't take much more to do it.

This was the consensus tonight among diplomats here who now believe that Mr. Khrushchev's bitter and conspicuously stage-managed blast at the United States was a conscious international maneuver in which he deliberately used a false set of facts to embarrass the United States and, among other things, to lay the groundwork for putting the blame on the West for a possible summit failure.

### Rocket-Rattling

Every diplomatic assessment both here and in Moscow is based on the assumption that Mr. Khrushchev knows that "aggressive forces"—as he charged—had nothing to do with dispatching an unarmed weather plane to high altitudes over Turkey. It is considered 99 per cent sure that the plane was, in fact, a missing high-flying American weather reconnaissance plane and that the Russians could tell full in advance of shooting it down that this single-engine jet was unarmed.

Had Mr. Khrushchev been interested in keeping tensions eased he could have dealt with the incident routinely, officials here point out.

Instead Mr. Khrushchev chose to advertise in advance at a diplomatic party that he would have a "sensational announcement" to make when he appeared before the Supreme Soviet today. He was better than his word. Seldom had that body seen such a performance replete with dramatic fanfare, skillful playing to the gallery and—most important of all—such rocket-rattling.

But diplomats here also felt

that Mr. Khrushchev meant to do more than alert world opinion to his charges that the West was reviving cold war tactics through "deliberate instigation" of the plane incident and to therefore make it seem that the West—not he—would be responsible if all did not go well at Paris on May 16.

He was also trying, these officials believe, by his tough talk to bring pressure on the West to make concessions in Paris and he was serving notice to the not inconsiderable numbers of Stalinists inside the Red empire (the Red Chinese for instance) who are against summitry that he would be a tough bargainer.

Despite public restraint pending an investigation, officials are saying flatly in private that Mr. Khrushchev's accusations concerning the American plane are as far off beam as the American plane was apparently—though accidentally—off course.

And—more important—it is the considered judgment here that despite Mr. Khrushchev's virulent and intemperate speech he really knew better.

### Leaves Little Hope

All of this brings agreement here with at least one point made by Mr. Khrushchev: that summit prospects offer "little hope."

Despite Congressional pressure, the odds remain tonight that President Eisenhower will not regard Mr. Khrushchev's threats as sufficient reason for cancellation of the long awaited summit meeting.

"But," said a key diplomat, "it would be misleading to exclude the possibility of such a cancellation. And if this sort of thing continues—even to a degree—there is some reason to doubt that President Eisenhower will follow through on his trip to Russia."

Officially the White House reaction was "no comment" on questions as to whether the bristling Khrushchev speech

might prompt a re-examination of the summit meeting or the Russian trip.

What really concerned the State Department was the deliberateness of Mr. Khrushchev's attempt to heat up the atmosphere plus the conviction that he knew his charges were not supported by the facts.

### Reshuffle Is Cited

Some officials tried to take comfort from a theory that Mr. Khrushchev, who has just staged a major reshuffle of his top party and governmental echelons, might be in trouble at home and was resorting to the old trick of distracting attention by igniting the fear of war. But this is minority opinion, since, evidence is that the reshuffle has enhanced the position of Mr. Khrushchev's proteges and demonstrated his ability to promote and demote at will.

NEW YORK  
HERALD TRIBUNE

MAY 10 1960

# U. S. Urges Pact to Bar Sneak Blow To Keep Spying Pending Accord

By Marguerite Higgins

WASHINGTON, May 10.—The United States today served notice that it would continue to use "all possible means" to obtain military information about Russia and its time as military operations is focused on a system for preventing surprise attack.

This was the key point in a spirited public and private defense of "extensive reconnaissance" of Communist territory made here today by Secretary of State Christian A. Herter. He was explaining the admitted espionage activities of a high-altitude Lockheed aircraft shot down last week near Sverdlovsk.

## Go on Offensive

In a dramatic ninety-minute report to Congressional leaders, both Mr. Herter and Allen W. Dulles, head of the Central Intelligence Agency, made clear that the Administration, far from being on the defensive, would go on the propaganda offensive to prove that it would be "in its duty" if it did not engage in intelligence missions such as that which resulted in the shooting down of the American plane and the capture and "confession" of its American pilot.

And it was later learned President Eisenhower himself will take the initiative in this matter at the May 16 summit meeting by challenging Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev to end military secrecy that makes espionage necessary by agreeing to one of several possible formulas of reciprocal inspection.

By evening the hubbaloos in Washington over the espionage admission seemed to have died down somewhat. An increasing

number of Congressmen were swinging to the view that the United States had no choice but to do whatever possible to find out the military dispositions of an enemy that has the capacity to destroy this country.

A formal statement summing up the policy position laid down by Messrs. Herter and Dulles in a secret briefing of eighteen Congressional leaders, was issued by the State Department in the late afternoon.

It clarified the controversial point as to whether the flight over Russia had been undertaken without the President's approval by stating that, although Mr. Eisenhower had not authorized this particular flight, it was undertaken under general policies approved by him.

## Aerial Surveillance

On this point the statement said that in accordance with the National Security Act of 1947, the President has put into effect since the beginning of his Administration directives to gather by every possible means the information required to protect the United States and the free world against surprise attack. "Under these directives, programs . . . put in operation have included extensive aerial surveillance by unarmed civilian aircraft, normally of a peripheral character (to Russia's frontiers) but on occasion by penetration. Specific missions of these unarmed civilian aircraft have not been subject to Presidential authorization."

Mr. Herter said it was "unacceptable" that Russia should have the opportunity to prepare secretly to face the free world with "the choice of abrupt surrender or nuclear destruction." He said the United States government would be derelict in its responsibility to the American people and free people everywhere if it did not "take such measures as are possible unilaterally to lessen and overcome this danger of surprise attack."

## Deny Flights Halted

Earlier, an otherwise sternly silent White House had denied reports that President Eisenhower had ordered a halt to aerial reconnaissance flights along Russia's border such as was carried out by the ill-fated Lockheed U-2.

## Other Developments

Other developments today in the spy-plane incident were:

1. A special National Security Council meeting was held this morning to discuss both the plane incident and summit strategy.

2. Norwegian Ambassador Paul Koht called at the State Department to "inquire" about Premier Khrushchev's charge that the plane was en route to a Norwegian airbase when it was shot down by a Soviet rocket.

3. The State Department announced that American Ambassador to Moscow Llewellyn Thompson would ask to see the downed pilot, Francis G. Powers, as soon as the United States received a reply to its latest note asking further information about the incident.

## Congress Briefing


But the dramatic high point of the day was the suddenly arranged Congressional briefing which, appropriately, had all kinds of cloak and dagger overtones.

Elaborate precautions were taken to protect the secrecy of the meeting. A special heavy gray wool blanket was hung in front of the door to muffle sounds inside the room. There was an air of tenseness and urgency about the room—as indeed there was about most government offices in any way connected with international affairs.

Only eighteen Congressional leaders were invited. In order to be admitted, their names had to be on a previously cleared list. One member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee—Sen. Frank J. Lausche, D., Ohio—was politely asked to leave the room when it turned out that his name was not among the special invitees.

## Mansfield Protest

The chief criticism made at the meeting—which was held in the



Herald Tribune—UPI

WARNS "AGGRESSORS"  
—Soviet Defense Minister  
Marshal Rodion Y. Ma-

was heard to describe as "a tough one"—was the timing of the intelligence mission so close to next week's summit conference.

Sen. Mike Mansfield, D., Mont., Democratic whip, was among those, it was reported, who protested that some control system should be devised over such missions so that Washington could prevent an incident having international repercussions.

The 2 o'clock meeting was called by Mr. Herter to allay an anticipated storm of criticism by taking the Congressional confidence and a

During aerial reconnaissance and other espionage missions. The secret report, however, quieting the growing rumor and won him considerable support from important Congressmen. Rep. Clarence Cannon, D., Mo., for instance, said in a typical comment:

"The United States was fully justified in doing what it did. We know the Russians have spies in our country. Why should we try to find out what they are up to in an effort to prevent a sneak attack which would kill hundreds of thousands."

Before the meeting Sen. Styles Bridges, R., N.H., complained that the United States was missing an important propaganda point by not making an issue of the flights made over American territory. He was unable to discuss this revelation, however, with specific dates and instances.

# U. S. Meets Red Threat To Allies Will Fight Attack Over Spy Bases

By Marguerite Higgins

WASHINGTON, May 10.—

The United States today pledged to go to the defense of any ally that might be threatened with attack for providing bases for American planes capable of espionage flights over Russia.

This was a sharp retort to threats made by Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev.

The spy case also dominated White House conferences today in which President Eisenhower intensively prepared for the May 16 summit—and the most difficult diplomatic confrontation of his career.

This, officials said, is the President's own assessment of forthcoming negotiations in Paris about which he consulted for ninety minutes with Secretary of State Christian A. Herter and Vice-President Nixon, who the President has said might substitute for him at the summit if it lasts beyond a week.

## Threat of Attack

And it was also learned that Mr. Eisenhower himself had personally indorsed the firm line taken today by the State Department in its retort to threats made informally last evening and repeated today in an official Soviet protest note.

In these threats, Mr. Khrushchev declared that the Soviet Union would attack bases of such American allies as Turkey, Pakistan and Norway in those cases where Moscow was convinced that such bases were being used for American planes engaging in aerial reconnaissance over Russia.

The threats by strange coincidence were being voiced by Mr. Khrushchev at almost the same time that the State Department was reiterating this country's determination to con-

tinue such espionage flights as needed to gather information vital in safeguarding the free world against surprise attack.

In his impromptu speech at the Czech Embassy in Moscow last night, Mr. Khrushchev focused his attention on Turkey, Pakistan and Norway because these three countries were allegedly involved in the "concession" of captured American pilot Francis G. Powers after his Lockheed U-2 plane was downed over Sverdlovsk.

Asked what the United States would do if the Russians undertook to carry out their threats, State Department spokesman Lincoln White said: "The United States has undertaken commitments for the common defense between this government and those which once again appear to be subjected to a policy of intimidation by the Soviet government. . . . There should be no doubt that the United States will honor these commitments."

Mr. White then went on to clear the three countries mentioned by Mr. Khrushchev of any responsibility for the United States espionage flights.

In this connection, it was explained elsewhere that the American air base at Adana, Turkey, where the U-2 plane is said to have originated its flight, is rented outright by the United States from the Turkish government. So technically speaking, the Turkish government's consent would probably not be necessary to espionage-directed missions of U-2 planes based at Adana.

In diplomatic quarters, the

most reassuring report of the day was evidence that Mr. Khrushchev's threat against Norway, Turkey and Pakistan, had rallied rather than frightened America's allies.

The first reaction reaching the State Department from Oslo, Ankara and Karachi, was one of calm, tinged with anger.

Officials said they had been assured by diplomatic representatives of the countries involved that despite the menace of Soviet attack there was contemplated no change whatsoever in mutual security arrangements with the United States.

As to Mr. Khrushchev's threats to shoot down any further espionage-bound U-2s, Mr. White's response was a curt "well, I haven't fainted yet."

## Japan Reassured

The key diplomatic developments of the day included:

1. State Department assurances to Japan that Lockheed U-2's based there "will not—and have not—" been used in reconnaissance missions, but would be confined "to legitimate and normal purposes" of weather observation. The assurances were designed, officials said, to end the furor over the Japanese Diet over possible involvement in espionage activities that might bring Soviet reprisals.

2. A denial that any other ally had asked for assurances that United States planes on their territory would be prohibited from such activities. It had previously been reported that Norway had asked for such assurances, but in point of fact the United States has no air bases of its own in Norway. As contrasted to its outright rental of Turkey's Adana field, the United States in Norway would use a field as part of its NATO operation and therefore espionage could not be conducted except with full consent of all NATO partners.

3. A White House declaration that President Eisenhower would still visit Japan and Korea as scheduled next month even if developments—such as the proposed spy trial of pilot Powers—caused him to cancel plans for a visit to Russia. The administration's official position is still that plans for the trip to the Soviet Union are going forward, but there have been indications that these plans are subject to change. The guide line will be Mr. Khrushchev's international behavior in the next few weeks.

## To See Press

4. White House announcement that Mr. Eisenhower would hold his regular press conference tomorrow.

This had been in considerable doubt due to reports that Mr. Eisenhower did not want to be pressed for comment on the spy plane incident. As of tonight it was reliably reported that even

though the press conference is on, the President does not intend to go much beyond the official statement on the incident released yesterday by the State Department.

Mr. Nixon's invitation to the pre-summit conference at the White House today had two important motives.

The first, officials said, was the obvious one of including the Vice-President in vital policymaking.

The second constituted pointed notification by Mr. Eisenhower to Mr. Khrushchev that he did not intend to pay heed to the Soviet leader's recent attempt to derogate Mr. Nixon's character.

This was in reference to one of Mr. Khrushchev's recent anti-Western tirades in which he looked with extreme disfavor on Mr. Eisenhower's proposal to let Mr. Nixon sit on the summit should he have to absent himself.

Saying that Mr. Nixon was an addict of the cold war, Mr. Khrushchev asserted that to send the Vice-President to a conference dedicated to peace was like "sending a goat to tend the cabbage patch."

Despite the potentially explosive exchange of threat and counter-threat between Russia and the United States in the

past week, by tonight officials thought they detected a calming sign in the newest official Soviet note, received here today, announcing the intended trial for espionage of pilot Powers.



NEW YORK  
HERALD TRIBUNE

MAY 12 1956

# Khrushchev Threatens Atom Blow If Plane Spying Flights Go On

By Marguerite Higgins

WASHINGTON, May 12.—The United States declared today that Russia's propaganda furor in the spy plane incident raises doubts as to the sincerity with which the Soviet Union approaches the Paris May 16 summit meeting.

In the latest of the flurry of diplomatic notes that have been speeding back and forth over the Atlantic, the State Department today denied previous Soviet charges that the plane incident was deliberately connected with efforts to prejudice the summit conference.

To the contrary, the note said, the United States is going to the summit "prepared to cooperate to the fullest extent in seeking agreements designed to reduce tensions."

## Open Skies Plan

And the note again served formal notice that President Eisenhower is pressing his open skies plan at Paris in an attempt to make espionage flights unnecessary, through achieving effective safeguards against surprise attack which, as the note said, "would make unnecessary issues of this kind."

The text of the note said:

"The Embassy of the United States of America refers to the Soviet government's note of May 10 concerning the shooting down of an American unarmed civilian aircraft on May 1, and under instruction from its government, has the honor to state the following:

"The United States government, in the statement issued by the Department of State on May 9, has fully stated its position with respect to this incident

## Denies Aggression

"In its note the Soviet government has stated that the collection of intelligence about the Soviet Union by American aircraft is a 'calculated policy' of the United States. The United States government does not say that it has pursued such a policy for purely defense purposes. What it emphatically does say is that this policy has any aggressive intent, or that the unarmed U2 flight of May 1 was undertaken in an effort to prejudice the success of the forthcoming meeting of heads of government in Paris or to 'return the state of American-Soviet relations to the worst times of the cold war.' Indeed, it is the Soviet government's treatment of this case which, if anything, may raise questions about its intentions in respect to these matters.

"For its part, the United States government will participate in the Paris meeting on May 16 prepared to cooperate to the fullest extent in seeking agreements designed to reduce tensions, including effective safeguards against surprise attack which would make unnecessary issues of this kind."

## Khrushchev Threat

In Moscow, Tass today released remarks made by Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev Wednesday but withheld by censorship. In them, Mr. Khrushchev assailed Secretary of State Christian A. Herter for the latter's defense of the spy plane incident as "the kind of statement that could only be made by a country in a state of war." The Soviet leader went on to say: "If the United States is going to unleash war and if they have never experienced an atom bomb on their territory, they certainly will in the first minutes of war."

The note on the incident, which involves the shooting down of an unarmed American reconnaissance U-2 on May 1 near Sverdlovsk was made public here in a charged atmosphere resulting from the blasts being launched in quick succession by Mr. Khrushchev not only against the policies of the United States but against President Eisenhower.

These blasts, officials say, have brought Russian-American relations to a frosty low and have seriously threatened the success of the summit conference. Officials are even suggesting that Mr. Khrushchev may be making all this hullabaloo to justify the one thing the West most wants to avoid—

## "Hostile Acts"

Today's State Department note was in reply to a Soviet protest demanding an immediate end to all reconnaissance flights over Russia. The Russian protest declared that these flights were "hostile acts" and threatened retaliation if they were continued. Today, in amplification, Mr. Khrushchev went further in saying that the retaliation would be in the form of atomic rockets.

Despite these threats, the State Department note today repeated its declaration of May 9 that which it indicated that such aerial reconnaissance flights would be continued until such time as the Russians made them unnecessary by agreeing to a reciprocal military inspection system.

The United States again vigorously defended the necessity for collecting intelligence about the Russians but stressed that it has pursued such a policy for purely defensive purposes.

## American Note

In its key section the note denied that the flight of the ill-fated U-2 "was made in an effort to prejudice the success of the forthcoming meeting of the heads of government in Paris or to 'return the state of American-Soviet relations to the worst times of the cold war.'"—as charged by Moscow.

On the contrary, it declared that it is "the Soviet government's treatment of this case which, if anything, may raise questions about its intentions in respect to these matters."

There was no mention in the note of Russia's threat to answer aerial reconnaissance with atomic retaliation against the "aggressor," since this was not part of the formal Soviet protest. But officials here conceded that the threat posed a terrible dilemma.

Since the United States has declared it will go ahead with reconnaissance flights, Mr. Khrushchev's threat amounts to putting the United States in the position of starting war if it does what it says. It is a position from which both sides would have difficulty in backing down.

## Herter Is Silent

The seriousness of this latest phase of rocket rattling was reflected today in the demeanor of Secretary Herter when he boarded a plane for Paris and early preparations for the summit.

Instead of the usual hopeful prepared statement, the tight-lipped Secretary of State met all questions with a terse: "No comment."

## Allies in Inquiry

Earlier, Mr. Herter had conferred at the State Department with some of the diplomatic repercussions of the incident of the spy plane, whose pilot, Francis G. Powers, will go on trial for espionage according to the latest announcement from Moscow.

These repercussions came in the form of calls by the Afghanistan Ambassador and the Pakistan Ambassador. The first, officials reported, was designed to serve notice that Afghanistan would protest strongly if, as rumored, the downed American plane had crossed its territory en route to Russia. The call by the Pakistani ambassador was an "inquiry" which in diplomatic parlance is a polite way of indicating disquiet. The object of the visit was to establish whether the U-2 did in fact use the Pakistani base of Peshawar for its departure point—see office, apparently, not yet confirmed.

## 'U.S. 'Clarifying' Stand On Further Spy Flights

By Marguerite Higgins  
From the Herald Tribune Bureau

PARIS, May 14.—The United States maneuvered here today to counteract the widespread impression that it is specifically committed to continuing spy flights over the Soviet Union.

This "clarification" of policy in diplomatic circles was the crucial development of a day in which both Eastern and Western leaders arriving here seemed—to varying degrees—to be anxious to refrain from

rocking the pre-summit boat. Western leaders, for instance, made a special point of characterizing Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev's airport speech here today as "moderate"—as compared, anyway, with the recent hot blasts from Moscow. And it was learned that at Washington President Eisenhower deliberately omitted a departure statement in order to refrain from adding a new round to the flurry of American-Soviet exchanges.

The clarification of America's plane spy policy came as diplomats passed the word that Secretary of State Christian A. Herter's May 9 statement on intelligence gathering apparently had been misunderstood if it was regarded as a specific commitment to continue to penetrate into Soviet air space.

On the contrary, diplomats said, Mr. Herter, on May 9, merely said that the United States would do whatever might seem to it necessary, in the way of intelligence work, in order to counter the danger of surprise attack.

Thus, officials explained, the question of whether spy flights over the Soviet Union would be attempted was simply left unanswered. The United States did not commit itself to continue them—or promise forever to halt them. And the question of whether such flights would again be undertaken would be something for determination at the highest level and would be dependent on judgments as to the degree of international danger.

Officials insisted that this

clarification was in no way "backing down" and that the United States still stood by its previous defense of the need for continuing intelligence operations until such a time as the Russians would agree to reciprocal inspection systems that would make such espionage unnecessary.

But the point was nevertheless that this clarification did open the way to getting the United States off the hook in one of the most difficult parts of its controversy over the spy plane incident, involving the shooting down of a Lockheed U-2 over Sverdlovsk.

### Angered Khrushchev

For the implication that continuing penetration of Soviet air space by American planes was avowed Washington policy set Mr. Khrushchev off on his most virulent attacks against both the United States and its allies. It also appeared to be an important reason why the Soviet Premier chose to raise serious doubts as to whether President Eisenhower should follow through on his plans to visit the Soviet Union on June 10.

The prospect of openly proclaimed continuation of spy flights in defiance of Soviet threats to retaliate with atomic bomb attacks on the air bases used also disturbed America's allies, especially those accused directly by the Soviet Union of being involved in the flight plan of the U-2 brought down at Sverdlovsk. These allies included Norway, which has registered a formal protest, and Pakistan, which has said it will register such a protest if in fact it is established that this particular U-2 departed from the Pakistani air field at Peshawar.

### Won't Defy Allies

In connection with the Norwegian protest, informed sources stated that the United States has no intention of repeating such flights over any Allied country in defiance of its protest. According to Soviet accusations, the U-2 was supposed to fly to the Norwegian air field at Bodø.

TAB

WASHINGTON, D.C.

MAY 11 1960

'Most Difficult Decision'

# Secret Session About Plane Reflected Calm Earnestness

By Robert C. Albright

Staff Reporter

"It was one of the most difficult decisions I ever made in my life."

Secretary of State Christian A. Herter was explicit in earnest but unemotional terms, his Department's admission that the United States aircraft brought down in the Soviet Union was a "difficult decision."

The House Appropriations Committee Monday, May 2. Eighteen Democratic and Republican leaders had gathered there to hear Herter's explanation of the "difficult decision" to shoot down the U-2 spy plane.

Many of the top legislators were unhappy about the admission, particularly the House Committee on Naval Affairs and Space Administration, which had been told that the plane was a Soviet spy plane.

But few of their questions to Herter were pointed, and none was designed to embarrass.

At one point Herter said: "When a decision of this sort has been reached, I have announced what I have decided to support it."

## No Antagonism

There was no antagonism or bitterness evidenced by Herter or Dulles. There was any consensus and sympathy for Herter's defense of his position. The atmosphere was described as "disturbed." Another called the over-all mood "tense."

Such criticism as was implicit in some of the questioning was directed mainly at the timing of the U-2 reconnaissance flight, or what some described as lack of proper coordination between local area intelligence offices and either the State Department or political intelligence officers here in Washington.

It was suggested that the local area men made their decision on the flight purely

on the basis of good weather conditions—without any thought of the impending summit meeting or the international havoc a miscarriage might cause.

Several of the legislators said responsibility should be centered for such decisions and due weight given to the possibility of defection should be taken into consideration.

One of the Congressmen said he believed every person present recognized that this kind of reconnaissance was essential—or at least no one would be ready to say that a plane should have been sent on such a mission at a time when disclosure could damage this nation so.

## Many Questions

The big unanswered question at the Herter-Dulles briefing session was what actually happened to U-2 observation plane, and Francis G. Powers, the pilot, himself.

In the first place, it was brought out that the plane had a "destruct" button on it, which the pilot surely would have pushed had he bailed out, thus destroying the plane and everything aboard it.

It was also questioned that the Russians had anything that could reach the 70,000 foot level of the "plane" to intercept it or force the U. S. plane down.

While the Russians undoubtedly could have hit the plane with a rocket, it was stressed that this surely would have destroyed the plane and probably everything in it.

One thesis was that Powers may have descended to a lower level, and that the Russians then forced him down. But key legislators asked why the pilot did not then destroy the plane, or, in the intelligence tradition, destroy himself.

Dulles told the "Hill" leaders the pilot had an excellent war record, both in the Air

Force and in subsequent service in other Government agencies. He said he thought it hardly conceivable, therefore, that he could have defected, and landed his plane in Russia.

In answer to further questions he said he was not ruling anything out, but that the possibility of defection should be kept in mind.

One member said Herter indicated that the reconnaissance flights over Russia would go on. He said there was no "consensus" among the leaders that the flights should be continued, adding that he himself was disturbed about this.

As for the impact of the U-2 interception, if that was what it was, legislators were in general agreement that it will place the United States on the defensive at the summit talk opening Monday.

TAB

MAY 10 1960

# State of the Nations

## Breaching the Closed Society

By **WILLIAM H. STRINGER**, Chief of the Washington News Bureau of The Christian Science Monitor

Washington  
Really the best face to put on the U-2 reconnaissance plane incident is to say—as the State Department suggests—that since the Soviets failed to accept President Eisenhower's open skies proposal for aerial surveillance of each other's territories, the United States inaugurated its own version of this plan.

This is, in effect, what happened when U-2's were sent on a series of flights over the Soviet Union. And since this is a case of the West's open society versus the closed society of the Soviet Union, one must note that Moscow has been equally active in conducting its own surveillance of the United States.

The difference has been that Moscow does not have to fly planes at high altitudes over America to learn the minimum about American defense preparations.

Soviets in the United States can pick up a lot of information just by walking and riding around, and reading the newspapers. The Soviets also send their spies here, as is attested by the presence of Col. Rudolf Ivanovich Abel, Soviet intelligence officer, now serving 30 years in Atlanta Federal Penitentiary. According to evidence at his trial, his studio contained more photographic and short-wave radio equipment than did the U-2 which came down in the U.S.S.R.

Having said this much, one

must note also that in the long run, when hysteria and speculation have subsided, the "case of the U-2 flight" likely will have some salutary impact.

The Soviets are discovering that, despite all the tremendous efforts to maintain a concealed military position, the West has been flying over the



Scott Long, Minneapolis Tribune

### IQ Test

Soviet Union and taking exceedingly accurate photographs.

The British have made a few flights themselves, it is reported. Pakistan, Turkey, Norway, despite denials, have had some idea that this is going on and—in responsible high quarters if not in the penny press—realize the necessity for the surveillance.

And none of these allies has any history of being intimidated by Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev's threats any more than they were intimi-

dated by Stalin's threats before him. The surveillance, in short, is likely to continue.

But the Soviets, if they are at all rational, will discover after a while that this possession of minimum information by the United States has not wrecked their defenses or ruined their economy. They will be realizing that two can play at this game, and that if they need to read the West's defense posture, so the West needs to read theirs.

This is an argument for the "open skies" plan and for other international safeguards against surprise attack. Moreover, the Soviets, again if they are rational, must realize that before many years have passed there will be reconnaissance satellites circling the earth capable of maintaining nearly as effective surveillance as the U-2 has accomplished, even though the Soviet Union is more cloud-covered than is the United States.

In short, whatever Moscow attempts to do about it, gradually and inexorably the closed society is going to have to open up. The U-2 incident is just the beginning, and if more people would take note of this inevitability instead of merely shouting "stupidity" and "blundering" at the American high command, they would be doing human society a better service.

To be sure, espionage is a dirty business. And there are different types of spying. Some cloak-and-dagger ventures, by isolated individuals, can easily be denied by

the perpetrating government. Moscow never admits its spying. But when a NASA-United States Government plane, big as life, flies over a foreign country, that cannot easily be denied.

Some people have been making much of the fact that President Eisenhower did not order this specific U-2 flight over Soviet territory. "Suppose this plane had carried a hydrogen bomb; does the United States have no better control over its flights than this incident indicates?" they worriedly ask.

The answer is simple enough. President Eisenhower did approve a "series" of U-2 flights, though not this specific one. Intelligence officials who sent this pilot on his mission were indeed foolhardy to risk a flight so near the summit conference. But no such low-level command could authorize a mission by a B-47 or B-52 plane carrying an H-bomb. In those instances, the command is ironclad and heads up directly in the White House.

The U-2 incident has, of course, damaged American prestige. But the President's determination is to press on to the summit conference, regardless. His chief goal is still to reduce world tensions. If Mr. Khrushchev wants to raise the U-2 case with him, the President undoubtedly will advise him to recognize the surveillance necessities of the cold war, and to be as realistic about it as Soviet policy always purports to be.

TAB

# Political Bombshells Land on Soviets

By Paul Wohl

Written for The Christian Science Monitor

Three political bombshells have hit Soviet opinion.

The first bombshell was the downing of an American reconnaissance plane near the industrial heart of the Urals, which casts doubt on the effectiveness of Soviet defenses and on the success of Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev's "historic" visit to the United States.

The second was the appointment of Leonid I. Brezhnev, the youngest Russian secretary of the Central Committee, as President of the U.S.S.R.

The third was a recent speech by China's chairman Mao Tse-tung which, in substance, criticized Mr. Khrushchev and sharply rejected the latter's reformulation of Marxism-Leninism (as presented by Communist Party Secretary Otto V. Kuusinen on Lenin Day, April 22).

## Public Shocked

Mr. Mao's speech so far is known only to the inner Communist circle, but the two other events came as a shock to informed segments of Soviet public opinion.

Moscow's immediate response to the plane incident struck observers as one of nervousness and strain.

The Kremlin must have been deeply disturbed to have canceled, on May 2, the scheduled visit to the United States of Soviet Air Marshal Konstantin A. Vershinin and then to reconfirm it two days later after the session of the Central Committee.

Although Soviet patriotism undoubtedly was aroused, just as American patriotism would be aroused if a hostile plane appeared near Pittsburgh or Detroit, there was evidence of fear. Fear of war was apparent, which is normal in a people which remembers two Pearl Harbors: one at the hands of Hitler in June, 1941, and one at the hands of the Japanese in 1904. There also must have been fear of the economic effects of renewed international tensions.

## Penetration Queried

Critics may well have raised the question how it was possible for one of these American reconnaissance planes to fly more than 1,500 miles over some of the country's most sensitive territories, as this one did. If the plane actually crossed the Aral Sea, it came close to

stan's great industrial centers of Karaganda and Temir-Tau, presumably also flew over the industrial giant of Magnitogorsk in the southern Urals, and over Chelyabinsk, which is larger and even more important than Sverdlovsk.

Although the incident, thanks to Mr. Khrushchev's skill, seems to have turned out to be a diplomatic and propaganda success for the Soviets, there are indications that it was used in Moscow to criticize the Premier for neglecting national defense. Mr. Khrushchev's speech before the Supreme Soviet of May 5 admitted that such criticism had been raised, presumably at the May 4 Plenum of the Communist Central Committee, which must have known about the plane incident.

The appointment of Mr. Brezhnev in place of Marshal Kliment Y. Voroshilov shows that the shake-up of top party and state leadership continues. Marshal Voroshilov's retirement was expected, but it was unusual that he should have been replaced at this time by one of the remaining five secretaries of the Central Committee, who all are under Mr. Khrushchev.

Mr. Khrushchev could not have named a more versatile, boastful, and obsequious official. Mr. Brezhnev, who was 10 years old when the Bolsheviks seized power, is entirely a product of the Soviet age. A metallurgical

engineer by training, he served during the war as a political commissar on the Ukrainian front.

## Compliments Aired

When Mr. Brezhnev last year was chosen to make the Lenin Day address, his speech was significant in only two respects. It was noteworthy for his then unusual reference to Stalin, who "for long years had stood at the head of the Central Committee when the party successfully carried out socialist industrialization, collectivization of agriculture, and a cultural revolution."

The second remarkable pas-

sage was an all-out compliment for Mr. Khrushchev who, "as head of the Central Committee, had proven himself to be a talented organizer, outstanding activist of the party and of the Soviet State, and of the whole international Communist and workers movement."

In nominating Mr. Brezhnev for President, the Premier apparently wanted to make sure that he would have the necessary backing in the arduous task of overhauling the leadership of party and state under conditions of internal and international strain.

Chairman Mao's speech undoubtedly will give new impetus to Mr. Khrushchev's critics. It may be the sheet lightning before the storm. No one knows when and where the storm will strike, but everything indicates that the sailing for Mr. Khrushchev from here to the next harvest will not be smooth.

With a Brezhnev as chairman of the presidium of the Supreme Soviet the Premier may feel freer to maneuver. In the meanwhile the successful handling of the plane incident once again has strengthened his position.



TAB

# Khrushchev Believed Setting Summit Trap

By JOHN M. HIGHTOWER

Associated Press Staff Writer

Soviet Premier Khrushchev, in the judgment of authorities here, is trying to force President Eisenhower into a summit conference trap where he must either make important concessions or take the blame for failure.

Alongside that assessment of Mr. Khrushchev's current blustery outburst against the United States and Mr. Eisenhower stands this additional view:

There is some danger Mr. Khrushchev may overplay his hand and wreck summit conference plans completely.

Mr. Eisenhower has repeatedly said he would not go to the summit under threat or duress. While Mr. Khrushchev has not carried his present anti-American campaign to that point, his tactics suggest the possibility that he could do so.

The follow-up salvo fired by a Khrushchev lieutenant before the Supreme Soviet in Moscow today reinforced the impression, based on Mr. Khrushchev's opening blast yesterday, that the Soviet leader has embarked on a deliberate campaign.

## Caught by Surprise

The suddenness of his action caught everyone here from the President down by surprise. Hence official reaction has been slow and cautious, its development hampered by the absence

of Secretary of State Herter, together with almost all the top officials of the State Department. They have been in the Middle East for allied conferences and are due home tonight.

Both the White House and State Department were withholding any definite reaction pending a report from United States Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson in Moscow on the facts behind Mr. Khrushchev's announcement yesterday that Soviet forces had shot down a United States aircraft last Sunday.

Mr. Thompson this morning delivered to the Foreign Office in Moscow a note asking for information about the plane and its pilot, United States officials said.

The second round in Mr. Khrushchev's offensive was fired today by Marshal Andrei A. Grechko. Speaking before the Supreme Soviet, as Mr. Khrushchev had done yesterday, Marshal Grechko said the United States aircraft was destroyed by a single shot of a

"remarkable rocket" and that the decision to fire was made by Mr. Khrushchev personally.

## 4 Points in Soviet Case

The effect was to focus attention on Russia's claim of a fantastically effective defensive weapon and to cast Mr. Khrushchev even more emphatically in the role of stout defender of Soviet territory.

But for the outside world the Grechko speech carries forward Mr. Khrushchev's main argument that Mr. Eisenhower is jeopardizing the success of the summit conference. He called the plane incident an example of United States aggressive action against the Soviet Union. But his case embraced several other points, including:

1. Mr. Eisenhower's decision to leave the Paris meeting after seven days, if it continues beyond a week, shows a lack of interest in seeking peace.
2. His assignment of Vice President Nixon as a possible substitute if the conference lasts over a week is bad because Mr. Khrushchev claims Mr. Nixon is not interested in ending the cold war.
3. The United States has taken an intransigent attitude on disarmament issues instead of displaying a desire for agreement with the Soviet Union.
4. The United States attitude on German and West Berlin problems is not in line with the need to settle East-West differences and end the cold war.

Officials who have studied the full Khrushchev text say these points stand out along with the airplane shooting incident and help define his purpose.

TAB

# Capital Views Spy Charge As Blow to Summit Hopes

By JAMES RESTON  
Special to The New York Times.

WASHINGTON, May 7—A new and pessimistic appraisal of this month's Big Four summit meeting in Paris emerged from today's prolonged official discussions of the Soviet Union's charges of aerial espionage against the United States.

Secretary of State Christian A. Herter, Under Secretary Douglas Dillon and their principal aides met privately most of the day on Premier Khrushchev's assertion that the Soviet Union had captured a "confessed spy."

Later, officials expressed disappointment over what they regarded as an obvious attempt by the Soviet leader to try to prove that the United States was engaged in a calculated effort to destroy the chances of the summit meeting, scheduled to open in Paris May 16.

[Diplomats in London feared that the plane incident had hurt the United States position in advance of the summit talks.]

Nevertheless, Assistant Secretary of State Andrew J. Berding, who just returned from Istanbul, Turkey, with Mr. Herter, said there was no thought of calling off either the summit meeting or President Eisenhower's trip to the Soviet Union starting June 10.

An atmosphere of embarrassed silence prevailed in the capital most of the day. Early this morning, officials were inclined to believe that Premier Khrushchev was not going to inflame the situation any more than was necessary.

They based this on two private messages that arrived here from Moscow this week. The first, sent Monday, indicated that the Soviet Union was going to cancel the visit to this country of the head of the Soviet Air Force, Marshal Konstantin A. Vershinin, because of the shooting down of an American plane inside the Soviet Union.

On Wednesday, however, even before Mr. Khrushchev disclosed the plane incident before the Supreme Soviet in Moscow, a second message arrived saying the visit would take place.

This at first led officials to hope that the Soviet leader was not going to make the crisis worse than it was early in the week. Later today, however, with the announcement that Mr. Khrushchev had added to his

charges and threatened a trial of the United States after it appeared that Washington was the maintarget of a major propaganda offensive just before the summit meeting.

As a result it was widely believed here that Mr. Khrushchev had decided to try to bring the United States to the conference table in Paris under a serious psychological and diplomatic disadvantage.

That this was already having some effect was obvious today by the private reaction of Allied officials. They said nothing in public and were restrained in their comments, but it was obvious that they were critical of Washington for getting involved in what many of them regarded as an unnecessary controversy.

Part of the difficulty within the Government and within the alliance was that Allied officials and even some prominent State Department officials did not

feel confident that they knew the facts of what, if anything, other United States agencies were doing on and around the southern boundaries of the Soviet Union.

What they did know, however, was that this incident was being used by Mr. Khrushchev to support his suspicion that the United States was trying to put difficulties in the way of an East-West summit accommodation on Berlin and Germany.

For the last few weeks, Soviet officials here and in Moscow have been charging that Washington is breaking "the spirit of Camp David." This was a reference to last fall's meeting between President Eisenhower and Premier Khrushchev at Camp David, Md., where they agreed to try to work out a German settlement, not with a deadline but as soon as possible.

Since then, no progress has been made on any agreement.

though President Eisenhower had agreed with Mr. Khrushchev at Camp David that the Berlin situation was "abnormal."

On April 4 in Chicago, Secretary Herter noted that Mr. Khrushchev had supported the principle of self-determination for peoples in Asia but that he was unwilling to do so for the peoples of East Berlin and East Germany.

Mr. Herter insisted that this principle be met in Germany and Berlin, and he criticized Mr. Khrushchev for the latter's

This insistence on supporting Dr. Adenauer produced some sharp criticism here by the Soviet Ambassador, Mikhail A. Menshikov, who complained in private that the United States seemed to be "reviving the cold war."

Shortly thereafter, Mr. Dillon made an even more critical speech on Soviet policy in Ger-

many before an A. F. L.-C. I. O. gathering in New York on April 20.

In this speech, Mr. Dillon questioned the accuracy of Mr. Khrushchev's policy on Germany and discussed that policy in often scornful terms.

"Mr. Khrushchev," he said, "has complained that the situation in Berlin is abnormal. With this contention we can wholeheartedly agree. It is indeed abnormal when a million East Berliners are forcibly divided from more than 2,000,000 fellow citizens in West Berlin — when they are constrained to live under a totalitarian regime unlawfully imposed by a foreign power—and when even family units are divided by an arbitrary boundary imposed in the name of a foreign ideology."

"But the abnormal situation in Berlin is merely one facet of

the greater abnormality created by the artificial separation of the East Zone from the remainder of Germany. The monstrous nature of this abnormality has been strikingly demonstrated by the fact that more than two and a third million East Germans and East Berliners have, during the last ten years, exercised the only franchise available to them and have voted with their feet against Communist rule by fleeing to West Berlin and the Federal Republic.

"The abnormality of which Mr. Khrushchev speaks can be cured only by permitting the whole German nation to decide its own way of life."

NEW YORK TIMES

## CAPITAL IS UPSET

Halting of All Flights  
Near Communists'  
Borders Reported

By JAMES RESTON

Special to The New York Times.

WASHINGTON, May 8—This was a sad and perplexed capital tonight, caught in a swirl of charges of clumsy administration, bad judgment and bad faith.

It was depressed and humiliated by the United States' having been caught spying over the Soviet Union and trying to cover up its activities in a series of misleading official announcements.

Nevertheless, the first priority of the day was to try to salvage something out of the May 1 crash of the United States U-2 reconnaissance plane in Soviet territory and to prevent the incident from wrecking next week's Big Four summit meeting in Paris.

President Eisenhower returned from his farm at Gettysburg this afternoon and met with Secretary of State Christian A. Herter in the White House for a review of the situation.

## Halting of Flights Reported

No announcement was made of this meeting or its results, but elsewhere it was stated on responsible authority that the President had ordered a halt to all flights over or near Communist frontiers, pending an executive investigation of the entire intelligence apparatus of the Government.

Though there were the usual suggestions of a Congressional inquiry into the case, the Federal legislators were obviously trying to avoid any summary action that would add to the Administration's embarrassment before the summit meeting.

For example, the Democratic majority whip in the Senate, Mike Mansfield of Montana, who has been urging for years the establishment of a joint Congressional committee to supervise the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, said today that this was no time to press his proposals.

## Inquiry Foreseen

In due course, he added, there will be an inquiry into all the Government's intelligence activities and contradictory statements on those activities. But for the time being he praised the President for having approved yesterday's official confession about the incident. This seemed to be the attitude of most of the Democratic leaders on Capitol Hill.

Elsewhere in the non-Communist world, the reaction was less generous. The Administration was being blamed publicly for reckless action before the summit, for not governing the activities of its own intelligence officers and for neglecting to tell the truth at first when the plane was shot down.

State Department officials were watching the reaction of

the Soviet Government to the affair very carefully. They observed that both Washington and Moscow had been caught in espionage activities before and that it was a question of judgment, depending on the purpose of officials at the time, whether to magnify or minimize the incidents.

The hope here is that Premier Khrushchev, now that he has exploited his propaganda advantage, will let the controversy settle down at least long enough to permit the summit meeting to take up the more important questions of Germany and arms control in a reasonable atmosphere.

It is known that President Eisenhower has been urged to write Premier Khrushchev at once, expressing this hope, before taking a final decision about going to the summit meeting and thereafter to Moscow in June.

## Flights Long Authorized

It is the charge of lying, rather than the charge of spying, that is troubling officials here. The Administration has authorized flights over Communist territory for years and its justification for doing so was defined today by a high official of the Government as follows:

The Soviet Union has made no effort to conceal its hostility to the United States and its allies. It has boasted for years of its armed forces and particularly of its new rockets. It has repeatedly threatened to use those rockets and has developed them in an atmosphere of complete secrecy, which it has refused to modify so that there can be an adequate system, inspection and control.

Meanwhile, the United States, and the other principal Western countries are open societies where Soviet officials can see much of what is going on. This gives the Communists a great advantage, which under the prevailing security system in the Soviet Union requires Western espionage of various types if any kind of equality is to be maintained.

In general terms, the efforts to break Soviet security by flights over Communist territory have been known to the President, his principal aides and to some members of Congress for some time. They have also been known to the Soviet leaders, including Mr. Khrushchev.

When the Soviet Premier was in this country last autumn, he met Allen W. Dulles, head of the Central Intelligence Agency, at a dinner at the White House.

Mr. Khrushchev remarked to Mr. Dulles at that time that he read Mr. Dulles' intelligence reports. Mr. Dulles replied that he hoped Mr. Khrushchev got hold of them "legally."

## Premier Sees Duplication

"I think we have the same agents in some places," the Soviet Premier replied. "Maybe we should get together and save money by not paying them twice."

Down through the years, however, it has come to be accepted here that the Central Intelligence Agency should not be questioned about its activities in the manner customary with other agencies. Congress has never insisted, for example, on anything but the most cursory review of its budget or its personnel, and the agency has felt little obligation to disclose what it was doing or to respond truthfully to embarrassing questions asked by the press.

Thus, the State Department spokesman, Lincoln White, said on his own authority during the crisis last week that the United States had never voluntarily sent a plane across the Soviet borders.

Thus, too, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration put out a long statement last Thursday giving the impression that it was one of its research planes that was missing, probably because of a failure of the oxygen equipment.

One official said tonight that this statement was put out on the authority of the N. A. S. A. itself, not at the direction of anyone else. The man in charge of the agency at the time was Dr. Hugh Dryden, deputy administrator, who was substituting for the director, T. Keith Glennan.

## State Department Criticized

Even the statement issued by the State Department yesterday admitting the espionage over the Soviet Union was being criticized here tonight.

"As a result of the inquiry into the President's statement," it has been established that insofar as the authorities are concerned, there was no authorization for any

This was criticized on two grounds. First, it gave an impression, which provokes considerable skepticism here, that high officials of this Government knew nothing about any such flights.

Mr. Dulles, as head of the intelligence agency, opens the meetings of the National Security Council, the top security Cabinet committee of the Government, with a briefing each week. He goes repeatedly to the White House to brief the President on the intelligence gathered on Soviet activities.

so that while this particular flight may not have been known to some top leaders, the fact of such flights in the past seems to have been rather widely known.

A second point of criticism was that the statement seemed to confirm one of the main points of Communist propaganda—namely, that some officials have the power to act, independent of civilian control and even in opposition to the President's policy.

The statement said, in effect: "We didn't know in Washington about these things, but they are standard practice."

On the question of control of intelligence activities, it was explained here that the C. I. A. coordinates all intelligence for the Administration but that it does not have control over the intelligence officers of the armed forces.

In theory, the President's Ambassador in each capital has a veto over all intelligence activities in that territory unless he is overruled by higher civil authority. Like many theories, however, this one is not, in the opinion of ambassadors still in the service, followed in practice.

Some officials were saying here tonight that they thought this incident, if allowed to subside, might in the long run put the "cold war" in better perspective. Because the intelligence activities of the United States have been discussed so little, there is a widespread illusion that only the Communists resort to the black arts in diplomacy.

If this illusion is dispelled, officials here will be consoled but not much. For the time being, they are afraid the plane incident has put President Eisenhower on the defensive just before what will probably be the last summit meeting of his Administration.

They were frankly not very hopeful about the results of the meeting before the U-2 was shot down. But now if the meeting fails, they fear that Mr. Khrushchev will be able to argue effectively that the United States was responsible for that failure.

TAB

# Herter Made Decision To Tell Whole Truth

By Chalmers M. Roberts

Staff Reporter

The historic American decision to lift the veil on one phase of American intelligence operations was largely the work of Secretary of State Christian A. Herter.

The statement was approved by President Eisenhower who was at his Gettysburg, Pa., farm at the time. But according to information available last night Mr. Eisenhower did little more than ratify the Herter decision and approve the wording by phone.

The man Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev blamed for the affair—Central Intelligence Agency Chief Allen Dulles—also approved the statement. While neither he nor any of his aides was listed as among those who conferred with Herter on Saturday, the CIA as well as the Pentagon was fully consulted.

Herter first heard about the missing plane when he was in

Athens, Greece. He arrived home Friday afternoon. Herter was at his desk from 9 a. m. to 6 p. m. Saturday, devoting the day to the problem of how the United States should react to one of the most embarrassing, and potentially serious, incidents in years.

Herter and his aides decided that Khrushchev had the United States so nailed down with voluminous details about the plane, its pilot and his mission, that the only thing to do was to admit the truth.

They argued that, given these circumstances, it would be of assurance to millions of Americans and the millions more elsewhere in the free world to know, by an official U. S. statement, that this country was doing its best to penetrate the Iron Curtain.

They philosophized that trouble and fear in the world springs in the main from what the United States does not know about the Soviet Union. Once caught at trying to find out, it was reasoned, why not go beyond a mere admission and try to put a positive face on the affair?

It was in this vein that the statement was drafted. Hence the statement that such activities are necessary "as measures for legitimate national de-

fense" because of the "excessive secrecy practiced by the Soviet Union in contrast to the free world." Hence the references to the President's 1955 "open skies" aerial inspection proposal rejected by the Soviets, as something which would have made unnecessary such clandestine flights over Russia.

One sentence stated that unarmed civilian-piloted U2 aircraft, such as the one downed, "have made flights along the frontiers of the free world for the past four years." The idea here was to let Khrushchev know the United States has learned a lot about his country since he rejected the "open skies" idea and the United States thereupon embarked on development of the Ultra-high altitude U2 program.

Officials here took careful note of Khrushchev's complimentary remarks about the high quality of the photographs taken by the U2 before it was downed. By inference, therefore, they were saying to him "we've got plenty more you haven't seen."

As to the statement's claim

that there was no authorization for the flight by "the authorities" in Washington, Herter and his colleagues faced something of a dilemma. To put it that way was to imply that an American plane could overfly at will the Soviet Union for far more lethal purposes than picture-taking without official approval; in effect, that a pilot might even make such a flight with a nuclear weapon and drop it without orders to do so. Khrushchev has long been warning of just such a danger to peace.

But the implication was allowed to stand for a more important reason: It was just totally impossible to concede that the President could have had any information about such a flight.

Here Herter and his aides paid attention to Khrushchev's statement that he was inclined to accept White House Press Secretary James C. Hagerty's earlier remark that the President did not know about the

plane.

In effect, therefore, each side is excusing the President personally from any hand in the embarrassing affair. By doing so, prospects for the Paris summit conference, due to open a week from today, as well as the Eisenhower visit to Russia in June were not dimmed, as far as the actual events are concerned.

Whatever the merits of the reasoning described here behind the decision to make the statement, there is no doubt it did not go down well with America's friends and allies.

For example, the New York Herald Tribune News Service last night quoted one British diplomat as saying:

"Your friends are going to ask a lot of questions and some of them—particularly the professionals in espionage—are going to ask why, even if your agent got caught, your Government had to admit to it? Long before the United States came into being, the cardinal point of international es-

pionage has been that an agent is dispensable. The fate of a nation is above the fate of an individual. And if you are going to act like amateurs, for God's sake, get out of the espionage business. For when your country is embarrassed, it diminishes the voice of the entire West."

As to the effect on the summit conference, Khrushchev's exploitation of the plane incident and his words yesterday on the Berlin issue appear to be evidence that he hopes to use the incident to drive a hard bargain.

The minority view here for some time has been that the Administration was taking too airy a view in thinking that Khrushchev would not kick up a major row at the summit over Berlin. The big question now is whether the incident itself, or internal pressures inside Russia aided by the incident, will move Khrushchev to take a tougher stand at the summit.

TAB



## People Want Cold War to End, Cleveland Capitalist Asserts

Cyrus S. Eaton, one of America's wealthiest capitalists, controls an industrial empire reckoned in billions of dollars. Eaton wanted to become a Baptist minister but failed in this aspiration. He is nevertheless preaching today—perhaps more effectively as a capitalist than as a man of the cloth—preaching peace and co-operation with the Communists of Russia.

A week ago Russia awarded him its Lenin peace prize. This undoubtedly reflected Eaton's untiring efforts to bring about personal exchanges between President Eisenhower and Premier Khrushchev as a means of cooling off the cold war. Next week these two leaders are scheduled to come face to face again at the summit.

On the eve of this historical meeting, and in the light of the downing of a U.S. observation plane deep within Russian territory, the Daily News sought Eaton's opinions on the latest crisis. A staff writer was sent to Cleveland to interview him. Here is his exclusive report of Eaton's views.

BY JAY McMULLEN  
Staff Writer

CLEVELAND — Cyrus S. Eaton, dyed-in-the-wool American capitalist who won Russia's Lenin peace prize, said the spy plane incident showed that the U.S. intelligence system was clumsy, stupid and "utterly wrong."

"It's a very stupid piece of business. And to think we're spending billions of dollars on that sort of thing," he said.

"It's all part of our unfortunate arrogance. It's incredible that we could be so stupid."

HE SAID the plane incident was "unfortunate" but added:

"It may help us take the summit meeting and our relations with the Russians more seriously."

Eaton said there is a groundswell of sentiment in this nation to get us off our arrogant high horse and end the cold war with Russia.

EATON SAID that since winning the Lenin prize, announced May 3, he has been deluged with letters, telegrams and phone calls of congratulations from business tycoons and ordinary citizens urging him to continue his work.

The prize brings \$35,000, but Eaton doesn't need the money. He controls or has an influ-

ential voice in industries worth well in excess of \$2 billion.

IN AN exclusive interview with the Daily News, Eaton assailed the American policy of ringing the Soviet Union with air bases.

"I feel very strongly our planes ought not to be going over Soviet territory to irritate them," he said.

"There are too many insulting epithets and provocative statements coming from the Pentagon and the State Department. The Soviets take all these things seriously."

"They believe the statements wouldn't be issued unless the heads of our government wanted them to be."

He urged that we "put an end to these provocative ghost writers" for the State Department and Pentagon.

HERE'S A MAN [Khrushchev] saying he wants peace, but we say we can't trust him, to keep our guard up and that nothing worthwhile is going to happen at the summit meeting," he said.

"Khrushchev had his heart set on great accomplishments at the summit. But the consensus of statements of U.S. government officials indicate we're not taking it very seriously."

EATON SAT with his legs crossed at the side of his desk—a highly polished wooden one, of customary office size—as he talked.

The room is an intimate wood-paneled conference room, cozy with a fireplace and an antique French clock on the mantel, on the 36th floor of Cleveland's Terminal Tower building.

Here are the offices of the Chesapeake & Ohio railroad, of which Eaton is board chairman.

His full crop of snow white

hair, neatly combed, would remind any Chicagoan of former Mayor Martin H. Kennelly, along with his gentle tones, kindly manner and alert blue eyes.

TWIN antique globe maps of the world, on pedestals, stand in the shadow as evidence of Eaton's world-wide business and political interests.

Occasionally, he arose, strode to a window and with hands in his pockets gazed distantly into the morning mists hanging over Cleveland's waterfront.

Even at 76, this man gives an unforgettable impression of vigor, determination and the courage of his convictions.

THE Russians are conscious we're trying to strengthen the hands of NATO and put more deadly weapons in the hands of the Germans right on their borders," Eaton said.

"We've got to quit talking about peace out of both sides of our mouth."

Eaton said he has been told by high British and Canadian sources that American officials negotiating in Geneva on cessation of A-bomb tests are "only stalling, hoping the Russians will lose their tempers" because the Americans don't want to halt such tests.

"The British are just as conscious as I am that we are making preposterous demands, but it's all make-believe."

He said he is "amazed at the patience and forbearance of Khrushchev, in view of what's coming out of Washington."

EATON chose the occasion of the award to announce a forthcoming visit to the Eastern European countries under Russian influence (he won't call them "satellites") to gather



CYRUS EATON

TAB

## U. S. Photographed Soviet Spy Planes

**By JACK RAYMOND**

WASHINGTON, May 10.

The United States has photographed Soviet jet planes on aerial reconnaissance over Western military bases all over the world, Pentagon authorities said today.

However, the highest available sources said they were unaware of any Soviet efforts to fly such missions over the continental United States.

The United States has never downed a Soviet reconnaissance plane, a high military official said. He explained that United States interceptor planes were operating under strict orders not to fire on Soviet reconnaissance aircraft unless they are fired on.

Most of the Soviet efforts at surveillance from the air have occurred in the Pacific, according to Defense Depart-

meat sources. They cited military installations in Taiwan and Japan, as well as ships of the Seventh Fleet, as the focus of known Soviet military intelligence interest.

On some occasions, according to a high official, United States planes have joined Soviet formations on aerial reconnaissance off the Asian coast, and each side has taken pictures of the other.

Official sources would not provide a list of incidents in which the Russians have been identified as attempting military reconnaissance.

Publication of such a list has been under consideration, it was learned. Many officials at the Pentagon would like to see it appear. The State Department, however, has not yet made the necessary judgment that it would favor United States national interests, it was said.

Official sources confirmed that the Russians had made a considerable number of reconnaissance flights across Arctic regions but had been careful to skirt Alaska, it was said.

In most instances the Russians have used an apparently heavily instrumented Badger TU-16 bomber. This is a twin-jet swept-wing plane from which the TU-104 civil airliner was developed.

The same plane has been seen in Soviet Naval Air force maneuvers with air-to-surface missiles under its wings.

The Badger, which can be released in the air, carries a crew of five or six. Its maximum speed is estimated at 620 miles an hour and its range at 4,320 miles.

## No Flights Over Hawaii

According to officials there is no evidence that the Russians have ever attempted aerial reconnaissance over Hawaii and the Philippines. Nor have they been known to attempt such missions in Western Europe, except to keep track of military traffic going into Berlin in one of three aerial corridors through East Germany.

Pentagon sources said that the Russians have been very active in naval reconnaissance with submarines and trawlers equipped with radar and various types of electronic instruments.

Fleets of submarines and trawlers have scoured both the Pacific and Atlantic and in many instances have been identified no less than three miles from the United States coast. This would put them in international waters according to the United States position at the recent international conference in Geneva on the subject but clearly inside the twelve-mile limit for territorial waters advocated by the Soviet Union.

Information that the State Department had prevented the Navy from making public more details of the appearance of a Soviet trawler in the area off Long Island where the United States, first Polaris submarine, the George Washington, was undergoing tests also became known today.

## Disclosure Was Barred

At first the Navy was allowed only to make public photographs of the Russian vessel with a brief caption. The State Department feared that exploitation of the incident might be provocative.

However, on April 30—the day before the U-2 plane was brought down in the Soviet Union—the State Department permitted disclosure that the trawler had forced two submarine support vessels to change course to avoid collision when it steamed into the test area.

The Navy was prevented from reporting a surmise that the trawler might have been trying to seize one of the dummy missiles the George Washington was firing.

Another note today was the confirmation by authoritative sources of the statement by Premier Khrushchev that a United States plane entered Soviet air space from Afghanistan April 9. It was explained that one of two U-2 planes taking off from Pakistan, had made a short "decoy" flight over the Soviet Union, perhaps to alert Soviet authorities to the Soviet bomber and possibly reach others.

## Alaska Flights Reported

**SAN FRANCISCO, May 10 (AP)**—An Alaska State Senator said today that planes, believed to be Russian, had made monthly flights over Alaska in recent years and Soviet fishing boats off Bristol Bay constantly checked on United States radar installations.

"Everybody in the northern part of Alaska knows about these flights and has come to take them for granted," Senator Bob Logan said in an interview.

TAB

# C.I.A. Faces Shakeup Over Spy Fiasco; Soviets to Bring U. S. Pilot 'to Account'

## U. S. Flyer Got No Spy Training 50 Dismissals In C.I.A. Likely

By Warren Rogers Jr.

WASHINGTON, May 19. — Heads will roll in the Central Intelligence Agency because of the dismal failure of spy pilot Francis G. Powers on his May Day flight over Russia.

Contrary to standard C. I. A. practice, Mr. Powers was never trained as a spy. His behavior under stress consequently failed to live up to the grim code imposed on all espionage agents.

Mr. Powers was under orders to destroy all the evidence of his trade and, if necessary, to destroy himself. He did neither, possibly because he was stunned by the ordeal of parachuting from a great height.

### A Propaganda Minus

Whatever the reason, his failure to follow orders and his subsequent confession—even if obtained through duress or drugs—woefully compromised his agency and his country. It was worse than failure. It turned a potential plus—the pictures of Soviet aggressive might he went out to get—into a propaganda minus.

Mr. Powers' immediate superiors at Adana, Turkey, compounded the boner. When Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev first accused the United States of sending a spy-plane over Russia, the C. I. A. field unit at Adana cabled a disclaimer, alleging it was a bona-fide weather-scanning flight which may have strayed into Russia.

### Agonizing Reversal

On the basis of this denial—strictly according to the spy's rule book for "covering up"—the United States pleaded innocent on Thursday. Then came the agonizing reversal on Saturday, when Mr. Khrushchev sprang the trap with Mr. Powers' confession and the pictures he took.

These are some of the early findings in the soul-searching now underway at C. I. A., the New York Herald Tribune learned today. Some dismissals are expected—one official said, "we may have fifty openings"—and a more precise requirement for training, with even tougher training, is in prospect. The shake-up will be done without fanfare. "C. I. A. officials in Adana, Washington and elsewhere will quietly get pink slips from Director Allen W. Dulles. They are not expected to make a public fuss by crying "scapegoat!" since they know they violated espionage's eleventh commandment: Thou shalt not get caught.

The C. I. A. has determined that Mr. Powers, a thirty-year-old former Air Force lieutenant with no combat experience, never received formal training.

est of the hush-hush at the agency, is based on the tried-and-true British system. It consists primarily of rehearsing with a student spy all of the eventualities he might face. It sometimes is done with hair-raising realism. How a man fares in the training is carefully recorded.

In Mr. Powers' case, the training was waived for some reason. It is theorized that he was one of the few pilots familiar with the U-2 weather-and-spy aircraft, essentially a glider powered by a single, powerful, J-57, jet engine. His willingness to undertake the hazardous job, at premium pay of \$30,000 a year plus fringe benefits and bonuses, together with his U-2 training, apparently outweighed his lack of espionage preparedness in the view of whoever hired him in 1956.

### Security Clearance

Mr. Powers was taken, on after the usual security clearance, normally including a lie-detector test, and a psychological examination. Psychologically—that is, whether he was temperamentally fitted to the task—he passed.

But officials in Washington are having some second thoughts about that now. They contrasted Mr. Powers' detailed confession with the stony silence of Col. Rudolf Abel, the Soviet spy caught in Brooklyn masquerading as a photographer in 1957 who is now serving thirty years in a Federal prison.


TAB

2004/05/13 : C10-50000T000

# TIME

THE WEEKLY NEWSMAGAZINE

**THE COLD WAR GETS HOTTER**  
The High-Flying U-2 & the Cloudy Summit



MAY 11 REC'D

PILOT  
FRANCIS POWERS

ASSOCIATED PRESS



Approved For Release 290T00782R00016

CONTINENTAL STYLING... the latest

About \$60.00 (slightly higher west of the Rockies)

NARROW SHAWL COLLAR... distinctively angled

...LINED IN WORSTED AND SILK... Forshmann's finest

...IN MAROON, OR BLUE, OR WHITE

it must be **After Six** BY RUDOFKER

AFTER SIX FORMALS, TWENTY-SECOND AND MARKET STREETS, PHILADELPHIA • 200 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK



Vol. LXXV No. 20

# TIME

THE WEEKLY NEWSMAGAZINE

May 16, 1960



THE U-2 IN FLIGHT

John Bryson

## NATIONAL AFFAIRS

### THE NATION

#### Cold-War Candor

"It is certainly no secret," said the State Department last week, "that, given the state of the world today, intelligence collection activities are practiced by all countries . . . The necessity for such activities as measures for legitimate national defense is enhanced by the excessive secrecy practiced by the Soviet Union in contrast to the free world."

With historic frankness, the statement went on to admit that "endeavoring to obtain information now concealed behind the Iron Curtain," an unarmed U.S. plane had flown over Soviet territory. Thus the U.S. told the world that a Lockheed U-2 brought down over Russia on May 1 was flying an intelligence mission, just as Premier Nikita Khrushchev said.

That admission stirred up a flurry of concern at home and abroad over the U.S.'s "embarrassment." The admission was embarrassing to the U.S. for one reason: it reversed the Administration's earlier claim that the U.S. was engaged in high-altitude meteorological research over Turkey and the plane drifted into Russia by mistake.

**Open Skies.** All the bored calm with which the world awaited an unproductive summit vanished in a new preoccupation: Would Khrushchev make use of his capture of the U.S. high-flying plane either to scuttle the summit or make unreasonable demands? Would allies be dismayed and neutrals angered?

The apprehensions, as they so often are, were exaggerated. The incident, coupled with Khrushchev's recent intransigence, has certainly heated up the cold war. But

people everywhere have accepted the reality of the cold war, which has its own kinds of maneuvers, battles, tactics and weapons.

Faced with the unexpected, the State Department, after its manly candor, set out to make its own points about the U-2.

"One of the things creating tension in the world today," it said, "is apprehension over surprise attack with weapons of mass destruction. To reduce mutual suspicion and to get a measure of protection against surprise attack, the U.S. in 1955 offered its 'open skies' proposal—a proposal which was rejected out of hand by the Soviet Union. It is in relation to the danger of surprise attack that planes of the type of the unarmed civilian U-2 aircraft have made flights along the frontiers of the free world for the past four years."

**Cleared Air.** If the U.S. felt embarrassed, perhaps rocket-rattling Nikita ("We will bury you") Khrushchev must have found it embarrassing, too, to have the world learn that unarmed, big-target U.S. planes had been flying missions over Soviet territory for four years before his armed forces finally managed to bring one down.

For reasons of his own, Nikita Khrushchev chose to make a spectacular out of the U-2 incident (*see FOREIGN NEWS*). In Washington, there were some calls for a congressional investigation, and in both the U.S. and Britain some fears were expressed that the U.S., by risking the U-2 flight "at this time," had risked prospects for "agreements" at the summit. But if the shooting down of the U-2 dimmed summit prospects, they could not have been very bright beforehand.

Perhaps they were never very bright.

President Eisenhower, Secretary of State Herter and Under Secretary of State Dillon have all made it clear in recent weeks that the U.S. will go to the summit determined to hold fast to its rights in Berlin, and Nikita Khrushchev has shown in tough-toned speeches that the U.S. firmness has undercut his hopes of making any headway at the summit.

The talk of endangered agreements at the summit showed a short memory of what the cold war was all about and how it got that way. Under standard Communist terms no agreements of any substance or durability were likely to be possible at the summit, before or after the U-2 incident, unless the U.S. and its allies would accede to Russian demands. By candidly admitting that the U.S. is flying intelligence missions over Russia, by vividly reminding the world that a cold war is going on, and by demonstrating that it reserves the right to defend itself in every way it can, the U.S. might have cleared the summit air for some hard talk on hard issues that could be a lot more worthwhile than vague, generalized agreements.

### DEFENSE

#### Flight to Sverdlovsk

(See Cover)

The low black plane with the high tail looked out of place among the shiny military jets crowding the U.S. Air Force base at Incirlik, near Adana, Turkey. Its wide wings drooped with delicate languor—like a squatting seagull, too spent to fly. Its pilot seemed equally odd: a dark, aloof young man who wore a regulation flying suit and helmet but no markings, and had a revolver on his hip. Pilot Francis Gary



Associated Press

KHRUSHCHEV SHOWS U-2's PHOTOS OF RUSSIA TO SUPREME SOVIET  
More annoying than the one he caught were those that flew unscathed.

Powers, 30, climbed into the one-man cockpit, gunned the black ship's single engine, and as the plane climbed toward take-off speed, the wide wings stiffened and the awkward outrigger wheels that had served as ground support dropped away.

Steadily the plane climbed—beyond the ceiling of transports, beyond the ceiling of bombers and interceptors, up through 60,000 ft., beyond the reach of any other operational craft and, as far as the pilot knew, of anti-aircraft fire as well. Back at Incirlik, an operations officer tersely logged the take-off of the high-altitude U-2 weather research flight. If all went well, that was all the official records would ever have to say. Meanwhile, Pilot Powers banked to a course that took him north and east—arcing toward the border of Soviet Russia.

As the world found out last week, Francis Powers, onetime U.S. Air Force first lieutenant, was off on an intrepid flight that would ultimately carry him up the spine of the Soviet Union. From south to north, his high-flying instruments would record the effectiveness of Russian radar, sample the air for radioactive evidence of illicit nuclear tests. The U-2's sensitive infra-red cameras could sweep vast arcs of landscape, spot tall, thin smokestacks or rocket blasts—if there were any—on pads far below.

Francis Powers was on an intelligence mission, like many unsung pilots before him. As such, he was as much a part of the long thin line of U.S. defense as G.I.s on duty in Berlin, technicians manning missile-tracking stations behind him in Turkey, shivering weather watchers drifting through a winter on ice islands in the Arctic. As such, he, and they, were engaged in giving the free world the warning it must have if it is to protect itself from Russian attack, and the shield of intelligence it must have if it is to seek peace

without the danger of being lured into a fatal trap.


**Cloak & Dagger.** But Pilot Powers had bad luck: he got caught, and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev says that he talked. Thus Khrushchev had the chance to tell the world about the U-2's mission last week—with all the embellishment and distortion that best suited his case.

After taking off from his base in Turkey on April 27, said Khrushchev, Powers flew across the southern boundary of the U.S.S.R. to Peshawar in Pakistan. From there, on May 1, he took off on a reconnaissance flight that was supposed to take him up the Ural Mountains to Murmansk

on the Kola Peninsula to a landing in Norway (see map). Soviet radar tracked him all the way, and over Sverdlovsk, on Khrushchev's personal order, he was shot down at 65,000 ft. by a Soviet ground-to-air rocket. Pilot Powers, said Khrushchev, declined to fire his ejection seat because that would have blown up his plane, its instrumentation and possibly Powers himself. Instead, he climbed out of his cockpit, parachuted to earth and was captured, while his plane crashed near by.

Khrushchev spared no cloak-and-dagger touches. He brandished what he called a poisoned suicide needle that Powers was supposed to use to kill himself to avoid capture. Said Khrushchev: Powers refused to use it—"Everything alive wants to live." Khrushchev displayed high-altitude, infra-red pictures of Soviet targets, which he said had been reclaimed from the U-2's cameras ("The pictures are quite clear. But I must say ours are better"). No one explained how so much could be salvaged from a plane purportedly destroyed by a rocket. Khrushchev waxed in sarcasm as he reported that Powers had carried a conglomeration of French francs, Italian lire and Russian rubles, plus two gold watches and seven gold rings. "What was he going to do?" asked Khrushchev scornfully. "Fly to Mars and seduce Martian women?"

"For the time being," said Khrushchev after threatening a trial for Powers and a press conference at which the remains of the U-2 would be put on public display, "we qualify this aggressive act by an American aircraft . . . as one aimed at nerve-racking, rekindling the cold war and reviving the dead rat while it is not yet prepared for war. Imagine what would happen if a Soviet plane appeared over New York or Chicago," he went on. "U.S. official spokesmen have repeatedly de-



clared that they have duty atomic bombers which, on the approach of a foreign plane, can take to the air and head for assigned targets . . . We do not have duty bombers, but we do have duty rockets, which accurately and inevitably will arrive at their appointed targets and do their job more surely and efficiently."

**Intelligence Gap.** As Khrushchev's scathing statement hit Washington, officials broke their Saturday calm for a day-long series of huddles and telephone calls to the President at his Gettysburg farm. In the end, a week of confusion was washed out with one eminently sensible decision: to tell the truth. With the President's approval, hapless Lincoln White, the same State Department spokesman who had the day before denied any U.S. overflights of Russia, dictated the statement that a U.S. jet had indeed been snooping for Soviet secrets—as U.S. planes have been doing for the past four years. "The necessity for such activities as measures for legitimate national defense," said White, "is enhanced by the excessive secrecy practiced by the Soviet Union in contrast to the free world."

Such cold-war candor gave the U.S. a chance to discuss with equal candor the massive problem of getting adequate intelligence about the vast Communist nations. The Soviet dictatorship keeps its secrets—even from its own citizens—by the classic techniques of a police state. Travel is restricted, and foreigners off the beaten path are spied on. No news of even an air crash ever appears in the Soviet press unless the Kremlin wants it there; no stories of new weapons or defense plants are ever told by Moscow's radio commentators unless there is a propaganda motive. Secrecy not only enables Khrushchev & Co. to hide what they have but to hide what they don't have as well.

Early in the high-stakes cold-war game, the U.S. knew that it was appallingly weak on its intelligence of the U.S.S.R. This meant that the U.S. had no real basis for shaping its own deterrent force. The U.S. Air Force thought for years that it had to defend itself against a big Russian bomber force when the Soviets actually had switched to missiles. In the dawning age of ICBMs, the U.S. itself became a certain target with all major defense installations well known; yet U.S. forces did not know of any military targets except major Soviet cities, and precious little about the new ones that were behind the Urals. No gap in weapons was ever so serious to U.S. security as the intelligence gap.

**Fringe of Space.** Soon after the cold war began, heavily loaded U.S. patrol bombers began lugging cameras and electronic gear around the rim of Russia to scout out Soviet radar defenses. As they fought their ill-equipped, cold-war intelligence battles, they counted their casualties from Siberia to Armenia. Some five years ago the Central Intelligence Agency asked California's Lockheed Aircraft Corp. to design an almost incredible plane. It must be capable of deep penetration of



UPI

MOSCOW PHOTO OF PURPORTED WRECKAGE OF THE U-2  
Right down on the landscape.

the Soviet land mass; it must be able to fly far above the possibility of interception—out on the fringes of space. And it must manage its lofty missions while burdened with a maximum of intricate electronic and camera gear. In an astonishing one year later, Lockheed's most expert design team delivered the U-2.

By 1956 U.S. pilots at far-flung airstrips—England, Japan, Turkey, Alaska—began to see the strange, gliderlike jet come and go on its errands. But details of its mission and its performance were hard to

come by. Whenever a U-2 landed, military police swarmed around it. Its pilots were civilians, and when an airman would nudge up close at the officers' club bar to swap plane lore, the U-2 pilot would smile and move along.

Inevitably, though, there were a few crashes, and, inevitably, word got around. In 1957 the Pentagon officially acknowledged the U-2, described it as a high-altitude, single-engined weather research plane—which it surely is. But the public rarely got a look at it. Then one day last September members of a Japanese glider club were shooting landings at a light-plane strip 40 miles southwest of Tokyo. In midafternoon a black jet, its engine dead, wobbled down on the strip.

Fifteen minutes later a U.S. Navy helicopter arrived, disgorged a squad of Americans in civilian clothes. For the first time the pilot opened his canopy, called, "I'm O.K.," and climbed out. The Japanese noted that he carried a pistol at his waist, that his flight suit bore no markings. Moments later more U.S. civilians arrived, drew pistols and ordered the Japanese away from the plane. But not before Eiichiro Sekigawa, editor of Tokyo's *Air Views*, got a meticulous description.

**Last Inch.** The tapered, square-tipped wings, reaching for 45 ft. to either side of a slim 40-ft. fuselage, gave the U-2 the look of a high-performance sailplane. They suggest a range far beyond that circumscribed by the fuel supply. Editor Sekigawa, a glider pilot himself, speculated that the U-2 was built to climb under its own power, soar with its engine cut, for long, valuable miles in the thin upper atmosphere. Its Pratt & Whitney J57 turbojet engine could kick it along at speeds just under the speed of sound, and its light frame could almost surely be coaxed to altitudes close to 100,000 ft.

Everything about the U-2 seemed tailored to obtain the last inch of range, the



U.S. Air Force

PILOT POWERS  
Right up the spine.

## THE ATOM

last moment of endurance. The thin straight wings were a model of aerodynamic cleanliness; the raked, razorlike tail added a minimum of drag. Even the landing gear was pared to the final ounce. Light bicycle-type main wheels were aided by wing-tip wheels that were dropped immediately after take-off. Between gliding and plain powered flight, Sekigawa guessed that the U-2 could stay aloft as long as nine hours on a single trip.

"Undoubtedly the plane's activity is largely weather reconnaissance," wrote Sekigawa. "Still it would be idle to think it is not being used for other reconnaissance while it goes about researching air conditions. Otherwise, why was it necessary to threaten Japanese with guns to get them away from the crippled plane? And why did the plane have no identification marks? Why did the pilot have no identifying marks on his clothes?"

**Plane-Happy.** Editor Sekigawa guessed more than most brass in Washington. Once the U-2 was test-flown, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) set up a pilot training unit ostensibly under control of Lockheed—but most of Lockheed's top officials made it a point to know very little about it. Everything was turned over to Vice President Clarence L. ("Kelly") Johnson, who is in charge of Advanced Development Projects. The training unit recruited select U.S. pilots, and presumably they were drilled in the same rigorous survival training as Strategic Air Command pilots. Presumably they got long special training in high-altitude work.

In 1956 Lockheed recruited Air Force 1st Lieut. Francis Powers. Powers was a plane-happy youngster born in the Cumberland mountain country in Kentucky, near the Virginia border. His father, Oliver Powers, 55, who owns a shoe-repair shop in Norton, Va., reveled in telling callers last week that Francis got his first plane ride at the age of 14, came back to announce: "I left my heart up there, Pap, and I'm goin' back to git it."

On the way to git it, Francis Powers finished high school in Grundy, Va., got a B.A. at Milligan College in Tennessee, and enlisted in the Air Force. In 1951 he was accepted for aviation cadet training, got his wings a year later. But even during the Korean war, when he was a full-fledged jet fighter pilot, Powers never saw service overseas. The Air Force did not seem to hold enough excitement for him, and in 1956 he resigned "to seek employment with civilian industry."

That employment meant the U-2 program at Lockheed. It meant the rigorous training of a modern-day espionage intelligence agent who had first of all to be a fine pilot, whose intricate instruments would do the actual work for him. Powers learned the tight-lipped, laconic line of the secret agent. After he and his wife moved to Turkey, he convinced his parents that he was doing only weather work, that he never flew closer than 100 miles to the borders of Russia, that life in Adana was long repetitious periods of boredom between infrequent flights.

**Grim Gamesmanship.** U.S. intelligence officers believe that the Russians have long known of U-2 surveillance flights. But the U-2, flying at least as high as 80,000 ft., was beyond the reach of their anti-aircraft weapons. To have accused the U.S. of overflights would have been to admit an inability to defend the country against U.S. planes. Whether Khrushchev indeed got himself an accurate new anti-aircraft rocket, or whether—as first U.S. stories had it—Pilot Powers came dangerously low with trouble in his oxygen system, the U.S., at week's end, did not know. In any event the bagging of a U-2 was a moment that Russia's bosses had long looked forward to, and Khrushchev understandably made the most of it.



LOCKHEED'S KELLY JOHNSON  
Part of the line of defense.

In the grim gamesmanship of the cold war, Khrushchev scored the U-2 missions as omens of aggression. But as long as U.S. forces need to seek out the sources of possible attack, such flights will continue. Until improved reconnaissance satellites swing into orbit, bold pilots will continue their crossing of a hostile continent. The oxygen mask will continue to put a new face on the secret agent of tradition, marking his release from the hole-and-corner, back-alley deals of history.

The State Department's blunt admission that it was engaged in aerial intelligence may have surprised sophisticates who felt the U.S. would never admit such activity. It may have shocked the innocent who were sure the U.S. would never indulge. But at this late hour of the nuclear age, it is inconceivable that any reasonable government would not accept all risks in the race for such military intelligence. The chance of exposure may be great, but the risk involved in not trying is far greater: the probable penalty would be more than mere embarrassment.

## Peaceable Explosions

Amid the excitement about the U-2, Presidential Press Secretary James Hagerty read to newsmen an announcement that, against the background of rumblings in Moscow, sounded deliberately provocative. President Eisenhower, said the announcement, had approved a massive boost, from \$10 million to \$66 million, in funds for Project Vela, a program of research on detection of underground nuclear tests—and Vela would include, "where necessary, nuclear explosions." Largely because of the awkward timing, the word buzzed far and wide that the President, in reaction to the shooting down of the U-2 and Nikita Khrushchev's tough talk, had decided to resume nuclear tests—suspended in October 1958—as a measure of national preparedness.

But Ike's decision was a logical outgrowth of the East-West negotiations on banning nuclear tests. With U.S. experts disagreeing among themselves about detection of underground nuclear tests, the U.S. had repeatedly made clear that 1) it could not enter into an agreement to ban underground tests without further research on methods of detection, and 2) this research, to be reliable, would have to include actual nuclear explosions, not just conventional explosions.

At the U.S.-British-Russian test-ban conference in Geneva early last week, Soviet Delegate Semyon K. Tsarapkin, on instructions from Moscow, unexpectedly dropped his longtime insistence that any East-West program of research on underground test detection would have to be carried out solely with conventional explosives, agreed to include a "strictly limited number" of nuclear explosions. Viewed in the light of Tsarapkin's concession and the previous history of the test-ban negotiations, Project Vela seemed entirely peaceable.

## FOREIGN RELATIONS

*Cleopatra's Needle*

In its patient diplomatic efforts to keep lids on a dozen potential volcanoes in the Arab world, the U.S. has to walk with care along the mountainous hatreds between the Arab nations and Israel. If U.S. diplomacy is offended in principle by the fact that Egypt's Dictator Gamal Abdel Nasser bars the Suez Canal to all Israeli shipping and blacklists all ships that traffic in Israeli ports, in private it thinks first about all those Arab volcanoes spouting at the same time. Last week the State Department found the whole delicately balanced U.S. position in the Middle East jeopardized by two self-appointed groups of mountain movers:

¶ For 24 days the Egyptian passenger-freighter *Cleopatra* has been dockbound in Manhattan, immobilized and unloaded because of a picket line thrown up by the Seafarers International Union (TIME, May 9). The union complained that Nasser's discrimination against ships touching at Israeli ports was, in effect, unfair to U.S.

## NATIONAL AFFAIRS

### THE NATION

#### Eruption at the Summit

The high-powered international diplomatic pressure generated by the May Day U-2 intelligence flight over Russia by U.S. Pilot Francis Gary Powers erupted spectacularly this week at the Big Four Summit conference in Paris.

Sitting across the table from the President of the U.S., Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev vented a bitter attack on the U.S. and on Dwight Eisenhower. He withdrew his invitation to the President to visit Russia next month. He demanded an apology for the U-2 flight, threatened



Jim Mahan  
SENATOR JOHNSON

to break up the summit conference unless the U.S. would promise to punish all responsible for the flight and promise that all such overflights cease. He suggested, in the kind of face to face insult that strained even cold war diplomacy, that the summit should be adjourned until the U.S. could elect a new president.

The President accused Khrushchev of coming all the way from Moscow to Paris to deliver an "ultimatum" and to "sabotage" the summit meeting, yet offered to meet with him in a private two-way conversation to try to save the summit. But Eisenhower assured Khrushchev that U.S. intelligence overflights had been suspended "and are not to be resumed." Then the President disclosed that he intends to go to the United Nations with a new plan for aerial inspection of all countries to guard against surprise attack—a plan similar to his "open-skies" proposal made to the 1955 summit conference at Geneva, which Russia has repeatedly and emphatically turned down.

**Right to Look.** The summit eruption was brought on not only by the U-2 flight itself (see following story), but by the

fact that all last week the U.S. took the firm position that, in the circumstances of the cold war, it had a right to defend itself against surprise attack by intelligence activities. This policy was laid down first by Secretary of State Christian Herter in a formal statement. "The Government of the United States," said he, as he prepared to go to the summit, "would be derelict to its responsibility not only to the American people but to free peoples



Paul Schutzer—LIFE  
SECRETARY HERTER

#### Risk and responsibility accepted.

everywhere if it did not, in the absence of Soviet cooperation, take such measures as are possible unilaterally to lessen and to overcome this danger of surprise attack. In fact, the U.S. has not and does not shirk this responsibility."

When Khrushchev responded with a threat to "strike" and "hit" at any nation that provided an airbase for such U.S. intelligence flights, the State Department replied that the U.S. would defend any foreign nation whose bases were so attacked.

**"Utmost Confidence."** Herter's proposition was recognized from the beginning as straining the bounds of international law (see box, next page), and promised a briefcase full of problems. But both par-

ties in Congress closed ranks behind it. In the Senate, Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson said: "Espionage and intelligence gathering are not something that cause the cold war. Nikita Khrushchev cannot use this incident in such a way as to divide the American people and to weaken our national strength. The American people are united in a determination to preserve our freedoms, and we are not going to be shaken from that course."

In the House, Missouri Democrat Clarence Cannon, a trained lawyer, brought his colleagues to a standing ovation by revealing that his special subcommittee on appropriations had secretly approved



Walter Bennett  
CONGRESSMAN CANNON

the U.S. overflights of the U.S.S.R. from the very beginning, and by praising President Eisenhower, "in whose military capacity (we) have the utmost confidence."

The President told his press conference that the real cause of world tension is not the U.S. policy of high flights but the Soviet "fetish of secrecy and concealment" behind which the U.S.S.R. could prepare a large-scale attack without detection. "No one wants another Pearl Harbor. This means that we must have knowledge of military forces and preparations around the world, especially those capable of massive surprise attacks. Secrecy in the Soviet Union makes this essential . . . Ever since the beginning of my Administration, I have issued directives to gather in every feasible way the information required to protect the United States and the free world against surprise attack and to enable them to make effective preparations for defense."

The secret operations are "supervised by responsible officials," he went on. "We do not use our Army, Navy or Air Force for this purpose, first to avoid any possibility of the use of force in connection



with these activities, and secret agents of our military forces cannot be given latitude under broad directives but must be kept under strict control."

**Common Cause.** The right-to-spy proposition had its domestic critics from the beginning. Adlai Stevenson recognized the need for intelligence but asked: "Is it possible that we, the United States . . . could do the very thing we dread: carelessly, accidentally trigger the holocaust?" Columnist Walter Lippmann kept up a running battle from the legal flank: "To avow that we intend to violate Soviet

spot . . . The avowal is an open invitation to the Soviet government to take the case to the United Nations, where our best friends will be grievously embarrassed."

Nikita Khrushchev did threaten last week to take the issue to the U.N. but the first hours of the summit conference this week proved that his goal was not so much discussion of issues as massive propaganda. And if he wrecked the prospects of meaningful high-level international negotiation in the process, he did not much seem to care.

## Tracked Toward Trouble

For a man whose profession was synonymous with secrecy, Pilot Francis Gary Powers continued to be the most-talked-about man of the week—in the U.S., in allied countries and in Russia, where his pictures were plastered on exhibition walls and where he would soon oust both Dwight Eisenhower and Mark Twain as the best-known American. Bit by bit, a more complete story of his ill-fated U-2 jet flight to Sverdlovsk emerged from

# LAW IN THE SKY

## What Are the Rights of High Flight?

**W**HEN the U.S. proclaimed that it has a defensive right to fly high in the sky above Communist territory, it entered into an area of international law as unexplored and uncertain as outer space itself. Says International Lawyer and Political Scientist Hans Morgenthau of the University of Chicago: "There are no legal precedents for such flights."

The U.S. now finds itself in a grey area between war and peace, in a time when old codes are frequently stretched or violated. In the past cold-war decade, Soviet or Red Chinese combat planes have attacked and gunned down half a dozen U.S. patrol planes, several of them well outside Communist borders. The cost: at least 28 U.S. lives. The penalty paid by the Soviets, despite U.S. protests to the World Court: none. In West Berlin, refugees are kidnapped by Communist agents and smuggled behind the Iron Curtain—beyond the reach of Western law. Considering these cold-war realities, does the U.S. have a legal or moral right to bend or break the generally accepted rules covering sovereignty and flights over national borders? The nation's ultimate position hinges on the answers to other questions:

### Is espionage legal?

All countries have spies. International law holds spying legal and moral. But no international law protects a captured spy. He has no rights. Usual penalty for wartime spying: death.

### Are frontiers held inviolable?

Invasion of another state's frontier is a well-established, old-fashioned breach of international law.

### Do frontiers extend into the sky?

All nations agree that a country's territorial rights extend above its land. But that agreement is fairly new—dating from World War I, when man began to appreciate the potential of the airplane as a weapon of combat and reconnaissance.

### How high does sovereignty go?

Some legal experts contend that sovereignty ends with the last trace of oxygen—more than 600 miles up. Others note that the three-mile limit at sea was fixed by the range of oldtime land-based guns, figure that the same measure of "effective control" can be applied to the air. By that gauge, a surveillance plane flying at 80,000 ft. could penetrate the U.S.S.R. without violating sovereignty, because so far as is known, no Soviet land-based rocket, missile or plane could touch it.

**If the U.S. claims the right to fly over the U.S.S.R., would it have to allow Soviet spy planes to fly over the U.S.?**

The Russians would have a strong case. The State Department seeks to deflect it by reminders that President Eisenhower has been working toward an internationally recognized right of overflight in his "Open Skies" plan offered at the 1955 summit conference in Geneva.

**Would U.S. defenders now fire upon any Soviet recon-**

**naissance planes if they were caught over U.S. territory?**

Yes, unless the pilot agreed to land and surrender himself and his craft.

**Is there a legal difference between an unarmed reconnaissance plane and an unarmed reconnaissance satellite, such as the U.S.'s Tiros?**

Plenty. No nation has claimed sovereignty over outer space, where satellites spin. The Soviets have not complained about the well-publicized fact that Tiros takes pictures of Soviet territory. One reason is that Soviet satellites have certainly passed over U.S. territory (though the U.S.S.R. has no picture-taking Tiros types in orbit). Thus the U.S. can make a legal argument that the U.S.S.R. has accepted satellite orbitings by "custom."

### Is there a recognized law of self-defense?

International law recognizes self-preservation as a fundamental right. For centuries the self-defense argument has often been used—and sometimes abused—to justify actions of one nation against another.

### Can the U.S. legally spy in the sky for self-defense?

Lawyers disagree—sharply. Says Milton Katz, director of international legal studies at Harvard: "The argument of self-defense is difficult to maintain if we're not at war." But other students of international law hold that in the age of hydrogen weapons, when nations can be devastated in a single strike, there is indisputable equity in the position taken by the U.S. Government; yet the Soviets could also claim the equal self-defensive right to shoot down any foreign-spy planes, since radarmen on the ground cannot distinguish an unarmed surveillance plane from a plane carrying a hydrogen bomb.

### Does Soviet Russia recognize international law?

Rarely. It has never accepted the jurisdiction of the World Court. It was one of the few major nations that declined to sign the 1944 Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, which says "every state has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the air space above its territory." It has questioned whether any treaty with a capitalist nation is binding on a Communist country.

At its best, the body of international law is incomplete, inconsistent—and sometimes incomprehensible. But the U.S. has pledged to support and contribute to a world rule of law. The challenge facing the U.S. is to clarify existing law and to lead the way in expanding the law to cover new situations. In laying down his argument for the U.S. right to defend itself from surprise attack by intelligence activities, Secretary Herter may have contributed to that expansion. Columbia University's Professor Philip Jessup believes that the only practical solution is for the U.S. and its allies to declare "a state of intermediacy"—something between war and peace—and lay down laws to regulate it, just as there are separate laws for war and peace.

TAB

the grim, grey silence of international espionage.

**Weather Watch.** Powers took off from the U.S. Air Force base at Incirlik, near Adana, Turkey, April 27, flew to Peshawar, Pakistan. There he fidgeted nervously, waiting to leave on his biggest mission ever. The demands of diplomacy scarcely figured in the delay; he was looking for perfect weather. He was watching for that rare day when everything would be ideal, when winds aloft promised the necessary boost along the 3,500-mile flight across the Soviet Union toward Norway, when cloud cover would be at a minimum and there would be so little moisture in the upper air that his plane would not form giveaway contrails.

Just five days after he landed at Peshawar, Powers got the go-ahead and took off. Friendly radars tracked him as far as they could across the Soviet frontier; then a U.S. radio watch tuned in on Soviet defense frequencies. The chatter of frustrated Russians was familiar and reassuring to the U.S. monitors as the intruder was passed from one Russian military zone to another. U-2 penetrations were no secret to the Soviets; Powers and other pilots had made them often during the past four years. The Russians had fired rockets, but the rockets had fallen short at some 60,000 ft.; MIG fighter planes had flashed after them and had mushed helplessly at the same altitude, well below the U-2's lofty sanctuary of 80,000-100,000 ft.

**Direct Hit?** This time the pattern changed. Over Sverdlovsk in the Soviet Urals, where his flight plan called for a half-left turn to take him northwestward toward Norway, Powers suddenly ran into trouble—probably an engine failure. "He's coming lower," said excited Russian radio-men. Listeners at U.S. outposts hung helplessly on every word while Russian antiaircraft batteries chattered tersely about the enemy plane spiraling downward into range. When the U-2 dropped to 40,000 ft., the Russians stopped talking.

Proudly, the Russian press later reported how a "rocket rushed into the stratosphere with a powerful roar," how "fragments of the foreign-spy aircraft fell through the rays of the May sun." In an effort to prove that a Soviet rocket had scored a direct hit, Khrushchev himself displayed the picture of a thoroughly wrecked plane, at the same time showed off high-altitude pictures of Soviet installations which he said had been recovered from the U-2's cameras. This raised an obvious question: How had the cameras survived such a splintering crash?

The Soviet press had no more trouble changing its tune than the U.S. State Department had forgetting its original "weather-flight" fantasy. The rocket, said a Moscow dispatch, had exploded under the U-2's tail, damaging the ejection seat. Pilot Powers had ridden his crippled ship down to 40,000 ft. before bailing out. Presumably, the Russians were claiming that the ship then fluttered in for a not-too-damaging crash landing on its own. Whether it did, or whether Powers flew his

Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100090001-4

ПЕЛТИК СБИТОГО САМОЛЕТА США  
ФРЕНСИС ГАРРИ ПАУЗРС

POWERS FRANCIS GARY THE PILOT OF THE SHOT AMERICAN PLANE



PHOTOS OF U.S. PILOT POWERS IN MOSCOW DISPLAY  
Out of the plain necessity of espionage.

Edmund Stevens

plane all the way down, this version neatly demolished Khrushchev's story that Powers had been afraid to pull the pin on his ejection seat for fear that it had been rigged to kill him.


**Told to Talk.** Despite such discrepancies, there was no doubt that the Russians had bagged the U-2. They had Powers, and they displayed some convincing wreckage. The long, gliderlike wings were remarkably intact. The Pratt & Whitney J57 jet engine was easily identifiable, as were the U.S. manufacturers' labels on cameras and electronic gear. Along with the varied supply of foreign money that Khrushchev had reported in the captured pilot's possession, the Soviets also laid out a pistol, a tube of morphine, a flashlight, a half-pack of Kent cigarettes, a Social Security card (No. 230-30-0321), a couple of pocketknives. Powers' suicide needle, they said, had been tested on a dog.

and the animal had died in 30 seconds.

They had Powers' "confession," too ("I plead guilty to the fact that I have flown over Soviet territory"), but any suggestion that his prompt admission marked him as a defector was quickly denied in Washington. In an age of such sophisticated third-degree methods as "truth serums," agents are taught to recognize the inevitable—and talk. Powers, for one, had little to tell beyond his own personal history. He had been trained as a pilot, not a spy. His instruments did his snooping for him.

**Cover Story.** Neutral intelligence experts, while admiring the daring of Powers' mission, cocked an eyebrow at what they considered poor U.S. intelligence planning. Obviously, the U.S. was using as a "cover" the story that the U-2 was engaged in weather-reconnaissance work. This story may have placated allies in case of U-2 trouble, but it was bound to fall apart if both plane and pilot were captured. Conventional cloak-and-dagger types argued that the U.S. should have kept a discreet silence in the face of all talk about the U-2. They wondered, too, why the U.S., if it really wanted to ensure against detection, could not have subcontracted the job to a foreign pilot without a country, perhaps a refugee from a Communist satellite.

But such subterfuges would probably not have satisfied critics or kept Khrushchev from making whatever use he wanted of the incident. And for all Khrushchev's claims, the U.S. was convinced that an oxygen-system failure or an engine "flame-out" had forced Pilot Powers down within rocket range, and, most importantly, that the Soviets still do not have an antiaircraft rocket capable of reaching the U-2's operating altitude. How the CIA will make use of this information, now that the U-2 program has been compromised, is still the CIA's secret.



John Bryson

U.S.'s U-2  
Into an unplanned turn to Moscow.



## "Even More Objectable"

As planned by the Democrats who pushed it through Congress, the \$251 million aid-to-depressed-areas bill was vetoed by the President last week and fell into place as a plank in the 1960 Democratic campaign platform.

I.e., in sending the bill back to Congress, recalled his veto of a bloated \$389.5 million depressed-areas bill in 1958, saw "in 1960, another election year," an "even more objectionable" approach to a long-neglected problem. His chief objection to the openhanded, broadly defined Democratic bill: "It would make eligible for federal assistance areas that don't need it."

In contrast to the Administration's \$53 million relief measure, said the President, the Democrats' bill "would squander the federal taxpayers' money where there is only temporary economic difficulty," would downgrade local self-help efforts by massive federal subsidy, might involve the Government in industry-financing in 600 eligible rural counties, and would largely overlap existing federal programs.

Chances of overriding the veto: nil. Chances of passing the Administration's alternative bill: dim.

## REPUBLICANS

### Back in the Race

New York's Governor Nelson Rockefeller got back in the Republican presidential race this week.

Faced with Vice President Nixon's overwhelming claim on the nomination, Rocky had withdrawn last December as an active challenger. Republicans of every hue, including Dick Nixon, immediately and persistently began to woo him as the most promising vice-presidential candidate around, but Rocky straight-armed every proposal. Last week Rockefeller announced that, to avoid any possible vice-presidential stampede, he would stay away from the Republican convention in Chicago.

This was the signal for New York's Republican state chairman, L. Judson Morhouse, to issue what amounted to a stinging challenge to Nixon. Urging the 96-vote New York delegation to go to Chicago uncommitted, Morhouse said: "We must recognize that the place for Rockefeller's broad appeal, reaching beyond party lines, is at the head of the ticket. Unless our national ticket this fall is headed by a candidate capable of the appeal that thrusts across and beyond Republican Party lines, we stand in serious danger of losing not only the presidency, but also the state legislature and many of our local offices."

"I believe that Governor Rockefeller should not be ruled out of consideration for the presidency—and that he should not rule himself out. He is not an active candidate and he will not seek the nomination: he has made this plain. The fact remains that he—alone with the Vice President—is one of the truly forceful



ROCKEFELLER & MORHOUSE

He won't play—unless he's pitching.

and distinguished leaders on the national scene. The Republican Party as a whole therefore must look to one or the other of these men as its best hope in 1960, and it must designate the wisest choice in the July convention."

## DEMOCRATS

### Forward Look

The first salmon streaks of dawn were coming up over Washington's National Airport when the darkened Convair winged in from West Virginia. Jackie Kennedy lay curled in sleep on a back seat, but her husband, the hero of the night before, was wide awake. As soon as the plane door opened, he hurried over to a vending machine, plunked in a dime and plucked out an early edition of the *Washington Post*. KENNEDY SWEEPS WEST VA. VOTE, proclaimed the headline. Chuckled Jack Kennedy: "I wouldn't be surprised if Lyndon and Stu might be having a conference today."

It was a logical guess. Kennedy's big victory had produced a sinking feeling in the camps of his rivals for the Democratic presidential nomination. Minnesota's Hubert Humphrey withdrew from the race and hurried home to campaign for the Senate. Texas' Lyndon Johnson and Missouri's Stuart Symington, the candidates who had sidestepped the primaries, now had every reason to form a grand alliance. Each made the usual brave comments. Said Symington: "The primary will not be any more decisive than Wisconsin." Said Johnson: "The nation can start judging on the basis of merit." But nobody was fooled; the political hour was growing late for Johnson and Symington—and later still for Adlai Stevenson, whose friends indicated that if someone would just promise to make him Secretary of State, he'd be happy.

**Liberal List.** Washington waited in vain for the stop-Kennedy summit meeting. It never came. Neither Symington nor Johnson was willing at this time to bow

Stevenson was urged to endorse Kennedy, but decided to wait out the results of this week's Oregon primary, where all hopefuls—including Oregon's own Wayne Morse—are entered. In the lull, United Auto Workers' Walter Reuther, political shop steward of Michigan's Governor G. Mennen Williams, came out for Kennedy. So did Humphreyman Joseph Rauh, vice chairman of Americans for Democratic Action.\* And even Eleanor Roosevelt, who has had her reservations about Jack Kennedy's Catholicism, issued the matriarchal opinion that he, more than either Symington or Johnson, "will be considered the candidate of the liberals."

The Ichabod specter of Estes Kefauver clomped through the stop-Kennedy speculation and talk. In 1952, with a successful string of 13 primaries behind him, the Keef was stopped cold in mid-convention by President Harry Truman and the Democratic bosses simply because he did not fit their image of a nominee. No such feelings exist about Kennedy, and his one big bugaboo—his Catholic religion—was gone with West Virginia.

**Southern Secession.** With nobody willing to step aside and nobody really determined to stop Kennedy, the situation of the rivals began to disintegrate. Truman endorsed Symington, as everyone expected him to, but even that had a slight boomerang quality about it. Questioned in Chicago by reporters, Truman said limply that the only thing he had against Kennedy was the fact that "he lives in Massachusetts." Campaigning in Maryland, Jack cracked back: "I have news for Mr. Truman. Mr. Symington was born in Massachusetts." In the South there were signs of an incipient secession from Lyndon Johnson. A wobbly move to nominate Herman Talmadge as a strategic favorite son began in Georgia. Commented the *Atlanta Constitution*: "This will further increase the probability that Senator Kennedy will be nominated on the first ballot." In Arkansas, Governor Orval Faubus noted that Kennedy seems to have "started a trend."

A grim group of Washington strategists tossed out the possibility that a crisis growing out of the Paris summit conference might change the whole picture. Such a time of national peril, they suggested, could make the Democratic Convention reject Kennedy as too young and too inexperienced to cope with Nikita Khrushchev. A better crisis candidate, the whisper went, might be Johnson, the cool, bipartisan helmsman, or Symington, the military expert, or Stevenson, the internationalist. It all had the sound, though, of whistling in the growing dark.

\* But not all liberals share the enthusiasm for Kennedy. Said the liberal *Nation* last week: "The Republican passion for Senator Kennedy is obviously based on the theory that however formidable he may be as a pre-convention candidate, he would be a weak nominee for the Democrats." In somewhat the same vein, Republicans have grinned over the fact that Kennedy has nominated New York's Nelson Rockefeller as his "strongest" possible opponent.

# Newsweek

THE MAGAZINE OF NEWS SIGNIFICANCE

May 16, 1960

SPECIAL CRISIS SECTION

## THE FLIGHT OF THE U-2

The news as it came last week, came like the successive shocks of an earthquake, timed so that there was no chance for recovery between the jolts, each one worse than the one before.

In America, from the sunlit float of a yacht club in the Carolinas to the cocktail lounge of a hotel above San Francisco, it seemed that no one could talk about anything else; but it was not only in America. In the Peninsula Hotel of Hong Kong they were talking about it, and at the Three Falcons Hotel in Copenhagen; it was on the front pages of all the British newspapers, the French, the Italian.

In short—on the very eve of the summit conference—it was an international incident: The use of the U.S. reconnaissance plane.

A blunt fact was that the U.S. had admitted that it had been guilty of a crime against international law; and Russia's Nikita S. Khrushchev was flaunting the crime to the entire world.

The rest of the world's reaction was typified by The Observer of London:

"It is hard to say which is the more irresponsible—the American order for such a flight at this politically sensitive time, or the Russian exploitation of this folly—Khrushchev's taunting statement puts American pride to a severe and risky test on the eve of the summit meeting ..."

And America's reaction was perhaps best summed up by Sen. Mike Mansfield, Montana Democrat:

"As a nation we are holding the short end of the stick, but this is the place where politics stops."

**Shock Waves:** The first jolt of this earthquake—like a real one—was not the worst.

The first jolt was Khrushchev's speech before the Supreme Soviet in the great white hall of the Kremlin. A United States airplane, Khrushchev said, had "violated" Soviet air space on May 1—May Day—and had been shot down by a Russian rocket (see next page).

This was enough to shake America. There were angry words on Capitol Hill, and news-editorials from coast to coast called on President Eisenhower to abandon his plans for the summit conference—slated to begin next week in Paris—and for his trip to Russia in June.

Two days later came the second jolt. Again

addressing the Supreme Soviet, Khrushchev triumphantly proclaimed that the Russians had the pilot "alive and kicking" and that—far from being an innocent weather pilot, as the U.S. had claimed—Francis Powers was in fact an American intelligence agent. Furthermore, Khrushchev went on, Powers had not just "strayed" into Soviet territory: He had been shot down over Sverdlovsk, 1,300 miles inside the Russian border, on a spying mission to photograph missile and other military installations.

With this speech, a new shock wave jolted across America; and the heart and center of the shock wave was in Washington.

What should be done?

**The Facts:** Everyone knows that the U.S. spies on Russia through secret agents, through intercepted transmissions, through aircraft flights—just as Soviet Russia spies on the U.S. and all the West. Col. Rudolph Ivanovich Abel, onetime chief Soviet spy in the U.S., is now serving a term in a Federal penitentiary; only a few weeks ago, a Russian trawler was photographed just off the tip of Long Island spying on the American Polaris sub George Washington (NEWSWEEK, May 9).

But everyone also knew that no modern nation ever admits spying on another.

This case, however, was a very special case; for above all it might determine the course of the summit meeting. What did Khrushchev's disclosures mean for the summit? Would the U.S. now go into the meeting at a disadvantage? How to recoup?

Into a huddle went Secretary of State Christian A. Herter; Under Secretaries Livingston Merchant and Douglas Dillon; ex-Ambassador to Moscow Charles E. Bohlen, and Allen W. Dulles, chief of the Central Intelligence Agency, and Mr. Eisenhower were consulted and the final decision was in no small part the President's own idea: Admit the spying.

Behind the decision was one major consideration—the Russians probably did have final and conclusive proof (perhaps actual film, as Khrushchev claimed, from a camera in the plane) that the American pilot had been photographing military installations.

The moment that Secretary Herter announced the truth, the major question was raised: Why the timing?

With the summit only ten days away, why

Associated Press



## SPECIAL CRISIS SECTION

had Khrushchev chosen just this moment for the disclosure? And why—again with the summit so near—had Powers been ordered onto this mission?

The answer to the second question, or at least part of it, seemed the easier. Often, just before a major conference or just before a major crisis, the Russians produce the grand gesture. (For example: The Russian moon shoot just before K's U.S. visit.) Recently, there had been ever-increasing reports that the Russians were up to something spectacular at their missile launching sites at Kapustin Yar and Tyuratam, timed for either May Day (May 1), or for just before the summit conference.

That would explain the technical necessity for Powers' flight—if not excuse the risk taken, in terms of national prestige, if the plane should be spotted and brought down, as it was.

But why Khrushchev's timing? The answer lay in a combination of factors:

►The usual Soviet procedure of trying to knock the West off balance just before a conference, so that any concession will be greeted by the world with a sigh of relief, as something achieved.

►K's own determination to show his critics at home—and in the Supreme Soviet—that he has not "gone soft" on capitalism.

►The likelihood that K simply was fed up with U.S. flights over Soviet territory and gave orders to shoot down the next plane that violated the border.

It seemed part of the pattern of the hardening of attitudes on both sides as the days before the summit dwindled to nothing. (K's speeches have become increasingly tougher in recent days, and President Eisenhower himself last week, when talking of his trip to Russia, said: "If I go"—to show Khrushchev he wasn't fooling either.)

All this seemed to make the prospects for the summit gloomy indeed. But there were rays of light:

►President Eisenhower announced the sextupling of a program of underground nuclear explosions—with the concurrence of Russia, Britain, and France—in order to improve underground detection methods.

►The North Atlantic Council announced "entire agreement" among the fifteen foreign ministers of NATO on the Western position at the summit. The West, the Foreign Ministers said, would push for "general and complete" disarmament through a series of planned stages, and would insist that the German problem can be solved only "in reunification on the basis of self-determination."

So, while the outlook for the summit was gloomy, it was not yet disastrous. Every experienced mountain climber knows the feeling of coming to a rock face that he has misjudged from below—it is far steeper than he thought. But he cannot go back down; he must go up.

## May Day! May Day!

It was on May Day—"the most festive day for our people"—said Nikita Khrushchev, that the American plane had been spotted, shortly after dawn, crossing the Soviet frontier and continuing into Russian territory. A report of the incident was flashed to Moscow and on orders from the "highest authority"—evidently Khrushchev himself—the plane was shot down. That, for the time being, was that.

From Washington, within a matter of hours, came the first official American version. It was given out, in what later proved to be embarrassing detail, by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the civilian agency nominally



Associated Press

### Pilot Powers: In the Storm

responsible for the missing plane. The U-2—so NASA said—was engaged in a routine weather data mission in the mountainous area around Turkey's huge Lake Van after taking off from a U.S. base near the Turkish port of Adana. The civilian pilot radioed that he was having difficulty with his oxygen equipment.

It was conceivable, the American statement added, that the pilot had blacked out and that the automatic pilot had kept the plane going on a northeasterly course into Soviet territory. The State Department backed up the story. "There was no deliberate attempt," it said, "to violate Soviet air space."

The Administration sent a polite note to Moscow, through diplomatic channels, asking for details about the plane and

particularly as to "the fate" of the pilot, whom it identified for the first time as 30-year-old Francis Gary Powers.

The answer came with the surprise of a plane breaking through a barrier—not through diplomatic channels, but from Khrushchev himself, in another speech before the Supreme Soviet. In a gloating speech, laden with melodrama, K made it clear to Russia and the world that the first Soviet announcement of the plane incident had been a trap, and the U.S. had walked right into it.

**"Red-handed":** Pilot Powers, roared Khrushchev, was not only alive, but he was doing plenty of talking. And, according to the Soviet Premier, he made no bones about the fact that his mission was one of espionage. "The thief," exulted Khrushchev, "was caught red-handed."

With a wealth of detail, Khrushchev gave the cheering Soviet delegates this version of what had really happened:

Francis Powers, a former Air Force flier, had taken off from Adana on April 27 in his U-2 and had flown to Peshawar in Pakistan; from there his instructions were—and here Khrushchev said he was quoting Powers directly—"to cross the state frontier of the U.S.S.R. and to fly across Soviet territory to Norway to the airdrome at the resort city of Bodo."

The pilot, Khrushchev said, admitted that he was assigned to fly over specific objectives, including Murmansk and Archangel. "I had to switch some apparatus on and off," Khrushchev quoted him as saying, "over definite landmarks which were shown on a map. I think my flight was for the collection of information on Soviet guided missiles and radar stations."

It was never intended, Khrushchev went on almost gleefully, that Powers should live to tell all these things in case he fell into Russian hands. He was equipped, said Khrushchev, with a "poison needle" with which he was supposed to kill himself before capture.

Also in the pilot's baggage, said Khrushchev, were a pistol with a silencer, a dagger, a penknife, two gold watches in addition to his own, and "seven gold rings for women." There was a roar of laughter when Khrushchev added: "Was he going to fly to Mars and seduce Martian women?"

**Mission's End:** Thus equipped, the pilot was flying deep into Russian territory, Khrushchev said, at an altitude of 60,000 feet near the Russian city of Sverdlovsk, high in the Ural Mountains. There, Powers' mission came to an abrupt end.

Apparently Powers had time to bail out, and the plane hit the ground with a good deal of damning evidence salvaged in the wreckage. And Khrushchev had it right there—or seemed to, anyway—waving it like a district attorney's Exhibit A. "We have not only the instru-

ments found on the aircraft, but also a developed film consisting of photographs of several places on our territory. Here, look at this. Here are the airfields ..."

As to Pilot Powers himself, Khrushchev observed contemptuously that he had left the Air Force in 1956 (which records bear out) to join "an American spy organization" for \$2,500 a month. "That is how capitalists buy people," he added grimly. Furthermore, he proposed that Powers should be tried for espionage.

**Quiet One:** If it came to that, Powers was almost ideally the ordinary, average, quiet American to fit the role of spy. He was an Air Force jet pilot from 1950 to 1956. An athlete (at Tennessee's Milligan College), he grew up in the Cumberland Mountain region, where his shoemaker father, Oliver, still lives at Pound, Va. He met his wife, Barbara, while in service at Albany, Ga. Few of his old acquaintances could recall anything striking about him.


As for K's flamboyant claim, how much truth was there in it? Unhappily, it looked as if there might be plenty. At the weekend, the State Department issued a statement—cleared by President Eisenhower—admitting that "insofar as the authorities in Washington are concerned, there was no authorization for any such flight as described by Mr. Khrushchev. Nevertheless it appears that in endeavoring to obtain information now concealed behind the Iron Curtain a flight over Soviet territory was probably undertaken, by an unarmed civilian U-2 plane."

## Surprise by Consent


U.S. TO RESUME UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR TESTS, the headlines blared. And, with the furor over the U-2 still raging, those who didn't bother to look behind the headlines instantly assumed that President Eisenhower had decided to answer Premier Nikita Khrushchev's diatribes by rattling the atom, too. Many, in fact, mournfully concluded that, if the U-2 incident hadn't already destroyed any hope of reaching even a limited understanding with the Soviet Union at the summit conference, the decision to hold new underground nuclear tests would.

The exact opposite was true. Actually, the decision was a necessary step toward working out a foolproof agreement by the atomic powers to ban nuclear tests—a problem that American, British, and Soviet scientists in Geneva have been debating for months. And, even though Semyon K. Tsarapkin, the Soviet delegate at the Geneva conference, expressed surprise when he learned of the decision, the fact was that it had been made with his approval.

What has baffled the scientists is how to distinguish an underground nuclear blast of less than 19 kilotons from an



Fateful Flight: From inside Russia, a crash heard round the world...



Sovfoto



Sovfoto

...and from the U-2's wreckage came these 'exhibits A and B' for Khrushchev, the Prosecutor, at his Kremlin show 'trial'

earthquake. Present detection methods are haphazard, at best. The scientists agree that, unless better methods are devised, it will be possible for a nation to violate a ban almost with impunity.

On Tuesday, May 3, the American and British scientists finally succeeded in getting the Soviet scientists to concede that it would be worthwhile for both the East and the West to conduct a series of underground nuclear tests in order to improve the instruments for detecting them. The U.S. was able to announce the decision to resume underground nuclear testing within days of the Soviet concession because it already had a project called "Vela" set up for the purpose. It was probably the speed with which the U.S. acted that caused Tsarapkin to express surprise.

Under Project Vela, the U.S. will set off nuclear devices, not atomic weapons. The U.S. has no intention of ending the moratorium on weapons testing, which is now on a month-to-month basis. The Soviet Union may be invited to participate in the experiments. It almost certainly will be invited to send observers. And whatever information American scientists get from the experiments will be shared with the Russians.

## The Reds

### K's Master Plan

Muscovites call the gray, undistinguished building at No. 4 *Novaya ploshchad* the "Little Kremlin." And for good reason. Behind the unimposing facade sits the greatest concentration of political power in the Soviet Union: The Communist Party's Central Committee and its far-reaching apparatus headed by First Secretary Nikita S. Khrushchev.

Last week, the Central Committee's 124 full members and 116 alternates met in a secret, one-day session which not only shook up the upper echelons of the Soviet Government and the party, but established beyond a doubt that a bulky cheerful engineer named Frol R. Kozlov can now be considered the heir apparent to Nikita Khrushchev.

Khrushchev was still in control, stronger than ever and ready to face the West at the summit. But up into the top levels of the party and the government, he brought new faces (see next page).

Khrushchev consolidated his grip on the party organization, put his right-hand man—Frol R. Kozlov—into the key job of a Central Committee secretary. He promoted younger, non-political technicians to top jobs in the government for a sustained drive to achieve his economic target: To overtake the U.S. in industrial and agricultural production.

He followed his own oft-repeated advice to the vast Soviet bureaucracy and gave younger generation, Soviet-trained cadres a chance to show their mettle in top jobs. At the same time, Khrushchev cut out the deadwood, the grumblers, the potential opposition, and some old-time Stalinists as well.

"Friendship is one thing, work is something else," Khrushchev once said. True to his words, he fired old buddies Nikolai I. Belyaev and former protégé Alexei I. Kirichenko from the party's Presidium for failure to execute important party assignments. He also dropped old comrades from the party secretariat.

These were big changes in personnel, but there were also important domestic developments. Khrushchev—ever sensitive to the average Russian's yearning for more consumer goods, higher living standards—introduced measures to meet


## Behind the U-2: CIA and the Anxious Congressmen

While no official in Washington was saying so publicly, nobody doubted privately that the U-2's ill-starred flight was a project of that great and shadowy organization, the Central Intelligence Agency. Indeed, it was a reminder of how far-flung and intensely complicated are the operations of the nation's top intelligence-gatherer. Plane flights close to the Soviet Union's borders are an integral part of the complex machinery by which this country tries to learn what the Russians are doing in the way of missile-launching sites.

Just what the CIA really does, around the world, and how well it does it, is something that very few people know. Even the size of its payroll remains a close secret—but certainly its employees range from scientists in hidden laboratories to dashing daredevils who risk execution by their activities in Iron Curtain countries. On one score, the CIA follows tradition of older days: When any of its people get into trouble, they are on their own.

Its security standards are so high that they sometimes seem laughable. All job applicants, for example, are expected to take lie-detector tests. And when a frazzle-nerved CIA official recently decided to consult a psychiatrist, the psychiatrist had to get security clearance.

In fact, the CIA never has been popular with Congress since it was created



Newsweek—Ed Weitz

by the National Security Act of 1947. That law permitted the organization to keep secret the names, salaries, and number of its personnel as well as their functions. It was an unprecedented divestiture of Congressional responsibility. Sen. Mike Mansfield of Montana pushed a bill to the Senate floor in 1956 calling for creation of a joint Congressional com-

mittee to supervise the CIA, modeled after the Atomic Energy Committee. The bill was defeated 59 to 27—after President Eisenhower, at the earnest behest of CIA Director Allen Dulles, passed the word that he opposed it.

Allen Dulles himself, a tweedy pipe-smoker of personal charm and undoubted abilities, commands the individual respect of most congressmen.

**The Team:** But what many rough-hewn congressmen can't abide are the types of people that Dulles seems to have surrounded himself with. The CIA's young men, school-tie and Ivy League, and a smaller number of equally poised and social young women take an active part in Washington's social life in the way that young lawyers and economists did in the early New Deal days.

One legislative leader summed up Congressional feeling like this: "We're pretty new and green at this game of espionage. For the most part, we like to believe that we don't engage in it. We know we have to do it but we don't like to think about it. This isn't the first time that we've been caught with our pants down. There'll probably be more occasions like it. And let's hope that the day will come when Congress can exercise supervision."

Congressmen don't expect that day to arrive this year. But they have a hunch that it isn't too far off.



## Q and A

### The U-2 and the Pilot

Were the Russians lying when they boasted they shot down that U-2 "spy plane" at 65,000 feet? Yes. After examining all the evidence—monitored messages of Soviet defenders, Soviet accounts of the crash, and photos of the wreckage—U.S. intelligence agents are convinced the U-2's engine flamed out and pilot Francis Powers descended to about 40,000 feet

in an effort to restart the engine. They believe that's where he was hit by anti-aircraft fire.

If so, what does this reveal about Soviet air defenses? Clearly, they are weaker and sparser than many Westerners had previously thought.

What about Powers? Why did he let the plane fall into Russian hands? U.S. officials consider Powers loyal. The Soviet rocket may well have damaged the plane's ejection mechanism.

What will happen to Powers now? Khrushchev threatens to put him "severely" on trial—which could mean execution. U.S. officials hope K will free him as soon as

### Ahead of the News

**PENTAGON**—Security forbids going into detail, but THE PERISCOPE learns that the U.S. definitely has spotted some vital Soviet strategic weaknesses. These might leave Russia vulnerable to sudden destruction in the event of war, according to members of the small, select group here which is in on the secret.

—From NEWSWEEK'S PERISCOPE (Sept. 7, 1959)

he has served propaganda purposes (see page 29).

Will the U.S. continue to make U-2 flights over Russia? It has implied it would, but it's only a matter of time until robot satellites take over reconnaissance.

Can the Russians make similar flights? No. They have reconnaissance planes but none capable of the work done by the U-2s. The Russians rely on espionage agents—and on their vast submarine fleet.

So where does the U-2 fit into the whole of East-West intelligence-gathering? It's simply part of what President Eisenhower called "a distasteful but vital necessity."

## Our Secret—And Russia's 'Secrets'

There is a double door to the narrow, high-ceilinged Room F-82 in Washington's Capitol building. The inner door is louvered, to permit air circulation when there is no great need for privacy; the outer door is solid oak, to insure secrecy when Senate finance experts gather around the green baize table to consider appropriations bills. Both doors were closed tight one day last week—the outer door was specially covered with an Army blanket to muffle the slightest sound that might otherwise filter through to the outside.

There was good reason for such dramatic precautions: A score of top legislators from both houses were meeting to hear Allen W. Dulles, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and Christian A. Herter, Secretary of State, explain the full details of how an American U-2 plane came to be shot down on a reconnaissance flight deep inside Russia May 1.

After finally lighting a stubborn pipe, the normally reticent Dulles did most of the talking during the 90-minute session, and he showed no misgivings about the "spying" crisis that had raised a worldwide storm of protest just previous to the summit conference.

"You gentlemen," Dulles said, "would consider us derelict in our duty if we didn't do that [make such flights]. Every time we locate a Soviet anti-aircraft base, we make the Strategic Air Command that much more effective. Such intelligence, in the event of war, will save lives and

bombers in many SAC squadrons. The risk we take on our reconnaissance flights is a small price to pay to accomplish that."

There was a hushed silence as Dulles paused, then went on. Flights by the U-2 and "some other craft" had been going on for more than four years, he said, and there had been several lesser "incidents" before this. What were the results of such missions?

U.S. intelligence had had great difficulty in locating Soviet ICBM bases, and the U-2 had been invaluable in spotting



Powers: He started it

UPI

them. The U.S. now knew Russia had more than 100 such bases.

►U.S. intelligence knew the Soviet air-defense command was absorbing a hefty 20 per cent of the Soviet military budget. It required U-2 flights to pinpoint aircraft installations.

►U.S. intelligence had reports that the Russians had an anti-missile missile in production, and the U-2 flights were an attempt to locate any such weapons.

Dulles then produced top-secret photographs of Soviet installations. The legislators were amazed at the detailed pictures, and it heartened leaders of both parties to know that the U.S. had such specific knowledge of the newest Soviet armaments.

At the same time, in Moscow the U-2 itself had become the biggest propaganda show in Russia. Outside the Chess Pavilion of Gorki Park, hundreds of Russians queued up to look at the jumble of wreckage—two olive-green wings riddled with little holes, a shattered fragment of the fuselage, a Magnavox radio, and such personal items as a crumpled and half-empty package of Kent cigarettes taken from the captured pilot, Francis G. Powers. It was here that Nikita S. Khrushchev climbed up onto a wicker chair to tell some 500 reporters that U.S. actions were "incredible" and "outrageous."

Where Powers himself was locked



SIMMERING  
SUMMIT

away all last week, nobody outside the Kremlin could tell. The Soviets had quoted him as confessing to "collecting intelligence information." But U.S. requests for an interview were rejected, while Khrushchev threatened to put his hostage on trial for his life.

Beyond all the dispute about the ethics or evils of spying, the crash of Powers' plane ended one chapter in the cold war—the saga of the Lockheed U-2's secret\* flights.

The U-2, originally designed for reconnaissance at very high altitudes, became a top-secret government project because of its ability to soar like a glider at altitudes up to 80,000 feet. Some 25 were built for aerial observation and each was equipped with up to fifteen infra-red cameras, powerful enough to photograph an automobile from a height of 12 miles. It was in 1956, after the Soviets rejected President Eisenhower's "open skies" plan for East-West aerial inspection, that the U-2 flights over Russia became a regular event. Not all the U-2s were engaged in spying, of course—last week, for example, the Air Force assigned three of the craft to Buenos Aires to study high-altitude radiation, and an Air Force information officer added: "This is the straight stuff."

**Monthly Mission:** But the U-2's key function was to penetrate as deep as 1,000 miles into Russian skies, apparently under the guidance of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the planes made the perilous flights on an average of once a month—a total of about 50. Sometimes two of the craft would take off at the same time, one serving as a decoy. At other times, the civilian pilots like Powers (who got \$30,000 a year for working under the cover of the innocuous National Aeronautics and Space Agency) set off on their own, usually following no one fixed course. Until Powers' crash they made the flights with virtual impunity, but not all of them returned safely. At least seven of the planes have crashed, and among imaginative flyboys some strange tales have circulated. One U-2, for instance, was rumored to have been hit by flak over Moscow and to have glided back to West Germany.

Surrounded by such legends, the U-2 was an almost legendary plane, but by now it appeared near the end of its usefulness. Politically, the spotlight of publicity would make it hard to operate U-2 bases. And technically, the first Tiros weather satellite was already foreshadowing the day when robots would do the U-2's work. But in its time, it was one of the most successful intelligence devices in history.

\*It was no secret, however, to one group of Americans: The youngsters who spend their spare time punching out and gluing together model planes. A 1958 issue of the Model Airplane News provided a complete design of the U-2 and reported a "rumor" that such planes "are flying across the Iron Curtain, taking aerial photographs."

## The Reasons the U-2 Flew



*The man responsible for the U.S. daylight bombing of Germany in World War II, Gen. Carl Spaatz, U.S.A.F. Ret., realizes the great value of reconnaissance and aerial photography. Without them, he says, World War III might have broken out already.*

*Here NEWSWEEK's Contributing Editor on Military Affairs analyzes both humanitarian and military considerations involved in American flights over Russia.*

President Eisenhower, as the leader of the free world, would have been negligent in performance of one of his most urgent duties had he failed to order the aerial reconnaissance of the Soviet Union finally revealed by the crash of the U-2.

Nothing is more vital in war, hot or cold, than knowledge of the enemy's military installations and dispositions. To tolerate blindness in these matters is to invite disaster. The whole history of warfare shows this to be true.

In the air age, it is more than ever necessary for both sides to know what each side is doing. Soviet knowledge of our capabilities has been our guarantee against outbreak of a third world war during the last decade. Actually, the Soviet people themselves should be the first to want us to have proper reciprocal intelligence about their nation's military targets. The alternative to bombing of such targets in case of war would be slaughter of civilians in centers of population. Humanitarian as well as military considerations are involved here.

### THE TIME WAS RIGHT

As for the Administration's refusal to suspend reconnaissance flights on the eve of the summit conference, there were doubtless valid reasons for this decision. Weather is so uncertain over the Soviet Union that favorable conditions must be exploited while they last. Photographs can best be made from high altitudes in late spring when the sun is high and the upper air is dry enough so that planes leave no contrails.

The President obviously knew about the on-going U-2 project as a whole, but probably not about the particular flight which came to grief. Even as commander of the Allied armed forces in Europe during the second world war, he left the details of day-to-day operations to those of us who were responsible for strate-

gic strikes. Obviously, the President cannot supervise each flight.

It is enormously encouraging to learn that we have been able to carry on reconnaissance operations above the Soviet Union. The conclusion is inescapable that Soviet air defenses are weak, and that our B-52s still constitute the greatest deterrent force in the world and probably will for another five years. The Soviet Union now must start building up its defenses to the detriment of its offensive strength, which is all to the good. By the time improved defenses make our B-52s obsolete, we shall, if we are wise, be well along with the B-70, which should keep us ahead for another decade. It is my opinion we should not place sole reliance on rockets (which once released can't be recalled) for a long time to come. They are a risky weapon in their current state of development.

### SATELLITES COMING

As for air intelligence, the SAMOS reconnaissance satellite should be ready to replace manned planes within the next three years. Until it is ready, however, we must not suspend plane reconnaissance. It will be particularly important for us to know from now on whether the Soviet Union is building civilian shelters for its own people. This can be one of the most significant indicators of its intentions if and when it gets ready to launch a surprise attack.

Over-all, the U-2 incident, however unfortunate in a diplomatic sense, has been encouraging from a military point of view. Nothing in it justifies panic. But neither does it suggest that we can afford smugness. The rest of the free world will forgive us diplomatic mistakes if it is convinced that we have the strength to win a war if war comes. We have that power now and we must keep everlastingly at the job of preserving it.

TAB



# U-2s Will Fly Again at Jap, Turkey Bases

By JERRY GREENE

Washington, May 13 (NEWS Bureau).—The National Aeronautics and Space Administration today ordered the six U-2 weather planes based in Turkey and Japan to resume high altitude reconnaissance flights on Monday.

The planes were grounded for a check of oxygen equipment last week after another U-2 from Turkey, with Francis Gary Powers at the controls, went down 1,300 miles inside Russia while on a missile base photographic spy mission.

The unannounced decision to get going again on the U-2 operations, which NASA still blandly insists are purely for scientific purposes, slipped out amid a flurry of developments resulting from the Russian incident:

1. President Eisenhower, without explanation, dropped plans to make a brief farewell statement to the people before leaving tomorrow night for the summit meeting in Paris.

2. The U. S. renewed its demand for Russia to allow an interview with Powers, held in Moscow on spy charges.

## Not Talking on Norway

3. The White House declined to comment on Norway's protest against plans for Powers to have landed there after the Russian flight.

4. Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson (D-Tex.) and assistant leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) in formal speeches assured Ike and the world that he would appear in Paris as head of a "united nation."

Tightest secrecy clung to future plans for use of the U-2

aircraft by NASA in connection with the Central Intelligence Agency or anybody else interested in anything other than weather.

NASA obtained 10 of the planes from the Air Force. It admits to losing three—the one flown by Powers, another in West Germany and one in the U. S.

One U-2 was damaged in a belly landing in Japan, but was repaired. There is one U-2 at Edwards Air Force Base in California.

## AF Also Has Them

The Air Force says it had five U-2s stationed in Puerto Rico and "some in Alaska."

Three of the Puerto Rican detachment were flown to Buenos Aires yesterday for further studies of a jet stream there, bringing demands for an explanation from Argentinian government opposition sources.

A check of the three scientific reports made on U-2 flights during the period ended last June showed that the planes had logged 148,635 miles in strictly legal tests in the Western United

States, Western Europe, Turkey and Japan.

The reports showed that more than 12,000 miles of the Turkish flights were at altitudes above 45,000 feet, and more than 23,000 miles of those out of Japan were at similar levels.

## The Higher, the Smoother

Scores of pages were devoted to the scientific findings, most understandable of which was a report that "moderately heavy" turbulence was found twice above Japan at 52,000 feet. Generally, the air appeared smoother the higher they flew. Officials said the tests were invaluable in designing and flying high altitude jets.

The Air Force said it had never been bothered with oxygen equipment failures.

Nobody would talk today about the search for the Russian agent who was believed to have obtained the flight plan for Powers' trip and tipped off the Soviets that he was coming.

MAY 18 1963

# U-2s Still Prowling Except Over Soviet

By JERRY GREENE

Washington, May 17 (NEWS Bureau). — The Air Force today disclosed that the Presidential suspension of high altitude spy flights over Russia does not apply to other reconnaissance activities and that U-2 aircraft are prowling the skies from Alaska to Argentina.

Grounded by President Eisenhower's directive are three U-2 planes in Japan, three in Turkey and one in the U. S., all handed over by the Air Force to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

The future of these planes, all flown by civilian contract pilots whose routine atmospheric reports went to the Air Weather Service, remained uncertain.

## Must Refer Questions

A NASA spokesman said orders were being prepared to return those abroad and their crews to the U. S. Then, remembering instructions, he hastily said NASA had been directed to refer to the State Department all questions concerning U-2 activities.

A departmental spokesman said he did not know what would be done about the NASA planes, but would investigate.

The Air Force, squinting slightly under the secrecy clamps thrown belatedly about the U-2, said it has about 30 of the planes in addition to the seven still held by NASA.

## In High Altitude Tests

Fewer than half a dozen U-2s have been given to the Air Research and Development Command. These are being used for high altitude tests of parts of the Midas-infra-red missile warning satellite, scheduled to become operational in 1963.

The Strategic Air Command planes, some of them on detached duty in Alaska, in Puerto Rico and three of them in Argentina, fly regular check flights for DASA—The Defense Atomic Support Agency—testing for nuclear explosions.

Some of them also are used for NASA support missions in high altitude surveys, and others have trained pilots for the space agency. But the Air Force insists that none of its U-2s have ever been based outside the Western Hemisphere.

Air Force brass said that some of Khrushchev's anger over the U-2 flights resulted from the public disclosure that U. S. unarmed planes, not equipped with radar counter equipment, have been flying at will over his homeland for four years.

NEW YORK  
JUNE 1960

MAY 18 1960

# Cloak, Dagger, U-2, Our Intelligence Giant

By JERRY GREENE

(Military Editor of the News)

WASHINGTON, May 17 (NEWS Bureau).—The unhappy affairs of civilian pilot Francis G. Powers and his U-2 reconnaissance plane over Russia lifted the lid a bit on just one phase of the world's least known military business — military intelligence.

Apart from the fact that the U-2's ill-fated flight to raise a political storm, the Powers incident within the trade was not much more than an annoyance, certainly no major tragedy. The public U-2 exposure simply means to the intelligence people the necessity for a reshuffling of arrangements to keep up on what the Russians are doing in some strategic areas. The basic data has long since been recorded in thousands of other photographs and radar and radio charts.

Military intelligence has become a vast and costly business, mainly since the beginning of World War II. It encompasses the collection, analysis and distribution of information by every major nation to an extent beyond the wildest dreams of the world's greatest spies just a few years ago.

The annual cost to the U. S., when all phases are included, is well above a billion dollars. Experts here agree that Russia is spending far more.

## OLD FASHIONED SPY STILL A NECESSITY

Nowhere in the field of military operations has the "tooted technological breakthrough" signaled by the advent of the A-bomb, the development of electronics and of automation been put to more dramatic use than in intelligence. But surprisingly, the coming of the machines has brought a greater need for the hard-working, old fashioned spy. And the more spies there are, the bigger the demand for better machines. One will get a hint of a suspicious operation, the other must check it out.

For figuring cost purposes, of course, it is necessary to include the vast Ballistic Missile Early Warning System and Distant Early Warning radar nets, and the highly secret anti-submarine warning systems. These alarm systems have been and are being created at the cost of billions. If they ever report a genuine Flash Red to Washington and to the Strategic Air Command headquarters in Omaha, it will be time to head for the hills.

## DON'T RULE OUT RIOTS, SABOTAGE

Military intelligence can be divided roughly into two kinds: strategic and tactical. The agent, the radar operator or the aerial photographer, never knows where his tidbit will fit. But if it has a purpose it will go quickly into the intelligence jig saw puzzle kept by the Central Intelligence Agency. Generally, strategic intelligence concerns the long-range plans and abilities of potential enemies; tactical data is worked into nuclear bomber target kits and into combat operational plans.

Somewhat apart from military intelligence but closely tied into the scheme of things are such undercover activities as the fomenting of riots in somebody else's street and promoting sabotage whenever necessary. So far as can be determined, the U. S. has never dropped freedom of Russia's satellites as a strategic objective.

Creation of the CIA in 1947 gave the U. S. its first permanent international intelligence organization. It came as a successor to the wartime Office of Strategic Services, brainchild of the late Maj. Gen. William (Wild Bill) Donovan and still called fondly



The late William Donovan  
His brainchild grew

"Oh, So Silly" by some of its former operatives. OSS, British trained, cost an estimated \$500 million. Its eager amateurs, snatched from reserve and regular ranks of all services, pulled sensational successes and fantastic bloopers. Many of its agents later went to CIA.

Basically, CIA was designed to see that everybody in Washington who needed to know had access to all the information collected by all other intelligence outfits, of which there were plenty. In this way it was intended that there would be no repetition of Pearl Harbor, when charges flew that the Army and Navy kept secrets from each other.

Thus, there was no cutback in the existing agencies and, like CIA, they have grown beyond imagination. Chief of these are the Army, Navy and Air Force intelligence sections, known as G-2 for the Army, ONI for the Navy and A-2 for the USAF. The State Department has long had its own "security" people working a different level.

Most secret and independent

## DAILY NEWS SPECIAL FEATURE

of all is the National Security Agency, at Fort Meade, Md. You can get shot for looking in the wrong direction at this outfit. It is a joint service, reporting only to CIA and the National Security Council. It intercepts radio transmissions and breaks codes. Not even the name of the chief of NSA is listed in the official Pentagon telephone directory, merely a number for the duty officer.

## THE JAPANESE CODE WAS BROKEN

The Pearl Harbor investigations by Congress disclosed one of World War II's most guarded secrets, how the Navy's Operation Magic broke the Japanese code before the first bombs fell. The Japanese scarcely made a move thereafter that the U. S. Fleet didn't know in advance; the decisive battle of Midway was one result.

All that can be said about NSA today is that it has been "greatly expanded" in the last 15 years. In addition to code breaking, the experts can learn much from



Gen. Thomas D. White  
Has his own experts

the volume of radio traffic in a given area. They can estimate the movement and concentration of aircraft and ships, and sometimes of men. No matter how much radio silence is imposed, a gathering of forces is always accompanied by a sharp increase in the number of essential communications.

Because it undoubtedly would be most thoroughly involved, come a war with Russia, the Air Force has one of the most elaborate of the intelligence agencies. Here one would find such photo-

graphs and radio and radar data as Powers and his U-2 might have delivered.

Maj. Gen. J. H. Walsh, assistant chief of staff for intelligence, reports directly to Air Chief Gen. Thomas White, who has his own experts. They did not agree fully in the last two years with the interpretations of the same radio, radar and photographic data available to CIA, and these differences of opinion led to some of the recent confusion in Congress over the status of the Russian ICBM program, and the production.

The job of this outfit is to keep fully abreast of foreign hardware — aircraft, missiles and equipment.

## EVERY LITTLE BIT ADDS UP TO A LOT

This can come from a radio interception, the discovery of a new radar transmission, from a piece of equipment shipped in by a CIA agent, from part of the wreckage of a plane which crashed in a "neutral" area and was scrounged by an alert diplomat. Such morsels as the Russian MIGs which have been flown out by defectors are taken apart bolt by bolt, reassembled and test flown. Aircraft wreckage from the Korean War was a fruitful source of information.

Sitting in Gen. Walsh's headquarters are officers from the Army and the Navy, picking up items of particular interest to them. Similar liaison is maintained in their own services.

Behind guarded doors at the Pentagon, at the air intelligence center, an indicator chart contains an hourly spot of all known air traffic in the Iron Curtain countries. Other charts give the military air power picture throughout the world. Such instant data can come, of course, only through radio and radar intercepts.

To aid them in their work,



Development of such effective sentries as these DEWLine radar stations in the Aleutian Island chain have not replaced the hard-working, old fashioned spy.

the air experts have a battery of giant computers which, fed the proper incoming information, can give the answers to almost everything except Nikita Khrushchev's mental gyrations.

All through these Pentagon offices are political scientists, translators and part-time college professors, who aren't supposed to be working for the Air Force at all, deep in studies of Soviet manuals and scientific and technical papers, trying to ferret out items helping shape the accurate form of Russian thinking, planning and doing.

The Strategic Air Command and its numbered Air Forces, such as the 8th at Westover Air Force Base in Massachusetts, have their own intelligence sections attuned specifically to the tasks assigned them. The data from the photographic reconnaissance plane over Russia, processed by CIA and A-2, winds up in the target kits of the bomber crews.

Chances are, the bulk of the material in that target folder came from radio and radar interceptions and from aerial photographs. Each select crew of SAC has one. The bombardier is tested constantly. He must be able to draw from memory the outline of his target as it appears on his radar screen at varying distances.

### WE HAVE RADAR TO TRACK RADAR

In World War II, radar detection meant that approaching enemy ships or aircraft could be spotted and tracked at distances of 100 miles or more. The planes could be plotted as to course and speed, and interception set in motion. In those days, the targets were merely "blips," irregular splotches of light on the screen.

We have gone far since. In some radar scopes the target shows up in photographic form. The improvement in all areas has been phenomenal. The video tape used in commercial TV is an outgrowth of military radar techniques. Now, radars track radars, thus giving the U.S. full knowledge that the Russians were waiting for pilot Powers and followed him from the moment he gained his mission altitude.

But there is still no substitute for aerial photography for gathering intelligence and, given a good photo "cover," the expert interpreter becomes a magician, finding not only the rabbit in the hat but the pocket where he was hidden.

*Tomorrow: Aerial photography, how it grew and what it shows, plus some spy tales from official records.*



MIG-15 is hit by U. S. Sabrejet gunfire over Korea in 1953. Wreckage from enemy planes has proved to be a fruitful source of information for American military intelligence.

MAY 19 1960

# Air Photography: Our Private Eye In a Foreign Sky

By JERRY GREENE

Military Editor of THE NEWS

Second of two articles on spying

WASHINGTON, May 18 (NEWS Bureau).—The U. S. Army major, attached to the Office of Strategic Services here in the midst of World War II, found nothing wrong with his highballs at the farewell party given for members of his secret mission to the Middle East.

He was leading a team which was going to bribe and cable Arab leaders into sealing off their territories to German armies—and to the Russians as well.

In less than two hours he was in Walter Reed Hospital having the poison pumped out of his stomach. OSS moved swiftly. An Army captain, the major's executive officer on the mission, was revealed as a German agent who had accomplished a masterful job of penetration into top U. S. spy circles.

The major recovered, the captain had a secret court-martial and drew a long prison sentence instead of a firing squad. This story is made public here for the first time but not even today will the Pentagon or Central Intelligence admit knowing anything about the case.

Nor will they explain the 20 right-hand drive Packard Clipper sedans, painted a distinctive gray, which were to have been part of the bribery package the major was carrying to Egypt. The mission was scrapped, of course, after the poisoning incident. A fabulous amount of loot, fancy automobiles and such—and the automobiles—were shoved into a warehouse. But the late Maj. Gen. William (Wild Bill) Donovan, the daddy of OSS, wasn't going to let those Packards rust.

## HIGH SPIES RIDE THOSE GRAY SEDANS

He turned them over to the OSS car pool and for a year they flitted around the capital carrying top spy chiefs from one secret headquarters to another and, because of the war, nobody paid attention.

Then there was the day at the Military Air Transport terminal at National Airport, just before the invasion of Sicily, when Mike Burke, former University of Pennsylvania All-America half-back, dropped a bag packed with 500,000 French francs, says the catches break and bills flutter all over the runway. The FBI quickly seized him. There were all manner of explanations before the local gendarmes turned him loose. Burke was a member of the OSS Macgregor Mission—a code name.

John M. Shaheen, now a New York public relations executive, was the leader and his other trusted aid was Jumpin' Joe Savoldi, the old Notre Dame full-back. Before they finished their job they rang in Henry Ringling North of the circus family and Douglas Fairbanks Jr.

## THEIR MISSION ACCOMPLISHED

The objective? To arrange the surrender of the Italian fleet, which they did.

Such tales as these pack the records of all governmental espionage agencies, particularly during time of war. The international undercover jockeying then, as well as now, covers a multitude of activities and the designation "intelligence agent," used loosely, applies to men given many and strange tasks.

But fundamentally, the job of the intelligence agent is to learn all he can about the warring capabilities of a possible enemy, and so far as possible, the intentions, now and in the future.

The prime objective is the col-



Actress Sarah Churchill was a top-flight afficionado interpreter during World War II

lection of military intelligence. The collectors, all of whom might be called spies in one way or another, may appear to be a waterfront bum, or a laboratory scientist.

In providing this military intelligence at the hard, indisputable level where it can be used for figuring a nuclear bomb run on a Russian target, nothing can take the place of the comparatively new art and science of aerial photography—and its interpretation.

"Bomb runs" these days are

plotted by mathematics and electronics which calculate to the last pound the devastation expected from a 10-megaton weapon. A B-52 bomb sight consists of a dozen black boxes packed with wire, tubes and transistors. But the bombardier still has to know what he is looking for and that's where photography, plus radar, comes to the fore.


British intelligence, at the end of the shooting in Germany in 1945, lucked into Hitler's complete file of aerial photographs, most of them taken beyond the Eastern Front. Similarly, a U. S. officer traded a few cartons of cigars for a truckload or so of German intelligence gold mine.

Such improvements as the development of radar and the flights of B-47 reconnaissance photo planes, followed by the highly successful operations of the U-2 very high altitude aircraft, have enabled the intelligence thinkers to estimate accurately the progress of Russian armaments—and have helped the Strategic Air Command bombardiers to keep their target data daisy-fresh.

The average camera bug has little conception of the detailed information his snapshot contains. Swap the Brownie for a new Zeiss-Aerograph or a convergent camera (price \$37.180), mount it in a specially trimmed down jet reconnaissance plane and the expert interpreter can discover almost anything down



Jumpin' Joe Savoldi  
Carried ball on secret OSS mission



Drawing pictures U. S. satellite Tiros high over earth. Carrying cameras for televising cloud cover, Tiros gives an idea of what can be done—and is planned—in aerial reconnaissance.

## DAILY NEWS SPECIAL FEATURE

to the price of eggs in the market place at Krasnoyarsk.

The first known aerial photographs were made from a balloon over Paris in 1856. Then, as is so often the case, the military looked down the nose at a new fad and refused an offer to investigate the applications. In 1860, one J. W. Black photographed Boston from a balloon and two years later Gen. George McClellan used an aerial photo and a balloon observer to direct operations in the Civil War near Richmond.

## FIRST AIR MOVIES MADE OVER ROME

The U. S. and France pioneered photography from airplanes in 1909, and during that year, Wilbur Wright piloted one of his aircraft over Rome to obtain the first moving pictures.

When World War I got underway, balloons and planes were used at first to carry visual observers, but the eye of the camera quickly supplanted them. In fact, machineguns were first mounted on aircraft to eliminate these spies in the sky. By 1915, both sides were hard at work photographing trench systems and rear areas. In the Middle East, where there were no decent maps of most of the area, the sky cameras were invaluable.

Along with the improvement of cameras and techniques, there came the art of learning just what the film actually showed, and the birth of photographic interpretation.

With the armistice came the customary loss of interest, more old cavalrymen were concerned with pressing use of the horse than in fiddling with cameras and film.

## BRITISH CIVILIANS SHOW THEM HOW

A few ardent souls kept plugging away, but little was done and the business of aerial photography and interpretation had to come up the hard way in Britain—harder in the U. S.—after the shooting started in World War II. The Royal Air Force didn't realize this to be a specialized science and busted its first few efforts. Trial and error, under civilian direction, brought the sky camera work to its proper place and standing.

Aerial survey for civilian and military map-making purposes had grown mightily between the wars, but it took the hardy British civilians to show how there was a wide difference between this survey work and photographic intelligence.

Pressed into service were the photogrammetry machines used

to draw from the pictures the information desired. Stereo photo strips gave the interpreters the third dimension. The interpreters were able not only to count ships in a harbor and planes on an airstrip, but they could measure them and determine the tonnage and the cargo carrying capacity.

The most obvious use of the sky spies was to determine bomb damage. At one point the RAF protested that the lying cameras were destroying the morale of the bomber crews—bombs which were reported as causing heavy damage had missed the targets entirely.

(That happened constantly throughout the war. A U. S. general reported there was "nothing left alive" on Tarawa the day before the marines landed and wanted to call off a heavy bomber strike scheduled at 11 minus one hour before troops hit the beach. Aerial photos showed that the general's last raid had produced 173 new holes in the reef and no damage to Japanese defensive positions.)

The U. S. Navy and the Air Force started learning from British interpreters in 1941. Sarah Churchill, daughter of the Prime Minister who has in recent years occupied a few front pages for other reasons, was known as a top-flight interpreter. But the U. S. brass also was somewhat hard to convince and it was not until the summer of 1942 that the then Lt. Col. Elliott Roosevelt, commanding the 3d Reconnaissance Group, took the first U. S. photographic unit to the European theatre.

## TOOK DARING FLYING TO GET THE GOODS

It took a lot of daring, specialized flying to bring back the photos the interpreters wanted, and the pilots of these recon planes were truly unsung heroes as they worked over Africa, Europe and flew extremely dangerous missions in the Pacific.

But the science proved its place in modern warfare and there is no hiding place down there from the superb new lenses and the skill of the interpreter with such new machines as the stereoplanograph, where the operator peers into eye pieces, mechanically moves a pinpoint dot six feet away and draws to scale roads and buildings on a photo.

Nikita Khrushchev may have been annoyed by the U-2 and Francis Powers. But that's a small bit of what is planned. The satellite Tiros, televising cloud cover from 400 miles out, might give an idea. The reconnaissance satellite Samos, with fine cameras designed specifically for just such spy work, is slated to be launched before the end of this year in a polar orbit, flashing back U-2 type photographs of Iron Curtain secrets every 90 minutes.

TAB

# THE WORLD'S BIG SPY GAME

## A Hot Front in the "Cold War"?

**A U. S. plane is caught over Russia, and all at once the lid on spying is off.**

**As facts keep coming out, this country is found to be in the spy business in a big way.**

**And the game has gone modern. Today's spies work with magic-eye cameras and radar. Soon they'll be using satellites.**

**But old-fashioned spying still goes on, too. The CIA has agents around the world.**

**All this is expensive. It costs this country about 2.5 billion dollars a year.**

**The spy business is new in the U. S. It has grown up here since World War II.**

**Why? A surprise attack today can be fatal. And Russia, committed to the doctrine of surprise, hides behind a wall of secrecy.**

**U. S. leaders have decided: This nation, to survive, must know what the Reds are up to.**

The spy business today is a vast business—among the largest—and far removed from the narrow cloak-and-dagger traditions of the past.

This country is spending as much as 2.5 billion dollars a year on spying of one type or another. As many as 100,000 persons are involved.

Spy operations of this scope are forced by one consideration: an urge to survive. Spying is today's hot front in the "cold war."

All this was made clear by President Eisenhower on May 11 when he defended the U. S. intelligence offensive as "a distasteful but vital necessity."

Behind the President's statement is this fact—

Soviet Russia has adopted the doctrine of "surprise attack." Her military leaders have indicated openly they believe in "preventive war," with this nation as the primary target.

**A warning job.** As early as 1947, a mission was given U. S. intelligence agencies to find and give early warning of any impending attack—to avoid another and vaster Pearl Harbor. Intelligence, or spying, operations have grown ever since, with the growing size of the problem.


Missiles, once launched from bases in

Soviet Russia, can strike U. S. cities within 30 minutes. Vast effort is called for to give warning against that background of time.

In 1950, before the age of missiles, U. S. intelligence failed to foretell the Communist attack that led to war in Korea.

Since that time, the problem has mushroomed and so has the effort to meet it.

Today's spying is tied closely to electronic gear. The "spy," more often than not, is a scientist far removed from territory of the enemy. His tools are aircraft with highly complicated equipment, huge "electronic brains," photographic and in-



## U. S. News & World Report

tion—at home and abroad—from his internal struggle.

**A preview.** What will Khrushchev seek at the "summit"? Following is what the British expect:

In Berlin—Khrushchev still aims at an eventual end of the occupation status that keeps West Berlin free, but he sees no hurry about this.

On nuclear tests—Khrushchev is believed to favor a ban on tests to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries—particularly West Germany and Red China.

On disarmament—A disarmament agreement is considered unlikely, although Khrushchev probably will continue trimming his armies in order to devote more resources and manpower to his goal of beating the U. S. economically.

Meanwhile, all around the world, the British expect Khrushchev to go right on making trouble.

### PARIS

As French officials see it: Russia is not changing her spots—only her tactics. "Peaceful coexistence," as advocated by Khrushchev, means "cold war" by other means. And Khrushchev is baiting a trap for the West at the "summit."

The trap is seen on the Berlin question. The French expect Khrushchev to take a position on this that appears conciliatory—that of offering a two-year "standstill" agreement on West Berlin, with only a slight increase of the official recognition that the West gives to his puppet East German regime.

In such a deal, Western occupation rights in Berlin would not be mentioned, leaving them for another Big Four meeting in two years.

Meanwhile, an East German and a West German committee would negotiate on a plan for reconciling the two parts of divided Germany.

**The devious approach.** The trap is this: The negotiations between East and West Germany would involve a degree of Western recognition of the East German regime—which the West has so far refused to recognize as legitimate. Such recognition might be interpreted as formal acceptance by the West of the division of Germany.

Khrushchev's scheme would also leave Russia free to claim, after two years of standstill, that Western occupation rights in Berlin had lapsed—and a new crisis could be created.

Right now, in French opinion, Khrushchev realizes that any attempt to force the Western powers out of Berlin means a risk of war—so he is trying the gradual approach. But his goal is regarded as unchanged: The taking over of Berlin and eventually all Germany.



—USN&WR Photo

IN THE KREMLIN, dictators come and go. But, as leaders in most Western nations see it, the Communist goal remains the same—world domination by the Soviet Union.

One thing, the French warn, should be kept in mind in dealing with Khrushchev: When he talks about "coexistence" and "status quo" he means more than mere acceptance by the West of the conquests he has already gained. He means the West also should not interfere with his further expansion. In other words, he means that the West should give up peaceably.

### ROME

Italian leaders who think the Russians have changed their spots are few and far between.

The general feeling here is that the drive for expansion is a deep-seated and long-term force which underlies every Soviet policy—including the present emphasis on building up the economy of the Soviet Union.

One Italian official said:

"We may well have 20 years of peace and trade coming up. But Soviet expansion will always be working under the surface, always haunting us."

Are the Russians ready to relax their pressures on the West? Not really, in the Italian view, Khrushchev's recent

belligerent speeches and the U. S. plane incident are cited as evidence.

Will Khrushchev make concessions on Berlin at the "summit"? Probably not, is the consensus here. But it is considered possible that Khrushchev might refrain from creating a Berlin crisis in exchange for Western concessions on some other issue.

### BUENOS AIRES

Ask Latin Americans if Khrushchev is changing his spots, and they point to Cuba.

Fidel Castro's regime is seen coming more under Red influence with every month that passes. Now that Castro is opening diplomatic relations with both Soviet Russia and Red China, a major step-up in Communist activities in the Caribbean area is expected.

Communist troublemaking is causing official concern, too, in Uruguay, Chile, Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela and Argentina.

All this leads Latin Americans to the view that Khrushchev is just as tough and unyielding as ever and is not about to make any real concessions to the West at the "summit."





## THE OLD "CLOAK AND DAGGER"—

Beautiful women . . .

Secret landings on enemy  
coasts . . .

Buying state secrets . . .

Planting agents in key places . . .

■ All still used, but these  
old spy methods have less  
importance now.



## THE NEW "ELECTRONIC SPYING"—

A new breed of spies: analysts and technicians, studios  
and scientific . . .

World-wide networks of electronic equipment: giant radars  
... "sniffer" aircraft taking photos and air samples ... picket  
submarines ... balloons with radios and cameras ... radio  
"ears" making tape recordings of everything they hear ...  
infrared devices ... fishing vessels spying on sea lanes ...  
electronic computers to digest all the reports — and, just  
ahead: "eye in the sky" satellites to photograph any area  
on earth.

Government agencies run spy operations like big businesses.  
The U.S. alone employs more than 100,000 people, spends  
2.5 billion dollars a year for this purpose . . .

■ All the big powers have their intelligence networks, spying  
around the clock, around the world.



Copyright 1960, U.S. News Publishing Corp.

frared equipment of the most highly de-  
veloped sort, the most modern radar.

Soon the scientific tools will include  
satellites in the sky. When spying by  
satellite is perfected, intelligence offi-  
cials say, the Iron Curtain that surrounds  
Soviet secrets will be penetrated far  
more effectively than it is today.

The U.S. plane caught May 1 on its  
spying mission into the Soviet Union was  
only one of such planes in use. There  
are other planes of this special type and  
there have been other missions that suc-  
ceeded. The mission is to locate and  
photograph missile-launching sites and  
other military installations. It also is to

detect and report on missile tests and  
nuclear tests in Soviet Russia.

Some—but not a great—success has  
been achieved in fulfilling this mission.

**Detection success.** Officials point out  
that the Soviet Government has not it-  
self announced any of its nuclear tests  
or any of its missile firings, and often  
has been silent on its space shots. All of  
those firings and tests have been detected  
by the spying apparatus of this Govern-  
ment—including aircraft that fly missions  
such as that of the U-2.

Gen. Thomas S. Power, commander in  
chief of the Strategic Air Command,  
in testimony released April 28, told

Congress that much dependence is being  
placed on Samos—a satellite—to attain  
success in spying not yet achieved by  
other means. An attempt will be made  
this autumn to put a test version of  
Samos into orbit.

It is noted, however, that the U-2 air-  
craft caught penetrating Russia had  
flown 1,200 miles over the very heart of  
potential Soviet missile-launching terri-  
tory. From an Allied headquarters comes  
an estimate that between 40 and 60 suc-  
cessful U-2 spy missions each year have  
penetrated Russia for the past few years.

The meaning? The U.S. very obvious-  
(continued on page 48)

MAP AT LEFT was made by  
U. S. for its "open skies" pro-  
posal of 1955. Swath 2,700  
miles long, 490 miles wide  
was photographed by one  
plane in less than four hours.

FROM NINE MILES UP, this  
photo was taken of a golf  
course near Fort Worth,  
Texas. Autos, players, even  
golf balls are clearly identi-  
fiable to photo interpreters.



## U. S. POLICY ON SPYING: TO GUARD AGAINST SURPRISE

The whole question of spying was brought out into the open after a U. S. plane was caught flying over the Soviet Union on May 1.

What was this country's policy on spying? And how would it be affected by the May 1 incident?

Answers were quick in coming.



Secretary of State Christian Herter told the world on May 9 that U. S. planes had been making "aerial surveillance" over Russia for years as protection against surprise attack—and he indicated they would continue to do so. He said:

"I will say frankly that it is unacceptable that the Soviet political system should be given an opportunity to make secret preparations to face the free world with the choice of abject surrender or nuclear destruction.

"The Government of the United States would be derelict to its responsibility not only to the American people but to free peoples everywhere if it did not, in the absence of Soviet co-operation, take such measures as are possible unilaterally to lessen and to overcome this danger of surprise attack.

"In fact, the United States has not and does not shirk this responsibility."



Representative Clarence Cannon (Dem.), of Missouri, chairman of the Appropriations Committee, said on May 10:

"The plane was on an espionage mission authorized and supported by money provided under an appropriation recommended by the House Committee on Appropriations and passed by the Congress.

"Although the members of the House had not generally been informed on the subject, the mission was one of a series and part of an established program with which the subcommittee in charge of the appropriation was familiar and of which it had been fully apprised during this and previous sessions."

Mr. Cannon said the U. S. Central Intelligence Agency has been "admonished" repeatedly by Congress that it must make sure that this country is never again caught unaware by a surprise attack, and he praised the Agency for its enterprise.



On the same day, Senator Lyndon B. Johnson of Texas, Democratic Majority Leader, said:

"Nikita Khrushchev cannot use this incident in such a way as to divide the American people and to weaken our national strength. The American people are united in a determination to preserve our freedoms, and we are not going to be shaken from that course."

Then, on May 11, President Eisenhower told a news conference that spying is "a distasteful but vital necessity." He said:

"No one wants another Pearl Harbor. This means that we must have knowledge of military forces and preparations around the world, especially those capable of massive surprise attack.

"Secrecy in the Soviet Union makes this essential. . . . The safety of the whole free world demands this."

When Premier Khrushchev threatened to hit Allied bases that are used by U. S. planes to fly over Russia, the U. S. took another firm stand. Lincoln White, State Department spokesman, noted that the U. S. has commitments to defend its allies and said:

"There should be no doubt that the United States will honor those commitments."

[continued from page 47]

ly has had some success in penetrating innermost Soviet secrets.

Military officials also say this, privately: "People need to realize that the flight of the latest U-2, unsuccessful as it was on the surface, had a degree of success. The world was shown that U. S. planes can fly over the most heavily defended part of Soviet Russia. This plane, relatively slow and wholly undefended and with no evasive capabilities, penetrated 1,200 miles into the Soviet Union."

**Who's ahead?** "The lesson the world should be learning is this," these officials say: "Bombers carrying nuclear warheads are able, almost at will, to penetrate Soviet antiaircraft defenses. The world should be able to see that the vaunted superiority of Soviet military might simply does not exist. Modern bombers, with their highly varied techniques and their new missile-launcher weapons, command a superiority over Russia that everybody now should be able to see with the naked eye.

"So long as this is true, Russia cannot attack the U. S. without having her own country blown to kingdom come. That reduces danger of early war. It also should quiet some of the clamor from abroad about the U-2 flight. An accident has served to reveal Soviet weakness and American strength."

**The offer Reds refused.** This whole business of spying, by modern methods using the latest scientific equipment as well as by old-fashioned methods, has been an international issue since 1955.

On July 21, 1955, President Eisenhower offered to Nikita Khrushchev to open U. S. skies to Soviet planes so that they could photograph every U. S. base and military installation of every kind. At the same time he offered to let Soviet inspectors come into the U. S. to see any U. S. military operations that they wanted to see.

The one condition: The Soviet Government would give the U. S. the same rights in the Soviet Union.

Russia's Khrushchev greeted the Eisenhower proposal with complete silence.

The vast game of spying took on added importance and urgency following Soviet Russia's rejection of the proposal by President Eisenhower to make spying in the atomic age open and aboveboard. Russia, committed to secrecy as a basic weapon, refused to open her skies or her borders to American observers in exchange for access to the skies and the military installations of the U. S.

Intelligence officials say that Soviet Russia, actually, is able to get U. S. secrets through her vast espionage system

(continued on page 51)

## U. S. News &amp; World Report

[continued  
from page 48]

## THE WORLD'S BIG SPY GAME

in this country, plus information printed in newspapers and sometimes in Government reports. Where the United States is forced to spend vast sums and risk the lives of its personnel to find out the exact location of Soviet missile sites, of Soviet missile firings, of Soviet arms industries, the U. S. openly prints that information for Soviet use—with maps and details—and without charge.

When Khrushchev threatened the United States with his rockets and missiles, officials say the U. S. was forced—at whatever cost—to get access to information that Russians insisted upon keeping secret.

**Sentinels in the sky.** It was in September, 1955, after the Eisenhower proposal for "open skies" had been rejected, that new complaints began to come from Russia of U. S. "spying" attempts.

The first complaint concerned U. S. balloons that were reported to have been recovered from Soviet territory. In 1958, the Soviets said that balloons carrying camera and radio "spy" equipment were being brought down. It is understood

that this venture did not succeed in producing many tangible results.

The spy game now took another turn. The U-2, a reconnaissance plane, was quietly perfected and put in the air. In 1956 and later, these planes operated from Okinawa and Japan in the Far East, and from Turkey and Pakistan, as well as from bases in Alaska, England and Germany.

**Evidence of A-tests.** Reconnaissance or "spy" planes carried cameras of constantly improved capabilities. As they penetrated Soviet territory, important information began to be assembled. The planes carried filters to give evidence of Soviet nuclear explosions from atomic particles picked up in the air.

Radar detection equipment also grew in effectiveness and complexity.

It was in this period that advertisements in technical publications began to give a picture of the modern spy.

Candidates for intelligence work, the hiring agencies revealed, needed skills in electronics, chemistry, photo interpretation, in the science of sound, tele-


phones, radio and television. Services wanted "studious and dedicated people—qualified technicians, men who can read shadows on a negative or thermal tracings."

**Streams of data.** At the same time, intelligence work of the more ordinary kind went on at an accelerated pace.

Agents have penetrated Soviet Russia and her satellites. The steady stream of refugees from East Germany and from other Soviet territory is the source of a great amount of highly important information. There have been defectors from Soviet armed services and from the Soviet diplomatic service. All yield intelligence information.

As Khrushchev's threats grew, boasting of what he could do to the U. S. with his missiles, the need arose—officials say—for knowledge concerning the sites for launching Soviet missiles. These sites and other key military information had to be pinpointed with absolute accuracy so that, in event of an attack on the U. S., the retaliatory missiles and bomb-

(continued on page 52)



## A CLOSE LOOK AT ANOTHER U. S. "SPY" OPERATION

## TOKYO

Heart of the U. S. "watch and guard" system of tracking Soviet air and ship movements in the Western Pacific is "Site 18" at Wakkanai, the northernmost tip of Japan.

On the surface, Site 18 is nothing but a rubber and plastic "bubble." Inside, where air is maintained at constant temperature and humidity, is an enormous radar screen. Far beneath the bubble, deep in the ground, are concrete-lined bunkers jammed with electronic and communications equipment.

Site 18 is an aircraft-control and warning outpost that snuggles right against the teeth of the Russian bear. On a clear day you can see the jagged mountains at the southern tip of Soviet Sakhalin. Russians have at least 20 airfields on Sakhalin alone, but it is a rare Soviet plane or ship that moves anywhere in this area without being spotted.

Far to the northeast of Wakkanai, in the Aleutians, is another huge U. S. radar base, similar to one in Turkey, which has missile-tracking

capabilities. This base is backed up by an extensive radar network in the Aleutians and Alaska linked with the DEW—Distant Early Warning—Line in Canada.

When the U. S. completes two huge stations for its Ballistic Missile Early Warning System, now being built at Clear Bay, Alaska, and Thule, Greenland, the northern approaches of America will be guarded by one of the most effective radar systems in the world.

The gap between Wakkanai and the Aleutian outposts is covered almost daily by U. S. reconnaissance flights. These flights extend around the periphery of the Communist bloc in Asia—from Kamchatka in the Far North to Hainan Island in the South China Sea.

Soviet reconnaissance, in turn, has been stepped up in recent months in both frequency and area covered. Reconnaissance planes come as far south as Tokyo Bay, generally in flights of three jet planes at extreme altitudes.



—UPI  
Francis G. Powers

## HOW RUSSIANS SAY THEY GOT POWERS

**Radio Moscow's story** of the rocket attack the Russians claim brought down Francis G. Powers and his U-2 jet:

"It was a clear, sunny day and the soldiers in Maj. Mihail Voronov's command were relaxing. Far away, radar screens began picking up a strange object at high altitude.

"Dials spun and buttons were pushed as alarms sped along the defense network.

"But it seemed to Voronov that Powers had sensed he was being tracked and was in danger. He almost saved himself by starting to curve around the rocket firing area.

"At 65,000 feet, his jet with extra-long, almost-ungainly wings seemed a tiny speck on tracking scopes. Voronov sounded the alarm buzzer. The men ran to their stations.

"Already the plane was almost out of range. Voronov feared it would get away. He

gave sharp, short commands. As the rocket was angled, he gave the order to fire.

"A moment's silence, and there was a thunderous boom. The rocket rose, gathering speed. On his radar screen, Voronov watched the two specks, one hurtling toward the other.

"Suddenly the screen went haywire with a galaxy of writhing specks and flashes. The rocket had exploded.

"The target is hit," the radar operator reported. Voronov ran outside into the sun. The sunlight flashed on the falling metal in the sky.

"Coming down and growing larger as it approached was a parachute bearing Francis Gary Powers to earth."

**The U. S. version:** Something failed on Powers's jet, forcing him to a lower altitude. There, with antiaircraft fire or other means, the Russians got him. Monitors heard Soviet fliers talk as they chased Powers.

[continued from page 51]

ers from this country could strike back effectively.

The role of the camera took on greater and greater importance against this background.

A modern camera performs "miracles" of spying. With cameras of today, two jet planes in two hours can photograph a strip 500 miles wide and more than 2,500 miles long. You can see from photographs on pages 46 and 47 what cameras can do. Latest cameras are much

more effective than those used to take the pictures shown. One is of a strip taken from a jet flying across the U. S. at more than 600 miles per hour. The other, when interpreted by skilled readers of photographs, shows two golfers on a golf links and shows the golf balls. The photo was taken from nearly 9 miles in the air.

**Photos 14 miles up.** U. S. jets, flying at night or in bad weather and using infrared sensing devices, from a height of 14 miles can "photograph" airstrips, docks, factories, highways or anything

that gives off more heat than the things around it.

As the need for the U. S. to gain information grew, so did Soviet complaints about activities of unidentified aircraft over the Soviet Union.

Khrushchev only now has revealed that a U. S. plane three years ago penetrated as far as Kiev, only 470 miles from Moscow. Much activity, however, was concentrated in the area of Central Russia where the U-2 was downed on May 1. This is a part of Russia, experts say, where sites are being built from

## WHY SPYING BY U. S. IS TREATED AS VITAL

Soviet military strategy of today embraces the concept of "surprise attack," in which a devastating first blow is to be struck, with the use of nuclear missiles.

The U. S. is prepared to accept this first blow. U. S. strategy calls for a counterstrike to knock out missile bases and launching sites. Success of the counterblow requires pinpointing of those sites.

After all the spying effort, is that knowledge available?

Gen. Thomas S. Power, chief of the Strategic Air Command, revealed in testimony published on April 28 that the answer largely is: "No."

General Power was questioned by Representative George H. Mahon (Dem.), of Texas, the chairman of

the Subcommittee on Defense of the House Appropriations Committee.

Testimony in part follows:

**Representative Mahon:** . . . We do not know where the [Soviet] missile sites are, either intermediate-range or intercontinental ballistic missiles. . . .

**General Power:** There is a great paucity of information on operational Soviet missile sites.

**Representative Mahon:** We do not know too much about the Soviet Union.

**General Power:** I think we will. . . . For example, the Samos system [Samos is a reconnaissance earth satellite near the testing stage]. . . . I think Samos is going to give us a


lot of information. I think we are making progress right now. . . . This is like putting bits of a jigsaw puzzle together.

**Representative Mahon:** If we did not tell our opponents where our missile sites were, they could not tell a missile site from an automobile junk yard, in my opinion. What do you think?

**General Power:** Missiles lend themselves to dispersion or deception. They know that. . . . This was said by [Marshal R. Y.] Malinovsky [Soviet Defense Minister] to the Supreme Soviet on Jan. 14, 1960: "Present-day ballistic missiles guarantee a high probability of inflicting powerful strikes simultaneously on a great variety of targets. . . . Missiles

## COMING NEXT: SPIES IN SPACE

*U. S. has two space vehicles coming along that will be able to photograph or monitor every inch of Russian or any other area of the world—*



### SAMOS:

A camera-carrying satellite that will take photographs of the earth or any special part of it, such as the Soviet Union, while orbiting in space. Films will be sent back to earth in capsules, ejected on command, for recovery at preset points. TV-like equipment will also transmit photos directly to earth stations.

**OUTLOOK:** First test model is to be launched early next autumn. The Discoverer series of space shots has been testing equipment and techniques for Samos. An operational fleet of Samos satellites probably is two or three years off.

Note: "Samos," name of a Greek island, has no special meaning.

### MIDAS:

A satellite carrying infrared equipment to detect missiles as they leave their launching pads. The "eye" in Midas is a device that senses the heat given off by missiles, converts heat trails into electrical signals and transmits its information to home base. It can give U. S. almost 30 minutes' advance warning of any missile attack, instead of the 15 minutes provided by radar systems now guarding northern approaches to the U. S.

**OUTLOOK:** First test vehicle was launched several weeks ago and failed. New tests are imminent. Fully operational system is about two years away.

"Midas" is a word coined to stand for Missile Defense Alarm System.

which missiles can be zeroed in on U. S. cities.

Squadrons of U. S. Air Force and Navy planes on the rim of the Soviet Union have carried out "aggressive reconnaissance" on the border of, or within—the Russians claim—the Soviet Union. Non-military planes have been assigned to penetration flights over the vital areas of that country.

U. S. military officials, however, are not satisfied with the results.

What is needed, as they have explained it to Congress, is a constant surveillance

of Soviet Russia. The great game of spying takes on even more fantastic characteristics as the U. S. pushes ahead with its intelligence plans. These plans of the future are related closely to practical use of earth satellites.

**"Spies" in orbit.** Two satellites, now near the testing stage, are counted on to do the day-to-day reconnaissance over Russia in the future.

One of these satellites is called the Midas. This one will detect missile firings and give almost instantaneous warning. The second is the Samos. It was

this satellite that General Power praised so highly in his testimony before Congress. Samos is designed to take photographs from a polar orbit, with the earth revolving below. It will return these photographs to the earth electronically and by ejecting a capsule that is to be recovered and developed. Experiments with Discoverer satellites have been related to the Samos project.

What kind of photographs will the sky yield?

Authorities in this field say that, from  
(continued on page 54)

are easy to camouflage and even to shelter in their launching sites. . . ."

Marshal Boris Shaposhnikov, military adviser to Stalin, said in 1928:

"We are interested in the question whether, from the point of view of historical progress, preventive war can be justified in general. We must answer unequivocally that such a war, provided it is of a progressive and revolutionary type, also will be a just and a defensive war. . . ."

**Representative Mahon:** If he launches his missiles, that is about it. . . . As far as hitting his bases generally, there are just too many of them; you cannot be sure of hitting them and he can use them to hit you. You cannot afford to start a preventive war.

**General Power:** I am not advocating preventive war. The mission of SAC is deterrence. I do not

think you can deter a war by wishful thinking. It is a real tough job, but I happen to believe it is possible. . . . You can only deter by operating from a platform of strength—unquestionable strength. . . . I also submit that you will not deter a war unless



GENERAL POWER

—UPI

you have the capability to start a war. . . .

I would like to quote from a speech by Mr. Khrushchev before the 21st Soviet Communist Party Congress:

"When strategic plans are built on false inferences, this can lead to errors holding disastrous consequences for the cause of peace. If a state thinks at any given moment its adversary lacks the weapon to strike at its territory the temptation may arise for starting war."

These are not novel ideas.

What General Power is saying is that today's world is a dangerous world in which the Soviet Union is toying with the idea of preventive war. It is a world in which spying—by whatever methods—will go on playing an important role.

## SPIES BY THE THOUSANDS

### BONN and BERLIN

Last year, in West Germany alone, 2,787 Communist spies were caught. They had 9,979 specific spy jobs to do. East German intelligence sent most of them on their missions, but 264 were from Russia, 114 from Poland, 63 from Czechoslovakia, 11 from Rumania, 8 from Hungary and 2 from Bulgaria.

During the first four months of this year, 820 more Communist agents were arrested, including 691 from East Germany, 72 from Russia. Yet only a fraction of all spies sent from the Soviet bloc to West Germany are caught.

This grand-scale operation can be compared to Nikita Khrushchev's capture of one spy. By contrast, the current estimate is that 17,000 Communist spies are operating in West Germany alone.

**Bustling spy mill.** These spies are directed from the Communist half of divided Berlin, which now is Europe's spy capital. In East Berlin, the Russians and their satellites run the biggest and busiest spy mill in history. Red agents also make West Berlin the kidnaping center of the world. Since the war they have tried 340 kidnapings, succeeded in 255.

East Berlin's spy masters do not confine themselves to Germany. They send agents across Europe, with France and Scandinavia as particular targets. The Communists use Berlin as the safest and easiest gateway to the West.

The high concentration of spy activity in East Berlin is apparent from a Western intelligence report just released. In East Berlin, 1,200 apartments are kept "secure" for meetings of spies. Western agencies have the addresses. More than 50 "cover" organizations include publishing houses, press agencies, export-import firms, employment agencies and lawyers' offices.

A bureaucracy of 15,000 runs the "home offices" of the spy capital. The Russians alone have almost 2,000 in civilian and military spy work in and around the city.

**A "silent group."** Poland, Czechoslovakia and Rumania are the most active of the satellites. The Poles and Rumanians need Berlin because they have no common borders with West Germany. Poland sends people from its former German territory into West Germany as refugees.

Some of those from Poland probably are in the "silent group" of agents sent into the West to pose as bona fide refugees until the time comes to act.

West German estimates of 17,000 active agents do not include either the "silent group" or the 35,000 members of the outlawed West German Communist Party.

Over the years, more than 15,000 Red agents have been arrested in West Germany. Of these, fewer than 2,000 have been convicted. Many were let off because they confessed, voluntarily, not long after they entered West Germany. Others



—USN&WR Photo

**BRANDENBURG GATE:** entryway to East Berlin, spy capital of Europe

showed they were coerced into spying by Red threats to their families.

Most of these agents are poorly trained people. But intelligence men believe they serve a worthwhile purpose for the Communists. Western police are kept busy catching the great numbers of "low level" people, have less time to go after the real, professional spies.

**Propaganda and pin-ups.** The Communists spend enormous sums on espionage and related work. East Germany alone puts out at least 30 million dollars a year. Each month, Red presses in East Germany grind out more than 10 million pieces of propaganda and subversive literature, including pin-up pictures of girls, to be smuggled into West German Army barracks along with political appeals.

The facts about the Red spy capital are in the hands of the Western Big Three delegations to the "summit." West Berlin authorities made sure the U. S., Britain and France had the story before the meeting with Khrushchev began.

[continued from page 53]

300 miles out in space, cameras being perfected for Samos will be able to pick up in good detail objects that measure only 20 feet on the ground. This means that large Russian tanks and even the smallest tactical missiles cannot escape detection.

**Russia's real aim.** With all this just around the corner, say U. S. officials, the Soviets are becoming concerned. These officials see the fuss over the U-2 plane as something that goes deeper than a single incident. What the Russians actually have in mind—these officials say—is to put a halt to U. S. plans to use satellite "spies" to strip away Soviet concealment and secrecy.

The period directly ahead is likely to see more and more useful intelligence reaching these shores. But, even with all sorts of modern gear, including satellites, any intention of Russia to make war can remain hidden.

Officials at the U. S. Central Intelligence Agency are the first to tell you that machines—no matter how sophisticated—can only report Soviet capabilities. They cannot determine what the Soviets are planning.

**A deadly challenge.** So old-fashioned spy methods still come in handy. CIA experts see it this way:

The challenge of cracking open Russian secrecy involves a complex, team operation. Heavy reliance will continue to be placed on so-called cloak-and-dagger agents roaming back streets of the world in search of information useful to this country. But they are only a part of an undertaking so difficult that the same CIA payroll must include "evaluators" with advanced physics degrees, economic analysts, skilled linguists and operators of huge data-processing machines.

CIA also receives and co-ordinates intelligence picked up by the espionage units of the U. S. military services. These, of course, maintain their own world-wide operations against the Russians.

Then there are the U. S. Allies. With these friendly nations, there is an exchange of diplomatic intelligence, aimed at pooling political know-how. This helps strengthen U. S. ability to figure out how the Soviets intend to use their vast power.

This effort to bring Soviet secrets into the open has no end. In the "cold war" it is a deadly, painstaking challenge—and vital to America's survival. What it all adds up to is a hot front that gives no signs of cooling off.

*Related articles on spying: pages 55, 58, 60, 85 and 104.*

**The Great Spy Game****AERIAL SPYING—AN OLD STORY**

Nearly five years ago, "U. S. News & World Report" published an article by an outstanding authority on aerial reconnaissance who forecast U. S. flights over Russia and told how such flights could be made.

Writing in connection with President Eisenhower's "open skies" plan, which he helped to develop, Col. Richard S. Leghorn of the U. S. Air Force Reserve in the Aug. 5, 1955, issue said, in part:

Aerial spying seems drastically new. Yet peacetime spying is considered normal between nations. It is diplomatic practice to admit military attachés who gather military intelligence. Certainly there is no reason to regard aerial spying as any more provocative than conventional espionage, such as the Klaus Fuchs and similar cases.

Aerial spying on the Soviet Union—done covertly and without Soviet permission—can be carried out with a very, very small probability of loss and with great gains for the West.

During World War II, high-flying reconnaissance planes, alone and unarmed, suffered fewer combat losses than any other type. And, since then, the techniques available for reducing the probability of detection and interception have been greatly advanced.

Any aerial reconnaissance that we conduct over the Soviet Union must be extremely difficult or even impossible to detect. I, for one, firmly believe that we *can* conduct such reconnaissance missions over Soviet territory without their being able to do anything about it—with very rare exceptions.

We can easily have airplanes with the necessary characteristics, to fly high and fast, for long distances.

The aeronautical arts are advancing so fast that the

performance of a few hand-tooled reconnaissance aircraft can be maintained through the years substantially superior to any air-defense system around an area as vast as the Soviet Union.

As an example of what can be done even in the face of overwhelming air superiority, toward the end of World War II the Germans flew at will over England, using hand-modified Ju-88s for photo-reconnaissance missions.

If the Soviets are provoked by reconnaissance into a major attempt to improve their air defense, we can only gain by their draining engineering and production talents from offensive to defensive activities.

Most importantly, knowledge that we can perform aerial inspection regardless of Soviet military opposition will be *the most significant factor* in bringing the Soviets to eventual acceptance of the President's proposal [see below].

The President's offer of mutual aerial inspection has at last seized for the West the initiative in the "cold war." If we press this advantage hard, we can win a major cold-war battle—perhaps decisive enough to turn the tide truly toward complete, universal and enforceable disarmament.

We have the required reconnaissance techniques, particularly aerial photographic methods.

We have paint developed early in World War II which hides from the human eye an aircraft flying at high altitude.

We have methods to tell us about the Soviet radar network—where, when and how it operates—so that we can arrange frequently to avoid it, slip through it or frustrate it. With research, we can develop better material and shapes for aircraft surfaces that will absorb or scatter radar beams so as to make radar detection of reconnaissance aircraft quite difficult.

Aerial reconnaissance is particularly needed against the Soviet totalitarian state, because other methods of collecting information and data operate under extreme difficulties.

**THE "OPEN SKIES" PLAN THAT RUSSIA REFUSED**

President Eisenhower first described his "open skies" plan—which he intends to offer again at the "summit" meeting in Paris—at a big-power conference in Geneva on July 21, 1955.

*In the President's own words:*

I propose, therefore, that we [U. S. and Russia] take a practical step, that we begin an arrangement, very quickly, as between ourselves—immediately. These steps would include:


To give to each other a complete blueprint of our military establishments, from beginning to end, from one end of our countries to the other, lay out the establishments and provide the blueprints to each other.

Next, to provide within our countries facilities for aerial photography to the other country—we to provide you the facilities within our country, ample facilities for aerial reconnaissance, where you can make all the pictures you choose and take them to your country to study, you to provide exactly the same facilities for us and we to make these examinations, and by this step to convince the world that we are providing as between ourselves against the possibility of great surprise attack, thus lessening danger and relaxing tension.

Likewise, we will make more easily attainable a comprehensive and effective system of inspection and disarmament, because what I propose, I assure you, would be but a beginning.



# EISENHOWER: "NO ONE WANTS ANOTHER PEARL HARBOR"



**In measured words President Eisenhower makes it clear why the U. S. considers flights over Russia, and other activities, vital at present. What follows is the President's own statement of U. S. policies in the "spy game."**

*Full text of President Eisenhower's statement on the American plane downed in the Soviet Union, as given to his news conference on May 11, 1960:*

**The President:** I have made some notes from which I want to talk to you about this U-2 incident.

A full statement about this matter has been made by the State Department, and there have been several statesmen-like remarks by leaders of both parties.

For my part, I supplement what the Secretary of State has had to say with the following four main points. After that I shall have nothing further to say—for the simple reason I can think of nothing to add that might be useful at this time.

The first point is this: The need for intelligence-gathering activities.

No one wants another Pearl Harbor. This means that we must have knowledge of military forces and preparations around the world, especially those capable of massive surprise attacks.

Secrecy in the Soviet Union makes this essential. In most of the world no large-scale attack could be prepared in secret, but in the Soviet Union there is a fetish of secrecy and concealment. This is a major cause of international tension and uneasiness today. Our deterrent must never be placed in jeopardy. The safety of the whole free world demands this.

As the Secretary of State pointed out in his recent state-

ment, ever since the beginning of my Administration I have issued directives to gather, in every feasible way, the information required to protect the United States and the free world against surprise attack and to enable them to make effective preparations for defense.

My second point: The nature of intelligence-gathering activities.

These have a special and secret character. They are, so to speak, "below the surface" activities.

They are secret because they must circumvent measures designed by other countries to protect secrecy of military preparations.

They are divorced from the regular visible agencies of government, which stay clear of operational involvement in specific, detailed activities.

These elements operate under broad directives to seek and gather intelligence short of the use of force—with operations supervised by responsible officials within this area of secret activities.

We do not use our Army, Navy or Air Force for this purpose, first, to avoid any possibility of the use of force in connection with these activities, and, second, because our military forces, for obvious reasons, cannot be given latitude under broad directives but must be kept under strict control in every detail.

These activities have their own rules and methods of concealment which seek to mislead and obscure—just as in the Soviet allegations there are many discrepancies. For example, there is some reason to believe that the plane in question was not shot down at high altitude. The normal agencies of our Government are unaware of these specific activities or of the special efforts to conceal them.

Third point: How should we view all of this activity? It is a distasteful but vital necessity.

We prefer and work for a different kind of world—and a different way of obtaining the information essential to confidence and effective deterrents. Open societies, in the day of present weapons, are the only answer.

This was the reason for my "open skies" proposal in 1955, which I was ready instantly to put into effect—to permit aerial observation over the United States and the Soviet Union which would assure that no surprise attack was being prepared against anyone. I shall bring up the "open skies" proposal again in Paris—since it is a means of ending concealment and suspicion.

My final point is that we must not be distracted from the real issues of the day by what is an incident or a symptom of the world situation today.

This incident has been given great propaganda exploitation. The emphasis given to a flight of an unarmed nonmilitary plane can only reflect a fetish of secrecy.

The real issues are the ones we will be working on "at the summit"—disarmament, search for solutions affecting Germany and Berlin, and the whole range of East-West relations, including the reduction of secrecy and suspicion.

Frankly, I am hopeful that we may make progress on these great issues. This is what we mean when we speak of "working for peace."

And, as I remind you, I will have nothing further to say about this matter.

**[END]**



# PEOPLE

## OF THE WEEK

### AMERICA'S SPY PILOT Prisoner Francis Powers

The No. 1 "war prisoner" at this stage of the "cold war" is a 30-year-old man from the South, Francis G. Powers.

Born in Kentucky, Mr. Powers is to be tried as a spy by Soviet authorities. He was the pilot of the U.S. reconnaissance plane that the Kremlin boasts was shot out of the sky over Central Russia by a rocket. Mr. Powers, a former Air Force officer, is listed as an employee of the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, assigned to the National Space and Aeronautics Administration.


Russia's announcement that Mr. Powers will be "brought to account" presumably means a trial in a Soviet court with all the fixtures of a Communist propaganda show.

There is little in Mr. Powers's background that seems to fit the pattern of the central figure in a spy trial. He was a good student, an athlete and a popular youth in high school at Grundy, Va., and at Milligan College, Johnson City, Ky. After duty as an enlisted man in the Korean War, he transferred to the Air Force cadet program.

For four years, Lieutenant Powers served as a jet-fighter pilot, always at bases in the United States. In 1956 he resigned his commission. His family, including his wife, believed he was engaged solely in weather and research flights for the Lockheed Corporation.

In the historic controversy now swirling about Francis G. Powers and the flight he made, the future of the 30-year-old flier is full of trouble.

### THE STORY OF ALLEN DULLES AND THE CIA



Allen Dulles

Americans now know more than ever before about the deadly serious spy game in the world—and who is playing it for the U. S.

They have just learned, for instance, that for the last four years Allen Dulles and the Central Intelligence Agency he heads have been sending planes high over Russia to take photographs.

Mr. Dulles is an old hand at espionage. He began more than 40 years ago in Vienna, before the U. S. got into World War I.

Spying then was more glamorous, less technical. In World War II, Mr. Dulles made the transition from social to military espionage.

In May, 1943, he sent the first U.S. spy plane over Germany and established an experimental station at Peenemünde. He was the chief U.S. spy in Europe at the time, operating from Switzerland. Among other things, he set up a network of hundreds of agents in Nazi Germany and 10 other countries. He got a special medal for being first to realize German forces in Italy were ready to quit, and helping to arrange their surrender.

Intelligence experts around the world knew the Allen Dulles record. When he joined the CIA in 1951 as Deputy Director, the Soviet newspaper "Pravda" said: "... if the spy Allen Dulles should arrive in Heaven through somebody's absent-mindedness, he would begin to blow up the clouds and the stars and slaughter the angels."

Mr. Dulles became CIA's Director in 1953. The agency had been created by Congress in 1947, to make sure that the U. S. never again would be caught short as it had been at Pearl Harbor. Congressmen were alarmed by revelations that the U. S. had all the information

necessary in 1941 to predict a Japanese attack, but that there was no system to pull all the information together and sound a warning.

Congress gave CIA a broad charter. Only a handful of Congressmen know how much it spends. Few know how many people work for CIA. The best estimates are that CIA itself spends half a billion dollars a year and employs many of the 100,000 or more people who work at U. S. intelligence activities around the world.

An enormous flow of scientific, economic, political and military information crosses CIA desks daily. CIA is building a new 46-million-dollar headquarters outside Washington to house its growing staff.

From the mass of information, CIA prepares a daily intelligence summary for the President, daily briefings for key Government leaders, a half-hour weekly briefing for the National Security Council. These summaries and briefings play an important role when the President, the Cabinet and the National Security Council make big decisions for the nation.

(Related articles on spying, pages 46, 55, 58, 60, 85 and 104.)

### New CIA Headquarters takes shape in the Washington suburbs

USN&WR Photo



TAB

## EDITORIAL

The whole truth of Francis Gary Powers' 1,400-mi. penetration of the Soviet Union in a Lockheed U-2 on a Central Intelligence Agency mission of photo and electronic reconnaissance has not yet been told. It may never emerge from the welter of official lies pouring from Moscow and Washington.

Nevertheless, there are some points that have already emerged from this adventure that are worth examining. Let us start with the fabrications that have been bullroared from the rostrum of the Supreme Soviet by Nikita Khrushchev because they reveal much about his fears and problems over the current state of the world.

Mr. Khrushchev's most blatant lie is his statement that the U-2 was hit by a Red Army anti-aircraft missile at an altitude of 65,000 ft. near Sverdlovsk after it had penetrated the air defenses of the Soviet Union for some 1,400 mi. This lie was necessary because the citizens of the USSR could understandably grow uneasy over the admitted ability of the U-2 and other specialized aircraft to penetrate Soviet airspace consistently with impunity. The spectacle of Soviet air defense system futility for the last four years in trying to stop these penetrations must provide a chilling counterpoint for Soviet citizens to the bellicose blustering of their leader over the aggressive strength of his military power.

The fact is, and Mr. Khrushchev undoubtedly knows it, that Powers' U-2 had an engine flameout at the altitude that it and other U-2 aircraft cruised safely beyond the reach of the Soviet air defense system. The flameout forced Powers to descend below 40,000 ft. where the denser atmosphere made an attempt to restart his jet engine feasible. Either Power failed to restart his engine or his plane was damaged at this relatively low altitude by the Red Army missile men to whom Mr. Khrushchev awarded medals.

Another obvious lie was used to bolster this originally false claim for the Soviet air defense system. A picture of some badly battered scrap from an Aeroflot Tu-104 crash near Sverdlovsk last February was officially released by the Soviets labeled as the U-2 wreckage to convey an impression of terrible damage wrought by the anti-aircraft missile. When this fake was exposed by Lockheed's U-2 designer, C. L. "Kelly" Johnson, the remains of the genuine U-2 were finally produced for an exhibition in Moscow's Gorki Park.

Further contradiction of the missile hit scored at 65,000 ft. was the Soviets' own claim that they recovered most of the U-2 photo and electronic reconnaissance equipment in good condition, were able to examine the cockpit ejection system in detail and to retrieve miscellaneous gear from the cockpit intact.

Mr. Khrushchev has good reason to worry about the ability of the U-2 and other aircraft to skim over his huge air defense system. For it must come as a real shocker to Soviet citizens, fed a steady diet of propaganda on the superiority of Soviet military might, to hear the admissions from Mr. Khrushchev and Andrei Gromyko that these U-2 flights have been going on successfully for at least four years. The Soviet citizens must wonder, if

## Lockheed U-2 Over Sverdlovsk:

this is true, how much credence they can place in the assurances they receive from Mr. Khrushchev that manned bombers are obsolete and cannot penetrate the Soviet air defense system. Even if his claim of a missile hit at Sverdlovsk was true, how does Mr. Khrushchev explain a 1,400-mi. penetration from the Pakistan border to the Urals?

It is obvious that Mr. Khrushchev does not really believe his own claims about the difficulty of manned bomber penetration into the USSR because he has been pushing a gigantic expansion of his air defense system for the past several years. This includes new improved surveillance, and ground control intercept radar, passive detection systems, new interceptors and a tremendous program of new anti-aircraft missile installations around key military and industrial areas. If Mr. Khrushchev really believed the Strategic Air Command B-47, B-52 and B-58 fleet of manned bombers were as ineffective as he publicly blusters, he would hardly waste the vast resources that he has and is still putting into his air defense system.

Nor is Mr. Khrushchev telling the truth when he announces that the Soviets have switched completely from bombers to ballistic missiles and that they no longer are producing or developing or exercising bombers because they are obsolete for modern warfare. The USSR is still producing long range jet bombers, although at far from maximum possible rates. It is developing new supersonic bombers and a nuclear-powered bomber and it is exercising its current operational jet bomber fleet at an accelerated rate in long distance Arctic missions. Mr. Khrushchev would like us to believe his lies on the future of the bomber in the Soviet arsenal. This belief would encourage the trend, already started, toward cutting back our own air defense system.

Mr. Khrushchev is also ignoring some pertinent facts when he stresses the "provocative" nature of the U-2 flights. The Soviet espionage system in this country has been exposed in many aspects of its hydra-headed operation. The record from the atomic secret snitching of Klaus Fuchs to the cozy Brooklyn espionage nest operated by the Soviet Col. Abel has offered ample provocation for anything this country cares to make of it.

The Soviets are fighting the reconnaissance war with every method at their disposal all around the periphery of the Iron Curtain, cutting transatlantic cables off Newfoundland, grappling for Caesar anti-submarine warfare stations, fishing for nose cones off Ascension Island, monitoring the Atlantic Missile Range communications, shadowing Polaris submarines and conducting electronic reconnaissance on our frontiers by trawler, submarine and aircraft. The Soviets do not require deep penetration of the United States for photo reconnaissance because of the availability of this information from public sources and their espionage system. Their prime need is for electronic intelligence and this they are gathering with every means at their disposal.

# Aviation Week

## and Space Technology

May 16, 1960

Vol. 72, No. 20  
Member ABP and ABC

EDITORIAL OFFICES: New York 36—330 W. 42nd St., Phone: LOnacre 4-3000 (Nights LO 4-3035) Washington 4, D. C.—National Press Bldg., Phones: National 8-3414, REpublic 7-6630 Los Angeles 17—1125 West Sixth St., Phone: HUntley 2-5450 Dallas 1—1712 Commerce St., Phone: RIverside 7-5117 European Office—1 rue du Temple, Geneva, Switzerland, Phone: 32-35-63

PUBLISHER.....Robert W. Martin, Jr.  
EDITOR.....Robert B. Hotz

MANAGING EDITOR.....William Gregory  
EUROPEAN EDITOR.....David A. Anderton  
WASHINGTON.....Cecil Brownlow  
NEW YORK.....Harry Raven, Herbert J. Coleman,  
John A. Nammack  
LOS ANGELES.....Irving Stone, Richard Sweeney,  
Russell Hawkes, William S. Reed  
DALLAS.....Erwin J. Bulban  
ENGINEERING.....Robert I. Stanfield,  
J. S. Butz, Jr., Michael Yaffee  
AVIONICS.....Philip J. Klass, Barry Miller  
CONGRESS.....Ford Eastman, Katherine Johnsen  
SPACE TECHNOLOGY.....Evert Clark, Craig Lewis  
TRANSPORT.....L. L. Doty, Glenn Garrison,  
Robert H. Cook, David H. Hoffman  
EQUIPMENT.....Barry Tully  
BUSINESS FLYING.....Erwin J. Bulban  
ART EDITOR.....Lawrence J. Herb  
ASST. ART EDITOR.....Karl G. Neuman  
SPECIAL PROJECTS.....Andrew A. Keil  
EDITORIAL PRODUCTION.....Arnold Sherman  
ASSISTANT EDITORS.....Elizabeth M. Hein,  
Edith Walford  
EDITORIAL ASSISTANTS.....Marjorie Nall,  
Jerome Bailey, Marjorie Todd  
LIBRARIAN.....Theresa V. Maggio

## FOREIGN NEWS SERVICE

EDITOR.....John Wilhelm  
LONDON.....John Tunstall  
PARIS.....Robert E. Farrell  
BONN.....Morrie Helitzer  
MEXICO CITY.....Peter Weaver  
TOKYO.....Sol Sanders

## DOMESTIC NEWS BUREAUS

ATLANTA 3.....1301 Rhodes-Haverty Bldg.  
CHICAGO 11.....520 No. Michigan Ave.  
CLEVELAND 15.....1510 Hanna Bldg.  
DETROIT 26.....856 Penobscot Bldg.  
HOUSTON 25.....W-724 Prudential Bldg.  
SAN FRANCISCO 4.....68 Post St.

## SALES

ADVERTISING SALES MANAGER  
E. P. Blanchard, Jr.  
ATLANTA.....R. H. Powell  
BOSTON.....A. C. Boughton  
CHICAGO and ST. LOUIS.....J. S. Costello,  
D. C. Jackson  
CLEVELAND.....T. H. Hunter, Jr.  
DALLAS.....R. T. Wood  
DENVER.....John G. Patten  
DETROIT.....R. R. Butera  
LOS ANGELES.....C. F. McReynolds,  
D. T. Brennan, C. A. Ransdell  
NEW YORK.....M. J. Storz, J. M. Grinton,  
R. Wallace, J. D. Warth  
PHILADELPHIA.....J. D. Willis, W. L. Blanchard  
PITTSBURGH.....H. P. Johnson  
SAN FRANCISCO.....William Woolston

PROMOTION & RESEARCH MGR.....C. C. Gersna  
EUROPEAN MARKETING DIRECTOR.....Fulvio Piovano

RESEARCH & MARKETING  
Jacqueline Gonnet

## BUSINESS

BUSINESS MANAGER.....J. G. Johnson  
CIRCULATION MANAGER.....T. J. Lucey  
ASST. BUSINESS MANAGER.....W. V. Cockren  
PRODUCTION MANAGER.....

**U. S. to Continue U-2 Flights Over Soviet**..... 26  
► 'Rocket' boasts of Russians largely discounted; loss of plane attributed to flameout of engine.

**Airlines Protest FAA Recorder Ruling**..... 38  
► ATA battles proposal on grounds expense will not justify the 'slight benefits' to investigations.

**Component Reliability Practices Proposed**..... 53  
► Joint Defense Department-industry study is aimed at improving component quality, cutting development times.

## SPACE TECHNOLOGY

Space Pilot Capabilities..... 66  
Pioneer V-Data Transmission..... 34  
Mercury Capsule Flight Test..... 37  
Aeronautic Lunar Vehicle..... 69  
Saturn Engine Static Firing..... 73  
Tiros Orbital Heating..... 75  
Deep-Space Tracking Facility..... 83

## MISSILE ENGINEERING

Titan Second Stage Ignition..... 36  
USAF Plan For ST..... 36  
Army Weapon Demonstration..... 84  
Navy Project Hydra..... 87

## AERONAUTICAL ENGINEERING

U-2 Flights to Be Continued..... 26  
Brantly B-2 Pilot Report..... 111  
Extreme Cleaness Marks U-2..... 28  
Bell HU-1A Production..... 132  
New Morane-Saulnier Jet..... 35  
Soviets Exploit U-2..... 30  
Ike Approves U-2 Missions..... 32  
U-2 Operational Chronology..... 33  
Production Briefing..... 123

## EQUIPMENT

Cargo Packs for Jets..... 138  
USAF Adapts Cartridge Starter..... 142  
New Aviation Products..... 144  
What's New..... 145

## AIR TRANSPORT

FAA Recorder Ruling..... 38  
MATS Procurement Plan..... 39  
Lockheed Completes Electra Test..... 40  
FAA Idlewild Jet Noise Rules..... 41  
TWA 707 Damaged in Landing..... 41  
Eastern Interested in Boeing 727..... 43  
Britannia Crash Cause Undetermined..... 45  
Caravelle Versions Include Fan Engines Shortlines..... 51  
Airline Observer..... 47

## MANAGEMENT

Procurement Changes Asked..... 125  
Who's Where..... 23  
Industry Observer..... 23  
Washington Roundup..... 25  
News Digest..... 37

## FINANCIAL

United Plans 1963-65 Jet Orders..... 91  
Aerospace Firms List Salaries..... 102  
Airlines List Officers' Salaries..... 105  
Lockheed Stock Dividend..... 95  
Acquisitions & Mergers..... 98  
Financial Briefs..... 98  
New Offerings..... 99

## AVIONICS

Component Reliability Practices..... 53  
Micromodule Environmental Tests..... 59  
Filter Center..... 64  
New Avionic Products..... 64  
Calendar..... 5  
Letters..... 158

## EDITORIAL

U-2 Over Sverdlovsk; Fact and Fiction... 20

**COVER:** Tiros I satellite's wide-angle camera lens photographed this section of earth, showing the Nile (left) and the Red Sea (center), and relayed the image to earth. Note earth's curvature at upper left.

## PICTURE CREDITS

Cover—NASA; 28, 29—E. J. Bulban, Aviation Week; 30—United Press (top), Sovfoto (center), Wide World (bottom); 34, 87—USAF; 35—Morane-Saulnier; 36, 37—Martin; 39, 66, 77, 107—Lockheed; 53—U. S. Navy; 55—Lear Inc.; 58—International Telephone & Telegraph; 69—Aeronutronic; 73, 78—NASA; 75—International Rectifier Corp.; 84, 85—U. S. Army; 85 (center)—United Press; 88—Hughes Aircraft Co.; 109—North American; 111, 113, 115, 117—Brantly Helicopter Corp.; 119—Convair, Kaman; 121—Saunders-Roe; 132, 133—Bell Helicopter Corp.; 138—Pan American; 142—AirResearch Mfg. Division; 126—Bristol Aircraft Ltd.

satellite systems. Eisenhower replied, "Well, I know of nothing—now, I keep in touch with my scientific advisory committee and operators, and I know of nothing we could do to speed these up. They are research items and, as such, no one can predict exactly what would be their degree of efficiency. So I couldn't make a real prediction of what is going to be."

In reply to another question as to whether the satellite systems "will ease our worries on the question of secrecy," the President said:

"Well, I say, I just can't predict what the final results will be. Now, we do know this, right now. I believe constantly pictures on the cloud cover all around the earth, and that is admittedly a rather rough example of what might be done in photography. But that is being done constantly, and I don't know how many thousands of photographs have been taken, and they send them back on command."


## U-2 Developmental and Operational Chronology

Following is a chronology of the developmental and operational cycles of the Lockheed U-2:

- Mid-1954—Lockheed began the design of the U-2.
- Late 1955—After flight tests had proven the capabilities of the U-2, the Air Force purchased several of the aircraft for a joint USAF-Atomic Energy Commission high-altitude research program.
- Early 1956—National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, which had assisted Lockheed in the original design, began planning a high altitude meteorological research program around the U-2 and other aircraft. U-2s operated by NACA were owned by the Air Force and bailed to the civil agency under the arrangement used for the majority of its research aircraft.
- Early 1956—Air Force formed its first U-2 squadron, the Weather Reconnaissance Squadron, Provisional (1st). It first operated from Watertown Strip, Nev., and assisted the USAF-AEC and NACA research programs which occupied the same airfield but were separate.
- Feb. 16, 1956—U-2 crashed in Arizona after fire started in cockpit. Pilot Robert J. Everett bailed out at about 30,000 ft. Everett was a Lockheed employee flying for NACA with NACA pilot number 357.
- May 7, 1956—NACA announces start of its high altitude gust-meteorological research program.
- May 22, 1956—NACA announces it is making preparations to begin the portion of its research program covering the European area. First U-2 operations in Europe were to be from USAF bases in England with the Air Force Air Weather Service providing logistical support. All planes were civilian with civilian contract pilots.
- July 9, 1956—NACA reported that the initial high-altitude weather data gathered by the U-2 had been processed and that it had proved the value of the aircraft as a research tool.
- Sept. 17, 1956—U-2 crashed near Kaiserlautern, West Germany. Pilot was Howard Carey, a Lockheed employee.
- February, 1957—NACA released first U-2 pictures.
- Mar. 27, 1957—NACA published Research Memorandum RM L57A11 entitled "Preliminary Measurements of Atmospheric Turbulence at High Altitude as Determined From Acceleration Measurements on a Lockheed U-2 Airplane." This report was unclassified, as are all other reports concerning the high-altitude weather program.
- April, 1957—U-2 crashed in isolated region of northwest Nevada killing Lockheed engineering test pilot Robert L. Sieker.
- July 2, 1957—NACA report RM L57G02 was written entitled "Airplane Measurements of Atmospheric Turbulence at Altitudes from 20,000 to 55,000 ft. over the Western Part of the United States," which contained more data taken by a U-2.
- May, 1958—Articles published in the Soviet air force newspaper Soviet Aviation indicated that Red Air Force intelligence was concerned over U. S. operations with the U-2. One article complained that the U-2 "lacks all identification marks indicating its mission." The Soviet writer then suggested that strategic reconnaissance was included among the high-altitude research activities of U-2s based at Wiesbaden, West Germany.
- March, 1958—Japanese magazine Air Review ran pictures of

U-2s landing in Japan reportedly taken by a 16-year-old boy standing at the end of the runway.

- Apr. 17, 1959—NASA personnel finished third report on U-2 weather research data. This paper, NASA Memo 41759L, was entitled "Airplane Measurement of Atmospheric Turbulence at Altitudes From 20,000 to 55,000 ft. for Four Geographic Areas." These areas were Western Europe and England, Turkey, U. S. and Japan.
- Sept. 24, 1959—U-2 made an emergency belly-landing with slight damage at Fugisawa airfield while it was attempting to land at its base at Atsugi Airport near Tokyo. Six U-2s were based in Japan at the time, and it was reported that at least some of them flew almost every day.
- Nov. 28, 1959—New York Journal-American published an article by George Carroll on U. S. reconnaissance over Russia which suggested that U-2 flights were used for this purpose.
- Dec. 12, 1959—Article in Soviet Aviation discussed U. S. strategic reconnaissance activity with the U-2 and gave some of the design details of the aircraft. The Soviet newspaper quoted Carroll's article and other material which had appeared in Model Airplane News in March, 1958.
- May 3, 1960—U-2 based at Adana, Turkey, reported missing since May 1 on weather mission in Lake Van region near the eastern border of Turkey by U. S. officials in Adana. Report says the civilian, Lockheed-employed pilot had radioed he was experiencing trouble with his oxygen equipment. Missing plane was officially assigned to NASA.
- May 5, 1960—Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev tells the Supreme Soviet that a U. S. aircraft has been shot down over Russia. NASA's Washington headquarters reports that it had been told the U-2 missing in the Lake Van region may have strayed over the Soviet border while the pilot was unconscious because of lack of oxygen.
- May 6, 1960—State Department said, "There was no deliberate attempt to violate Soviet airspace and there has never been."
- May 7, 1960—Khrushchev retorts that the aircraft was downed near Sverdlovsk well inside the Soviet Union, that the pilot had been captured alive and admitted attempting a photo-reconnaissance mission across the Soviet Union from Pakistan to Norway. U. S. State Department then issued a statement acknowledging that "an unarmed civilian" aircraft probably had made an information-gathering flight over Soviet territory. It denied that authorization came from Washington.
- May 9, 1960—Secretary of State Christian Herter admits that U. S. reconnaissance planes have collected information on the Soviet Union by flying along its borders and "on occasion by penetration." Herter indicates the U. S. will continue such flights, which, he says, are conducted under broad directives from President Eisenhower.
- May 10, 1960—Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko issues a formal note of protest over the U-2 incident to the U. S. Embassy in Moscow.
- May 11, 1960—President Eisenhower at his weekly press conference gives tacit approval to reconnaissance flights over the Soviet Union and the reasons the U. S. believes they are necessary.



## Minuteman ICBM Tethered Test Vehicle Fired From Silo

Minuteman ICBM test vehicle is fired from a silo at Edwards AFB, Calif., in one of seven successful silo launchings (AW May 9, p. 28). Improvised nose cone is for ballast. The vehicle is restrained by a nylon tether which interrupts the flight after a few seconds.

### Space Technology

## Pioneer Switched to 150-Watt Unit

Washington—Pioneer V began broadcasting space data through its 150-watt transmitter last week, but battery troubles have dimmed prospects of getting useful data from the space probe at distances as great as the hoped for 50 million mi. (AW May 9, p. 32).

National Aeronautics and Space Administration turned on the 150-watt transmitter after data broadcast from the five-watt transmitter became almost useless and when it became apparent that the probe's batteries are degenerating. Pioneer V was 8,001,000 mi. from earth when the 250-ft. Jodrell Bank radio telescope at Manchester, England, commanded the first transmission from the 150-watt unit.

Since the larger transmitter draws a great deal more power than the five-watt unit, ground stations can interrogate the probe for only a few minutes every six to eight hours. Broadcasts begin when battery power is at 18 volts, and the system has an automatic cutoff that terminates transmission when power drops below 15 volts. This was cutting off transmissions from the five-watt transmitter just before the shift was made to the larger unit, and last week it was limiting transmissions to about a minute and a half.

NASA deduces from this relatively-rapid power drop that the 28 battery

cells are leaking. One theory is that the ambient gas in the batteries is leaking after two months in space.

Following the switch, Manchester could receive data at the rate of either 8 or 64 bits per sec. Both Manchester and the station at South Point, Hawaii, were taking data at one bit per second before the switch. The data received at Hawaii had been unusable for two weeks, and the data at Manchester had become very poor.

The station in Hawaii will continue to receive data at one bit per second. At this rate, it takes 44 min. to get a complete readout of data on the seven channels stored by the Pioneer V telemetry system. A complete readout can be obtained in 1.5 min. at 8 bits per sec. and in 12 sec. at the 64-bit rate. As distance increases, Hawaii will be out of range and Manchester will be reduced to receiving one bit per second. Diminishing power will make it difficult to obtain data at that rate.

The five-watt transmitter had broadcast 109 hr. of data before the change was made to the 150-watt unit. At its highest rate, the smaller unit broadcast 2.5 hr. of data in a single day; it was down to about 68 min. just before the change. NASA can get only about four minutes of data a day from the larger transmitter because of its greater power

demands and weakening power supply.

Manchester station commanded the 150-watt transmitter on and received the first transmission about 1.5 min. later, the time it took for the command signal to reach the probe and for the responding broadcast to reach earth. This initial transmission followed a sequence of command signals which prepared the 150-watt system for use.

The day before the first transmission, Manchester commanded power into the tubes through a resistor, warming the filaments for about a minute. Six hours later, this step was repeated without the resistor, supplying full filament heating for several minutes. First transmission command was sent from Manchester early the following day, May 8.

Transmitter and its converter operated after remaining idle in space for two months. Packaged in the probe by Space Technology Laboratories, the transmitter was constructed by Spectrolabs, Inc. It uses Radio Corp. of America tubes and is served by a converter built by Engineered Magnetics, Inc., a division of Gulton Industries, Inc.

Earlier, a malfunction had been detected in the Pioneer V system, and a means was devised of compensating for it in analyzing the data. Bad component was a diode in a temperature-sensing system which produced a battery temperature reading too low for an operating battery. Since the batteries were operating, the trouble was traced to the temperature-monitoring system.

## Study in Fabrication

When we turn to the record of our own government agencies involved in the U-2 adventure the record of deliberate falsification is equally bad. The series of inter-agency bumbles gives us a queasy feeling over what might happen in a real emergency with survival or defeat hinging on the speed and acumen of the official reaction.

First, there are the ivory tower researchers of the old NACA now with NASA who had their hard-won reputation for scientific integrity shredded overnight by the exposure of their role as unwitting dupes of the Central Intelligence Agency. They saw no reason to sniff suspiciously at an offer of a free research program for high altitude weather and gust loading research from the military. This bailment of military aircraft to NACA was traditional, since NACA had no budget of its own for this purpose. NACA wrote the test program requirements, sporadically got back data from missions executed according to its specifications and apparently never did much analytical research into the geographic locations of the U-2s or the isolation of the agency from any contact with their personnel. NACA, and later NASA, dutifully published three technical reports in four years on this work and worked happily in the traditional role of the piano player in a baguio who was never told what was going on upstairs.

This coupling of CIA (which Washington wags are now saying stands for Caught in the Act) with NASA in an international espionage venture will badly damage, if not altogether destroy, the fine foundation NASA was organizing for international cooperation in the scientific exploration of space. NASA can hardly blame foreign nations already solicited in this program for inquiring as to how much of a tracking station, launching site or payload instrumentation is earmarked for CIA missions. Nor can they be blamed for politely declining to take a chance with an agency that apparently doesn't know all it should about its own activities.

This damage to NASA's scientific integrity may count for little in the calloused calculations of CIA super-sleuths, but it will do irreparable harm in the international scientific community where this country has many of its staunchest friends.

Second is the spectacle of the State Department turning a complete slow motion somersault from the flat lie that "there was no deliberate attempt to violate the Soviet airspace and there never has been," to a mousy admission that there might have been such flights but that they "were not authorized by Washington," to a final complete admission that the U-2 penetrations were in fact an integral part of U.S. national policy. What the State Department can command as a credibility factor in future roles as a U.S. spokesman will be interesting to see.

The official U.S. policy as finally stated by President

Eisenhower some 10 days after Powers' U-2 hit the Siberian earth also carries some future forebodings.

It officially commits the United States to a continuous and deliberate policy of violating the Soviet airspace and formally makes espionage an integral part of U.S. policy. Although virtually every American citizen can see the need for continuous surveillance of the Soviet Union by whatever effective methods are available and will tacitly support these efforts, it is quite another matter to publicly announce that espionage and violation of another country's territory have become an official policy.

This policy, which is unprecedented in the history of nations, leaves our allies in an untenable position and forces the Soviets to carry this matter much further than they may have originally intended. It appears to be another one of those hasty, poorly thought out, improvised policies aimed at a quick fix with not much thought for future consequences or other implications.

Third, of course, comes the Central Intelligence Agency, in this incident stripped of all its protective secrecy, and standing nakedly exposed in an incredibly amateurish performance compounded from inadequate training, faulty execution and rather transparent cover operations. Apparently, all that was adequately provided in this operation was the \$30,000-a-year salaries for the pilots. Whatever reasons impelled Francis Powers to decline to carry out the traditional self-destruction orders of the espionage agent apprehended red-handed by the enemy may never be known. Suffice to say his embarrassing survival was not in the best tradition of either USAF, the agency that originally trained him, or CIA, the agency that hired him without training him properly in its specialized requirements.

The need for a congressional or some other "watch-dog" operation over CIA was never more apparent.

Finally the most important aspect of the U-2 episode is the illumination it must shed for most Americans on the simple salient fact that we are in fact fighting a war against the forces of communism. It is a far different war than we have ever fought before and it is being fought with weapons that we are not accustomed to using. The bungling, naivete and innocence our various government agencies have displayed in the U-2 episode show clearly that we are not yet organized for this type of conflict nor do we yet really understand its scope and strategy.

Although too few Americans realize it, we are already deep into this struggle to determine whether the Soviet system or our own will prevail. If we hope to preserve the basic elements of this civilization we cherish, we must dedicate ourselves more thoroughly to this task and organize our national resources and policies more effectively to achieve this goal.

—Robert Hotz



**B.F. Goodrich**

## THERE'S A TAKEOFF IN THAT RUBBER BAG

Douglas Aircraft engineers wanted to store pressurized air for emergency jet engine starting on the DC-8 overseas model. Rather than using valuable space inside the aircraft, they came up with the novel idea of storing air in the cavity in each main landing gear strut.

B.F. Goodrich fabricated leakproof strut liners which hold the air, and protect the metal from moisture. Special rubber provides the ultimate in long life. In service, each bag is charged to 3000 pounds per square inch, enough to provide energy for two engine starts.

Fabricating rubber to meet unusual requirements fits right in with B.F. Goodrich experience...from strut liners and fuel tanks to vapor barriers and De-Icers. Whenever you have a problem that rubber know-how can solve, check with BFG. Write *B.F. Goodrich Aviation Products, a division of The B.F. Goodrich Company, Dept. AW-5C, Akron, Ohio.*

**B.F. Goodrich**  
aviation products





C  
A  
R  
T  
O  
O  
N  
S

MAY 9 1960

BALTIMORE SUN

# Suggested Slogan For Our Cloak And Dagger Masterminds





MAY 11 1960

WASHINGTON Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100090001-4




'Maybe I'll Do a Little Spying of My Own!'

Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100090001-4

"Maybe YOU Could Tell Us Who Ordered That Flight?"



'Somebody Must Have Blacked Out And It Went On Automatic Pilot'





©1960 **MOULDIN**

**"IT'S YOUR FAULT FOR ALWAYS SNEAKING AROUND YOUR YARD."**

## Two Sides to Every Story






1960

NEW YORK  
HERALD TRIBUNE

**"In Case He Brings It Up at the Summit!"**



MAY 11 1960


## While We're on the Subject of "Overflights"



WHILE WE'RE ON THE SUBJECT OF "OVERFLIGHTS"

© 1960, New York Herald Tribune Inc.

**"Some of Our Statecraft Is Missing"**






MAY 19 1960

# **Will the Cloud Pass?** By Rube Goldberg



Weather Plane



# KEEPING THE DOOR OPEN









## Time to Press for Open Sky Policy Again



## Cloak-And-Dagger Man







MAY 2 1960


# His Other German Teacher





## **What Next?**

**By Rube Goldberg**




MAY 18 1960

"We Said We'd Soon Have a Man in Space"



HERBLOCK  
©1960 THE WASHINGTON POST CO.





Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100090001-4


## Soviet Delegation to Paris



© 1960, New York Herald Tribune Inc.

GUESS WHO WANTS TO MAKE CLUBS TRUMPS





Drawn for The Christian Science Monitor by Ami Weiss.

NEW YORK DAILY NEWS

MAY 17 1960





—UPI Radiophoto.


## Plane Comment in Pravda

Cartoon depicting downing of American U-2 "spy" plane,  
which appeared in Pravda, official journal of the Soviet  
Communist party.

THE WORKER

MAY 15 1960

## Allen Dulles Roams the Blue




MAY 1 1964

# INCIDENT BEFORE THE SUMMIT




Herblock in The Washington Post & Times-Herald  
"What's so funny?"



J. J. Jones in The Minneapolis Star  
Special delivery, too!"





—UPI Radiophoto.

## Red Cartoon Comment on Plane Incident

Three-panel cartoon dealing with shot-down American plane, which appeared in yesterday's issue of *Pravda*, official journal of the Soviet Communist party. Panels depict a Soviet rocket downing the "spy plane" and an American subordinate trying to revive his superior officer who had fainted from the "shock" of the news.


NEW YORK TIMES

MAY 15 1960

THE SPY CASE AS TWO COMMUNIST CARTOONISTS SEE IT








Anders in Svenska Dagbladet, Stockholm  
"Ready to take off for the summit."



—World Copyright 1960. By arrangement with the Manchester Guardian.

**'WHO? THE PRESIDENT? WHAT'S HE GOT TO DO WITH IT?'**

## While Everybody Is Watching The Main Attractions



WASHINGTON STAR

MAY 4 1961




'Where Do I Find the Spy Planes, Please?'

# THE CHICKENS THAT FLEW OVER THE FENCE







GRIST

## HOLDING HIS OWN SUMMIT




## Shot Heard 'Round The World!



## You Dirty Bandit!

**By Hesse**






CHICAGO DAILY NEWS

6 May 1960

## Becoming Uninhabitable







This cartoon, which appeared in the Soviet government newspaper Izvestia, shows United States Government officials propelling U-2 Pilot Francis Gary Powers into the air. They are (left to right) CIA Director Allen Dulles, Vice President Nixon, Undersecretary of State

Douglas Dillon, Secretary of State Herter and President Eisenhower. West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer is crouched at right with a range finder.—AP Wirephoto via radio from Moscow.



MAY 23 1960


Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100090001-4

# Russian Ballet—Act II

By Burris Jenkins



Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90T00782R000100090001-4



## Help Wanted . . . Clean-Up Man (Experienced)

